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squid blocks a runtime deny list from the controller in every egress mode, ahead of the allow list

This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-11-04 22:00:42 +01:00 • committed by mara
commit dd5fde848f

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@ -613,6 +613,9 @@ impl Policy {
// The egress allow-list (`swarm_wire::egress_allow`): one key, read with
// one direct get, so exactly that subject and no other key of the bucket.
subjects.push(swarm_wire::egress_allow::direct_get_subject());
// The deny list is a second key of that bucket, read the same way; the
// allow-list grant does not cover it, since it names one key.
subjects.push(swarm_wire::egress_allow::deny_direct_get_subject());
// The archetype an agent was created from
// (`swarm_queue_client::agent_archetype`), read the same way and every
// key for the same reason.
@ -984,6 +987,48 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// A hive reads the deny list with its own grant, not the allow-list's, and
/// can change none of it. An agent's token reaches neither key, so nothing an
/// agent holds can write the list a hive enforces.
#[test]
fn a_hive_reads_the_deny_list_and_no_agent_reaches_it() {
use swarm_wire::egress_allow::{
STREAM, deny_direct_get_subject, deny_key_subject, direct_get_subject, key_subject,
};
let p = policy()
.permissions("hive-alpha")
.expect("a hive is admitted");
let may = |subject: &str| p.publish.iter().any(|g| covers(g, subject));
assert!(may(&deny_direct_get_subject()), "cannot read the deny list");
for forbidden in [
deny_key_subject(),
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.PURGE.{STREAM}"),
format!("$JS.API.STREAM.MSG.DELETE.{STREAM}"),
] {
assert!(!may(&forbidden), "hive alpha may publish {forbidden}");
}
let agent = policy()
.with_agent_token_subjects(vec!["$SWARM.term.{agent}".to_owned()])
.expect("a per-agent template is valid")
.agent_token_permissions("atlas")
.expect("configured");
let agent_may = |subject: &str| agent.publish.iter().any(|g| covers(g, subject));
for reached in [
deny_key_subject(),
deny_direct_get_subject(),
key_subject(),
direct_get_subject(),
] {
assert!(!agent_may(&reached), "an agent may publish {reached}");
}
// Control: the lookup finds a subject the agent is granted.
assert!(agent_may(
&swarm_queue_client::operator_profiles::direct_get_subject()
));
}
/// A hive reads any agent's archetype and can change none of them, and the
/// grant reaches no other bucket.
#[test]