correct the ssh revocation docs and say the sign permission is shared
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3 changed files with 30 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -5,11 +5,17 @@ key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. It asks the swarm's secret
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store for a certificate that lasts an hour, and the machine trusts the swarm's
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store for a certificate that lasts an hour, and the machine trusts the swarm's
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SSH certificate authority (CA) instead of a list of keys.
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SSH certificate authority (CA) instead of a list of keys.
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Nothing changes until you do both of these:
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Agent-side, nothing changes until you do both of these:
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1. Switch SSH on for the agent and name the machines it may reach.
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1. Switch SSH on for the agent and name the machines it may reach.
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2. Make each machine trust the CA and list the agents allowed in.
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2. Make each machine trust the CA and list the agents allowed in.
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The permission to get a certificate is in the policy every agent shares, so
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every agent with a store identity can already get a certificate for its own
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name, whether or not you switch SSH on for it. That's harmless: no machine
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trusts a name it doesn't list. Switching SSH on only sets up the key, the
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renewal and the client config.
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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In the agent's config:
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In the agent's config:
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@ -82,9 +88,15 @@ module writes no `authorized_keys`.
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- **One agent from one machine:** remove its name from that user's
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- **One agent from one machine:** remove its name from that user's
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`principals` and deploy the machine. The next login attempt fails.
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`principals` and deploy the machine. The next login attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** delete its cert-auth role
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- **One agent from every machine:** remove its name from every machine's
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`hive-agent-<name>` in the store. It can no longer log in to the store, so
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`principals`. That's the revocation. No swarm-wide switch
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nothing signs for it, and its last certificate lapses within three hours.
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stops signing for an agent that a hive still declares: if you delete
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its cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` in the store, `swarm-controller`
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writes it back within five minutes. Signing stops only once no hive declares
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the agent any more (you destroyed it); the controller then stops renewing
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its store identity, and the identity lapses with its 7-day certificate.
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- **A certificate already issued** stays valid until it expires, at most three
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hours, whatever you remove. Removing a principal blocks new logins at once.
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- **The CA itself:** if the CA key changes, every machine needs the
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- **The CA itself:** if the CA key changes, every machine needs the
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new public key. Nothing replaces the CA by itself.
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new public key. Nothing replaces the CA by itself.
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@ -81,3 +81,14 @@ NixOS then writes `/etc/ssh/authorized_principals.d/<user>` and sets
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Egress. The default `egress.forward = "log"` lets a direct connection from an
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Egress. The default `egress.forward = "log"` lets a direct connection from an
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agent to a machine's SSH port through, and `reject` blocks it; there is no
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agent to a machine's SSH port through, and `reject` blocks it; there is no
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per-agent allowance for it yet.
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per-agent allowance for it yet.
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## Revocation
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Every agent shares the role, which holds nothing per agent, so there is no
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per-agent signing switch. `swarm-controller`'s renewal pass (`agent_renewal.rs`) re-mints
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the store identity, and writes the cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` back, for
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every agent a hive still declares, so deleting the role doesn't stick. Nothing
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in the controller deletes the role when you destroy an agent; the renewal pass
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skips a destroyed agent and its identity lapses with its 7-day
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certificate. A target's `principals` list is the immediate control. A
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certificate already signed stays valid for at most `max_ttl` (180 minutes).
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@ -9,8 +9,9 @@
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# a certificate, the agent's name, so listing an agent here is what lets it in.
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# a certificate, the agent's name, so listing an agent here is what lets it in.
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# No `authorized_keys` entry is written or needed. Removing a name from
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# No `authorized_keys` entry is written or needed. Removing a name from
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# `principals` ends that agent's logins at the next attempt, whatever
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# `principals` ends that agent's logins at the next attempt, whatever
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# certificate it holds; the swarm stops signing for an agent whose store
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# certificate it holds. The swarm has no switch that stops signing for an
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# identity is gone, and the certificates it has lapse within three hours.
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# agent that is still declared; a certificate already signed expires within
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# three hours.
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#
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#
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# The agent's side is ../agent-modules/ssh.nix.
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# The agent's side is ../agent-modules/ssh.nix.
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{
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{
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