refuse tls hellos that carry encrypted client hello before squid sees them
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1 changed files with 1537 additions and 43 deletions
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@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ not the whole daemon-shared crate.
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`storage` (btrfs subvolumes, quotas, snapshots, disk measurement), `files`
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(pause marker, socket dir, legacy tmpfiles) and `infra` (gateway nginx, forge
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admin, infra containers). `egress` holds four sub-commands that never
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touch the socket, `egress-load`, `egress-pin`, `egress-lease` and `egress-whois`; the
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touch the socket, `egress-load`, `egress-pin`, `egress-lease` and `egress-whois`, and
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`egress_ech` a fifth, `egress-ech-relay`, the long-running ClientHello check in front of
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squid's HTTPS intercept port; the
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`hive-egress` unit, udev, a timer and dnsmasq run the first three to fill the sets of
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the anti-spoofing table and the interception exemptions, and squid runs the last to
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name the agent of an intercepted flow (see
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