Watch
0
0
Fork
You've already forked hyperhive
0

gate ssh signing per agent: ssh permission, signing policy on the login role, ca key endpoint

This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-11-16 18:29:06 +01:00 • committed by mara
commit 910f9a6f50
13 changed files with 805 additions and 57 deletions

View file

@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ pub mod limits;
pub mod messages; pub mod messages;
pub mod permissions; pub mod permissions;
pub mod schedules; pub mod schedules;
pub mod ssh;

View file

@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ pub struct Permissions {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "schema", schema(example = 0, minimum = 0, maximum = 100))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "schema", schema(example = 0, minimum = 0, maximum = 100))]
pub max_repos: Option<u32>, pub max_repos: Option<u32>,
/// Whether the agent may get short-lived SSH certificates from the swarm's SSH
/// CA. Absent in a `GET` means the swarm never set it, which counts as off.
/// Absent in a `PUT` keeps the stored value. The agent's store login role
/// takes the change within five minutes; a certificate already signed stays
/// valid until it expires, at most three hours.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub ssh: Option<bool>,
} }
#[cfg(test)] #[cfg(test)]
@ -56,6 +63,7 @@ mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: None, unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}, },
r#"{"permissions":[]}"#, r#"{"permissions":[]}"#,
), ),
@ -65,6 +73,7 @@ mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: Some(false), unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}, },
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false}"#, r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false}"#,
), ),
@ -74,6 +83,7 @@ mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: Some(false), unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: Some(true), internet_log: Some(true),
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}, },
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false,"internet_log":true}"#, r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false,"internet_log":true}"#,
), ),
@ -83,6 +93,7 @@ mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: None, unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}, },
r#"{"permissions":["messaging","manage_root_agent"]}"#, r#"{"permissions":["messaging","manage_root_agent"]}"#,
), ),
@ -93,6 +104,13 @@ mod tests {
}, },
r#"{"max_repos":3}"#, r#"{"max_repos":3}"#,
), ),
(
Permissions {
ssh: Some(true),
..Permissions::default()
},
r#"{"ssh":true}"#,
),
] { ] {
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&value).unwrap(), wire); assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&value).unwrap(), wire);
assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Permissions>(wire).unwrap(), value); assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Permissions>(wire).unwrap(), value);

View file

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
//! `/api/ssh/ca` — the public key of the SSH CA that signs the agents'
//! certificates.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// The CA's public key, one `authorized_keys`-style line. A public value: a
/// machine puts it in its sshd config to trust the certificates the swarm
/// signs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "schema", derive(utoipa::ToSchema))]
pub struct SshCa {
/// For example `ssh-ed25519 AAAA…`, with no trailing newline.
pub public_key: String,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::SshCa;
#[test]
fn the_ca_round_trips() {
let wire = r#"{"public_key":"ssh-ed25519 AAAA"}"#;
let value = SshCa {
public_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA".to_owned(),
};
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&value).unwrap(), wire);
assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<SshCa>(wire).unwrap(), value);
}
}

View file

@ -71,12 +71,16 @@ struct RoleInputs<'a> {
attached: Vec<String>, attached: Vec<String>,
} }
fn role_inputs<'a>(agent: &str, credential: &'a mtls::Credential) -> Result<RoleInputs<'a>> { fn role_inputs<'a>(
agent: &str,
credential: &'a mtls::Credential,
ssh: bool,
) -> Result<RoleInputs<'a>> {
let name = policy::agent_object_name(agent)?; let name = policy::agent_object_name(agent)?;
Ok(RoleInputs { Ok(RoleInputs {
name: name.clone(), name: name.clone(),
ca: &credential.ca, ca: &credential.ca,
attached: vec![policy::SHARED_AGENT_POLICY.to_owned()], attached: crate::agent_ssh::attached(ssh),
}) })
} }
@ -107,6 +111,11 @@ async fn publish_access(
) )
}) })
.at(MintStep::Policy)?; .at(MintStep::Policy)?;
store
.write_policy(policy::SSH_POLICY, &policy::render_ssh_signer())
.await
.with_context(|| format!("writing the SSH signing policy {}", policy::SSH_POLICY))
.at(MintStep::Policy)?;
crate::agent_entity::ensure_agent(store, agent) crate::agent_entity::ensure_agent(store, agent)
.await .await
.with_context(|| format!("naming {agent}'s identity entity; the role is not changed")) .with_context(|| format!("naming {agent}'s identity entity; the role is not changed"))
@ -322,7 +331,13 @@ pub async fn mint_and_verify(agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
} }
let queue_credential = wanted; let queue_credential = wanted;
let inputs = role_inputs(agent, &credential).at(MintStep::Role)?; // The role is where the agent's SSH switch lives, so a rewrite keeps what it
// has (`crate::agent_ssh`).
let ssh = crate::agent_ssh::role_has_ssh(&store, &name)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("reading the policies of the cert-auth role {name}"))
.at(MintStep::Role)?;
let inputs = role_inputs(agent, &credential, ssh).at(MintStep::Role)?;
publish_access(&store, agent, &inputs).await?; publish_access(&store, agent, &inputs).await?;
tracing::info!(agent, %path, role = %name, "agent store identity published"); tracing::info!(agent, %path, role = %name, "agent store identity published");
@ -560,7 +575,7 @@ mod tests {
key: "KEY".to_owned(), key: "KEY".to_owned(),
ca: "AGENT-CA".to_owned(), ca: "AGENT-CA".to_owned(),
}; };
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
assert_eq!(inputs.name, "hive-agent-atlas"); assert_eq!(inputs.name, "hive-agent-atlas");
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
inputs.name, inputs.name,
@ -581,7 +596,7 @@ mod tests {
// The control: another agent's inputs differ in name, and attach the // The control: another agent's inputs differ in name, and attach the
// same shared policy, so the check above can see a policy that is there. // same shared policy, so the check above can see a policy that is there.
let other = role_inputs("argus", &credential).expect("legal"); let other = role_inputs("argus", &credential, false).expect("legal");
assert_ne!(other.name, inputs.name); assert_ne!(other.name, inputs.name);
assert_eq!(other.attached, inputs.attached); assert_eq!(other.attached, inputs.attached);
} }
@ -600,7 +615,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn the_role_is_narrowed_after_the_entity_is_named() { async fn the_role_is_narrowed_after_the_entity_is_named() {
let store = FakeAccess::default(); let store = FakeAccess::default();
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs) publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await
.expect("a store that accepts everything"); .expect("a store that accepts everything");
@ -617,6 +632,54 @@ mod tests {
); );
} }
/// Switch on: the role attaches the signing policy as well, and the policy
/// itself is written before the role names it. Off: the shared policy alone.
/// A rewrite for a new certificate keeps what the role had.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_signing_policy_is_attached_only_when_ssh_is_on_and_a_rewrite_keeps_it() {
let credential = credential();
let on = FakeAccess::default();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, true).expect("legal");
publish_access(&on, "atlas", &inputs)
.await
.expect("accepted");
assert_eq!(
on.roles_written(),
["write_cert_role hive-agent-atlas hive-agent,hive-agent-ssh"]
);
let calls = on.calls();
let at = |call: &str| calls.iter().position(|c| c == call).expect(call);
assert!(
at("write_policy hive-agent-ssh")
< at("write_cert_role hive-agent-atlas hive-agent,hive-agent-ssh"),
"the policy exists before the role names it: {calls:?}"
);
// The rewrite reads the role it replaces, and keeps the grant.
let ssh = crate::agent_ssh::role_has_ssh(&on, "hive-agent-atlas")
.await
.expect("reads");
assert!(ssh);
let again = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, ssh).expect("legal");
assert_eq!(again.attached, ["hive-agent", "hive-agent-ssh"]);
// The control: a role that never had it does not gain it.
let off = FakeAccess::default();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
publish_access(&off, "atlas", &inputs)
.await
.expect("accepted");
assert_eq!(
off.roles_written(),
["write_cert_role hive-agent-atlas hive-agent"]
);
assert!(
!crate::agent_ssh::role_has_ssh(&off, "hive-agent-atlas")
.await
.expect("reads")
);
}
/// An agent created under the name of a destroyed one gets its entity /// An agent created under the name of a destroyed one gets its entity
/// enabled and its role back, the enable first. /// enabled and its role back, the enable first.
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
@ -629,7 +692,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(store.role("hive-agent-atlas"), None); assert_eq!(store.role("hive-agent-atlas"), None);
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs) publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await
.expect("a store that accepts everything"); .expect("a store that accepts everything");
@ -648,7 +711,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn a_mint_whose_enable_is_refused_leaves_the_role_alone() { async fn a_mint_whose_enable_is_refused_leaves_the_role_alone() {
let store = FakeAccess::default().refusing_disable(); let store = FakeAccess::default().refusing_disable();
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs) let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await
.expect_err("the enable is refused"); .expect_err("the enable is refused");
@ -660,7 +723,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn a_renewal_whose_entity_step_fails_leaves_the_role_alone() { async fn a_renewal_whose_entity_step_fails_leaves_the_role_alone() {
let store = FakeAccess::without_accessor(); let store = FakeAccess::without_accessor();
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs) let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await
.expect_err("the entity step failed"); .expect_err("the entity step failed");
@ -681,7 +744,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn a_renewal_whose_alias_is_on_another_entity_leaves_the_role_alone() { async fn a_renewal_whose_alias_is_on_another_entity_leaves_the_role_alone() {
let store = FakeAccess::with_alias_on("id-1", "somebody"); let store = FakeAccess::with_alias_on("id-1", "somebody");
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs) let err = publish_access(&store, "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await
.expect_err("a conflict is an error"); .expect_err("a conflict is an error");
@ -700,7 +763,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test] #[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_step_is_named_in_the_message_and_by_failed_step() { async fn a_refused_step_is_named_in_the_message_and_by_failed_step() {
let credential = credential(); let credential = credential();
let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential).expect("legal"); let inputs = role_inputs("atlas", &credential, false).expect("legal");
let err = publish_access(&FakeAccess::refusing_policies(), "atlas", &inputs) let err = publish_access(&FakeAccess::refusing_policies(), "atlas", &inputs)
.await .await

View file

@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
const MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5; const MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5;
/// The permissions to store for `req`, whose list is already checked. The list /// The permissions to store for `req`, whose list is already checked. The list
/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` and `max_repos` left out /// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet`, `max_repos` and `ssh` left
/// keep the ones in `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets /// out keep the ones in `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
/// `unrestricted_internet` without it turns it off: an agent that moves to /// `unrestricted_internet` without it turns it off: an agent that moves to
/// unrestricted and back to restricted does not come back logging. /// unrestricted and back to restricted does not come back logging.
fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions { fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions {
@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions
unrestricted_internet: req.unrestricted_internet.or(current.unrestricted_internet), unrestricted_internet: req.unrestricted_internet.or(current.unrestricted_internet),
internet_log, internet_log,
max_repos: req.max_repos.or(current.max_repos), max_repos: req.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
ssh: req.ssh.or(current.ssh),
} }
} }
@ -123,6 +124,7 @@ fn view(v: AgentPermissions) -> Permissions {
unrestricted_internet: v.unrestricted_internet, unrestricted_internet: v.unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: v.internet_log, internet_log: v.internet_log,
max_repos: v.max_repos, max_repos: v.max_repos,
ssh: v.ssh,
} }
} }
@ -331,6 +333,9 @@ async fn put_with(
if value.max_repos != current.max_repos { if value.max_repos != current.max_repos {
MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notify_one(); MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notify_one();
} }
if value.ssh != current.ssh {
crate::agent_ssh::SSH_CHANGED.notify_one();
}
if !revoking { if !revoking {
mirror(leaves, &agent, &before, &after) mirror(leaves, &agent, &before, &after)
.await .await
@ -390,6 +395,7 @@ async fn delete_with(
unrestricted_internet: current.unrestricted_internet, unrestricted_internet: current.unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: current.internet_log, internet_log: current.internet_log,
max_repos: current.max_repos, max_repos: current.max_repos,
ssh: current.ssh,
..AgentPermissions::default() ..AgentPermissions::default()
}; };
mirror(leaves, &agent, &held(&current), &held(&kept)) mirror(leaves, &agent, &held(&current), &held(&kept))
@ -490,6 +496,7 @@ pub(crate) fn at_create(
unrestricted_internet, unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}) })
} }
@ -520,6 +527,7 @@ fn merged_at_create(
current.internet_log current.internet_log
}, },
max_repos: value.max_repos.or(current.max_repos), max_repos: value.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
ssh: value.ssh.or(current.ssh),
} }
} }
@ -875,6 +883,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet, unrestricted_internet,
internet_log, internet_log,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
} }
} }
@ -1012,6 +1021,80 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), MAX_REPOS); assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), MAX_REPOS);
} }
/// The SSH switch is the agent's own and off by default: a `PUT` sets it and
/// wakes the role pass, a `PUT` or `DELETE` that leaves it out keeps it, and
/// another agent is not changed.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_agents_ssh_switch_is_its_own_default_off_and_survives_other_changes() {
use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
use swarm_wire::wanted::AgentState;
let nats = TestNats::start();
let client = nats.client().await;
let state = crate::agent_limits::tests::declared(&client).await;
WantedWriter::new(client.clone())
.set("pr1ma", "iris", AgentState::Up)
.await
.expect("declare iris");
let ssh = |on| Permissions {
ssh: Some(on),
..Permissions::default()
};
assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.ssh, None, "off until set");
while tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_millis(1),
crate::agent_ssh::SSH_CHANGED.notified(),
)
.await
.is_ok()
{}
assert_eq!(
put(&state, "atlas", ssh(true)).await.expect("set").0.ssh,
Some(true)
);
tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
crate::agent_ssh::SSH_CHANGED.notified(),
)
.await
.expect("the change wakes the role pass");
assert_eq!(
get(&state, "iris").await.ssh,
None,
"another agent is not changed"
);
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", granted()).await.expect("set");
assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.ssh, Some(true));
delete_agent_permissions(State(state.clone()), Path("atlas".to_owned()))
.await
.expect("cleared");
assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.ssh, Some(true));
assert_eq!(
put(&state, "atlas", ssh(false)).await.expect("set").0.ssh,
Some(false)
);
tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
crate::agent_ssh::SSH_CHANGED.notified(),
)
.await
.expect("switching off wakes the role pass too");
}
/// A create keeps the stored SSH switch and does not set one.
#[test]
fn a_create_keeps_the_ssh_switch() {
let current = stored(r#"{"ssh":true}"#);
assert_eq!(
super::merged_at_create(&stored("{}"), &current, true).ssh,
Some(true)
);
assert_eq!(super::at_create(None, None).expect("valid").ssh, None);
}
/// A stored limit above the range, as a hand edit could leave it, reads as /// A stored limit above the range, as a hand edit could leave it, reads as
/// none rather than as that many repositories. /// none rather than as that many repositories.
#[test] #[test]
@ -1050,6 +1133,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: None, unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
} }
} }
@ -1096,6 +1180,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: None, unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}; };
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", none.clone()).await.expect("set"); let _ = put(&state, "atlas", none.clone()).await.expect("set");
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
@ -1125,6 +1210,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: Some(false), unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: Some(true), internet_log: Some(true),
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}; };
let stored = put(&state, "atlas", log.clone()).await.expect("set").0; let stored = put(&state, "atlas", log.clone()).await.expect("set").0;
assert_eq!(stored, log); assert_eq!(stored, log);
@ -1148,6 +1234,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: Some(true), unrestricted_internet: Some(true),
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}; };
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", on.clone()).await.expect("set"); let _ = put(&state, "atlas", on.clone()).await.expect("set");
let off = Permissions { let off = Permissions {
@ -1296,6 +1383,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
unrestricted_internet: None, unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
} }
} }

View file

@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
//! SSH certificates for agents: the per-agent switch, and the public key of
//! the CA that signs them.
//!
//! An agent may have its SSH key signed only while its `ssh` field in
//! `agent-permissions` (`swarm_wire::agent_permissions`) is on. The grant is
//! the policy [`policy::SSH_POLICY`], which holds `update` on the one sign path
//! and nothing else. It is attached to the agent's cert-auth role
//! `hive-agent-<name>` next to the shared policy while the field is on, and
//! left off otherwise. The role is the state: [`crate::agent_identity`] keeps
//! whatever the role has when it rewrites it for a new certificate, and
//! [`reconcile`] is the only code that changes it.
//!
//! **When a change takes effect.** The role is rewritten when the field
//! changes ([`SSH_CHANGED`]) and by a pass every [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`]. A token
//! carries the policies of the role it logged in under and keeps them until it
//! expires, which is at most [`swarm_secret_client::client::CERT_ROLE_TOKEN_TTL`]
//! after login, so a new login gets the new policies at once and an agent that
//! was signed in when the switch went off can still sign for up to an hour.
//! Switching on takes effect at the agent's next login, which its certificate
//! unit makes on every run (every 20 minutes). A certificate already signed
//! stays valid until it expires, at most three hours.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::time::Duration;
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::State;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use swarm_controller_api::ssh::SshCa;
use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions;
use swarm_secret_client::{client::DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, policy};
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::AgentPermissions;
use crate::routes::{AppState, error_problem};
use crate::schedules::read_or_default;
use crate::store::AccessStore;
/// How often [`spawn`] re-checks every agent's role.
const RECONCILE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_mins(5);
/// Woken when an agent's `ssh` field changes, so [`spawn`]'s pass applies it at
/// once instead of at its next tick. A wake with no pass waiting is kept for
/// the next one.
pub(crate) static SSH_CHANGED: tokio::sync::Notify = tokio::sync::Notify::const_new();
/// The policies an agent's cert-auth role attaches: the shared one, and the
/// signing grant when `ssh` is on.
#[must_use]
pub fn attached(ssh: bool) -> Vec<String> {
let mut policies = vec![policy::SHARED_AGENT_POLICY.to_owned()];
if ssh {
policies.push(policy::SSH_POLICY.to_owned());
}
policies
}
/// Whether `role`'s current policies include the signing grant, which is how
/// [`crate::agent_identity`] knows to keep it when it rewrites the role.
///
/// # Errors
/// The store could not be read.
pub async fn role_has_ssh(
store: &impl AccessStore,
role: &str,
) -> Result<bool, swarm_secret_client::Error> {
Ok(store
.cert_role_policies(DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, role)
.await?
.is_some_and(|p| p.iter().any(|p| p == policy::SSH_POLICY)))
}
/// What one pass did, one count per role.
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Counts {
pub rewritten: usize,
pub already_current: usize,
pub failed: usize,
}
/// Give every agent of `wanted` the policies its `ssh` field says, writing the
/// signing policy first. An agent with no role is skipped: the mint that makes
/// one keeps nothing, and the next pass attaches the grant.
pub async fn reconcile(store: &impl AccessStore, wanted: &BTreeMap<String, bool>) -> Counts {
let mut counts = Counts::default();
if let Err(e) = store
.write_policy(policy::SSH_POLICY, &policy::render_ssh_signer())
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "agent ssh: the signing policy was not written; retrying next pass");
counts.failed = wanted.len();
return counts;
}
for (agent, ssh) in wanted {
let Ok(role) = policy::agent_object_name(agent) else {
continue;
};
match reconcile_one(store, &role, *ssh).await {
Ok(Some(true)) => counts.rewritten += 1,
Ok(Some(false)) => counts.already_current += 1,
Ok(None) => {}
Err(e) => {
counts.failed += 1;
tracing::warn!(role, error = %e, "agent ssh: this role's policies were not brought current");
}
}
}
if counts.rewritten > 0 || counts.failed > 0 {
tracing::info!(
rewritten = counts.rewritten,
already_current = counts.already_current,
failed = counts.failed,
"agent ssh roles checked"
);
}
counts
}
/// `Some(true)` when the role was rewritten, `Some(false)` when it was already
/// right, `None` when it does not exist.
async fn reconcile_one(
store: &impl AccessStore,
role: &str,
ssh: bool,
) -> Result<Option<bool>, swarm_secret_client::Error> {
let Some(mut current) = store.cert_role_policies(DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, role).await? else {
return Ok(None);
};
let mut wanted = attached(ssh);
current.sort();
wanted.sort();
if current == wanted {
return Ok(Some(false));
}
let policies: Vec<&str> = wanted.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
store
.set_cert_role_policies(DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, role, &policies)
.await?;
tracing::info!(role, ssh, "agent ssh: role policies set");
Ok(Some(true))
}
/// `agent`'s `ssh` field: on only when its record says so.
async fn ssh_of(store: &async_nats::jetstream::kv::Store, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
let (record, _, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(store, agent).await?;
Ok(record.ssh == Some(true))
}
/// One pass: every agent holding a cert-auth role, with its field. An agent
/// whose record cannot be read is left out, so its role stays as it is.
async fn desired(
queue: &async_nats::Client,
roster: &[String],
) -> anyhow::Result<BTreeMap<String, bool>> {
let store = agent_permissions::open_or_create(queue).await?;
let mut wanted = BTreeMap::new();
for agent in roster {
match ssh_of(&store, agent).await {
Ok(on) => {
wanted.insert(agent.clone(), on);
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
%agent,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"agent ssh: the agent's record was not read; leaving its role as it is"
),
}
}
Ok(wanted)
}
/// Apply every agent's field now, again on each wake and on every tick. A pass
/// that fails is logged and retried at the next tick.
pub fn spawn(queue: async_nats::Client) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(RECONCILE_INTERVAL);
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = ticker.tick() => {}
() = SSH_CHANGED.notified() => {}
}
if let Err(e) = pass(&queue).await {
tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "agent ssh: pass failed; retrying next tick");
}
}
});
}
async fn pass(queue: &async_nats::Client) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
use anyhow::Context as _;
let store = crate::store::connect()
.await
.context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?;
let roles = store
.list_cert_roles(DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT)
.await
.context("listing the store's cert-auth roles")?;
let roster = policy::agents_from_role_names(&roles);
let wanted = desired(queue, &roster).await?;
reconcile(&store, &wanted).await;
Ok(())
}
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/ssh/ca",
responses(
(status = 200, description = "the public key of the SSH CA that signs agents' \
certificates", body = SshCa),
(status = 404, description = "the store holds no SSH CA yet (problem+json)",
body = String),
(status = 502, description = "the store could not be read (problem+json)",
body = String),
),
tag = "agents"
)]
pub(crate) async fn get_ssh_ca(
State(_state): State<AppState>,
) -> Result<Json<SshCa>, ProblemDetails> {
let store = crate::store::connect().await.map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
&format!("logging in to the swarm secret store: {e}"),
)
})?;
match store.ssh_ca_public_key(policy::SSH_MOUNT).await {
Ok(Some(public_key)) => Ok(Json(SshCa { public_key })),
Ok(None) => Err(error_problem(
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"the swarm secret store holds no SSH CA yet",
)),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(
StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
&format!("reading the SSH CA: {e}"),
)),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use swarm_secret_client::policy;
use crate::store::fake::{FakeAccess, FakeRole};
use super::{Counts, attached, reconcile, role_has_ssh};
fn role(policies: &[&str]) -> FakeRole {
FakeRole {
certificate: "CA".to_owned(),
common_name: "hive-agent-a".to_owned(),
policies: policies.iter().map(|p| (*p).to_owned()).collect(),
ttls: swarm_secret_client::client::CertRoleTokenTtls {
token_ttl: swarm_secret_client::client::CERT_ROLE_TOKEN_TTL_SECS,
token_max_ttl: swarm_secret_client::client::CERT_ROLE_TOKEN_TTL_SECS,
},
}
}
fn wanted(of: &[(&str, bool)]) -> BTreeMap<String, bool> {
of.iter().map(|(a, on)| ((*a).to_owned(), *on)).collect()
}
#[test]
fn the_signing_policy_is_attached_only_while_on() {
assert_eq!(attached(false), ["hive-agent"]);
assert_eq!(attached(true), ["hive-agent", "hive-agent-ssh"]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn switching_on_attaches_the_policy_and_keeps_the_rest_of_the_role() {
let before = role(&["hive-agent"]);
let store = FakeAccess::default().with_role("hive-agent-a", before.clone());
let counts = reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("a", true)])).await;
assert_eq!(
counts,
Counts {
rewritten: 1,
..Counts::default()
}
);
assert_eq!(
store.role("hive-agent-a"),
Some(FakeRole {
policies: vec!["hive-agent".to_owned(), policy::SSH_POLICY.to_owned()],
..before
})
);
assert!(
store
.calls()
.contains(&"write_policy hive-agent-ssh".to_owned())
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn switching_off_takes_the_policy_away_and_a_current_role_is_left_alone() {
let store = FakeAccess::default()
.with_role("hive-agent-a", role(&["hive-agent", "hive-agent-ssh"]))
.with_role("hive-agent-b", role(&["hive-agent"]));
let counts = reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("a", false), ("b", false)])).await;
assert_eq!(
counts,
Counts {
rewritten: 1,
already_current: 1,
failed: 0
}
);
assert_eq!(
store.role("hive-agent-a").map(|r| r.policies),
Some(vec!["hive-agent".to_owned()])
);
// The role already right is not written.
let writes = store
.calls()
.into_iter()
.filter(|c| c.starts_with("set_cert_role_policies"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(writes, ["set_cert_role_policies hive-agent-a hive-agent"]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn flipping_twice_ends_where_it_started() {
let store = FakeAccess::default().with_role("hive-agent-a", role(&["hive-agent"]));
reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("a", true)])).await;
assert!(role_has_ssh(&store, "hive-agent-a").await.expect("reads"));
reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("a", false)])).await;
assert!(!role_has_ssh(&store, "hive-agent-a").await.expect("reads"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_agent_with_no_role_is_not_given_one() {
let store = FakeAccess::default();
let counts = reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("gone", true)])).await;
assert_eq!(counts, Counts::default());
assert_eq!(store.role("hive-agent-gone"), None);
assert!(
!role_has_ssh(&store, "hive-agent-gone")
.await
.expect("reads")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_role_the_store_refuses_to_write_is_counted_and_the_rest_go_on() {
let store = FakeAccess::default()
.with_role("hive-agent-a", role(&["hive-agent"]))
.with_role("hive-agent-b", role(&["hive-agent"]))
.with_unwritable_role("hive-agent-a");
let counts = reconcile(&store, &wanted(&[("a", true), ("b", true)])).await;
assert_eq!(
counts,
Counts {
rewritten: 1,
already_current: 0,
failed: 1
}
);
}
}

View file

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ mod agent_login;
mod agent_permissions; mod agent_permissions;
mod agent_renewal; mod agent_renewal;
mod agent_role_ttl; mod agent_role_ttl;
mod agent_ssh;
mod agent_state_stream; mod agent_state_stream;
mod agent_status; mod agent_status;
mod agent_todos; mod agent_todos;

View file

@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ use crate::routes::hives::{HiveEntry, ServiceLink};
use crate::routes::{self, AppState, agents, config_prs, forge_admin, hives, jobq_graph}; use crate::routes::{self, AppState, agents, config_prs, forge_admin, hives, jobq_graph};
use crate::{ use crate::{
agent_commands, agent_control, agent_custom, agent_icon, agent_input, agent_limits, agent_commands, agent_control, agent_custom, agent_icon, agent_input, agent_limits,
agent_login, agent_permissions, agent_renewal, agent_state_stream, agent_status, agent_todos, agent_login, agent_permissions, agent_renewal, agent_ssh, agent_state_stream, agent_status,
agents_md, alerts, archetypes, auth, backend_env, bash_task, builder, claude_login, agent_todos, agents_md, alerts, archetypes, auth, backend_env, bash_task, builder,
config_drift, config_pr, egress_allow, egress_deny, forge, forge_account, github_account, claude_login, config_drift, config_pr, egress_allow, egress_deny, forge, forge_account,
gitlab_account, inference, issue_report, linked_accounts, matrix_account, message_stream, github_account, gitlab_account, inference, issue_report, linked_accounts, matrix_account,
notify_flows, notify_router_api, pause_hold, pr_report, pulls, queue_identity, message_stream, notify_flows, notify_router_api, pause_hold, pr_report, pulls, queue_identity,
review_classifier, schedules, status, subagent_term, term_stream, wanted, webhook, review_classifier, schedules, status, subagent_term, term_stream, wanted, webhook,
}; };
@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ fn spawn_forge_workers(
forge::runner_token::spawn(Arc::clone(&client)); forge::runner_token::spawn(Arc::clone(&client));
if let Some(queue) = queue { if let Some(queue) = queue {
forge::agent_max_repos::spawn(Arc::clone(&client), queue.clone()); forge::agent_max_repos::spawn(Arc::clone(&client), queue.clone());
crate::agent_ssh::spawn(queue.clone());
crate::cache_miss::spawn( crate::cache_miss::spawn(
queue.clone(), queue.clone(),
Arc::new(wanted::WantedWriter::new(queue)), Arc::new(wanted::WantedWriter::new(queue)),
@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ pub(crate) fn build_app(state: AppState) -> axum::Router {
agent_permissions::delete_agent_permissions agent_permissions::delete_agent_permissions
)) ))
.routes(routes!(agent_permissions::get_permission_catalogue)) .routes(routes!(agent_permissions::get_permission_catalogue))
.routes(routes!(agent_ssh::get_ssh_ca))
.routes(routes!( .routes(routes!(
egress_allow::get_allowed_domains, egress_allow::get_allowed_domains,
egress_allow::add_allowed_domain, egress_allow::add_allowed_domain,

View file

@ -65,6 +65,21 @@ pub(crate) trait AccessStore {
name: &str, name: &str,
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<(), Error>> + Send; ) -> impl Future<Output = Result<(), Error>> + Send;
/// As [`SecretStore::cert_role_policies`].
fn cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error>> + Send;
/// As [`SecretStore::set_cert_role_policies`].
fn set_cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
policies: &[&str],
) -> impl Future<Output = Result<(), Error>> + Send;
/// As [`SecretStore::auth_mount_accessor`]. /// As [`SecretStore::auth_mount_accessor`].
fn auth_mount_accessor( fn auth_mount_accessor(
&self, &self,
@ -142,6 +157,23 @@ impl AccessStore for SecretStore {
SecretStore::set_cert_role_token_ttls(self, mount, name).await SecretStore::set_cert_role_token_ttls(self, mount, name).await
} }
async fn cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error> {
SecretStore::cert_role_policies(self, mount, name).await
}
async fn set_cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
policies: &[&str],
) -> Result<(), Error> {
SecretStore::set_cert_role_policies(self, mount, name, policies).await
}
async fn auth_mount_accessor(&self, mount: &str) -> Result<String, Error> { async fn auth_mount_accessor(&self, mount: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
SecretStore::auth_mount_accessor(self, mount).await SecretStore::auth_mount_accessor(self, mount).await
} }
@ -385,6 +417,35 @@ pub(crate) mod fake {
Ok(self.role(name).map(|r| r.ttls)) Ok(self.role(name).map(|r| r.ttls))
} }
async fn cert_role_policies(
&self,
_mount: &str,
name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error> {
self.log(format!("cert_role_policies {name}"));
Ok(self.role(name).map(|r| r.policies))
}
async fn set_cert_role_policies(
&self,
_mount: &str,
name: &str,
policies: &[&str],
) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.log(format!(
"set_cert_role_policies {name} {}",
policies.join(",")
));
if self.unwritable_roles.iter().any(|r| r == name) {
return Err(Self::denied());
}
// Only the policies: the store keeps the fields a write omits.
if let Some(role) = self.roles.lock().expect("not poisoned").get_mut(name) {
role.policies = policies.iter().map(|p| (*p).to_owned()).collect();
}
Ok(())
}
async fn set_cert_role_token_ttls(&self, _mount: &str, name: &str) -> Result<(), Error> { async fn set_cert_role_token_ttls(&self, _mount: &str, name: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.log(format!("set_cert_role_token_ttls {name}")); self.log(format!("set_cert_role_token_ttls {name}"));
if self.unwritable_roles.iter().any(|r| r == name) { if self.unwritable_roles.iter().any(|r| r == name) {

View file

@ -474,6 +474,67 @@ impl SecretStore {
Ok(()) Ok(())
} }
/// The public key of the SSH secrets engine mounted at `mount`, one
/// `authorized_keys`-style line, or `None` when the mount holds no CA yet.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::Vault`] for anything that is not a 400 or 404: a denial, or an
/// unreachable store.
pub async fn ssh_ca_public_key(&self, mount: &str) -> Result<Option<String>, Error> {
let request = ReadSshCa {
mount: mount.to_owned(),
};
match vaultrs::api::exec_with_result(&self.inner, request).await {
Ok(ca) => Ok(Some(ca.public_key.trim().to_owned()).filter(|k| !k.is_empty())),
Err(e) if is_absent(&e) || is_bad_request(&e) => Ok(None),
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}
}
/// The policies the cert-auth role `name` attaches to its tokens, or `None`
/// when the role does not exist.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::Vault`] for anything that is not a 404.
pub async fn cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>, Error> {
let request = ReadCertRolePolicies {
mount: mount.to_owned(),
name: name.to_owned(),
};
match vaultrs::api::exec_with_result(&self.inner, request).await {
Ok(role) => Ok(Some(role.token_policies)),
Err(e) if is_absent(&e) => Ok(None),
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}
}
/// Replace the policies the existing cert-auth role `name` attaches, leaving
/// the rest of the role as it is. The write names no other field, for the
/// reason [`Self::set_cert_role_token_ttls`] gives. Tokens already issued
/// keep the policies they were issued with until they expire or are renewed.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::Vault`] when the token's policy does not cover
/// `auth/<mount>/certs/<name>`, or the store refuses the write.
pub async fn set_cert_role_policies(
&self,
mount: &str,
name: &str,
policies: &[&str],
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let request = SetCertRolePolicies {
mount: mount.to_owned(),
name: name.to_owned(),
token_policies: policies.iter().map(|p| (*p).to_owned()).collect(),
};
vaultrs::api::exec_with_empty(&self.inner, request).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Have the PKI role `role` on `mount` issue a client certificate for /// Have the PKI role `role` on `mount` issue a client certificate for
/// `common_name`, returning it with its key and the issuing CA. /// `common_name`, returning it with its key and the issuing CA.
/// ///
@ -768,6 +829,11 @@ fn is_absent(e: &vaultrs::error::ClientError) -> bool {
matches!(e, vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { code: 404, .. }) matches!(e, vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { code: 404, .. })
} }
/// A 400, which the SSH engine answers a CA read with while it holds no CA.
fn is_bad_request(e: &vaultrs::error::ClientError) -> bool {
matches!(e, vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { code: 400, .. })
}
/// Write an ACL policy, spelled out here because [`vaultrs`] does not have it: /// Write an ACL policy, spelled out here because [`vaultrs`] does not have it:
/// its `sys::policy` module targets `sys/policy/<name>`, the deprecated alias, /// its `sys::policy` module targets `sys/policy/<name>`, the deprecated alias,
/// and the store ACLs that path separately from `sys/policies/acl/<name>`. A /// and the store ACLs that path separately from `sys/policies/acl/<name>`. A
@ -828,6 +894,53 @@ struct SetCertRoleTtls {
token_max_ttl: String, token_max_ttl: String,
} }
/// Read an SSH engine mount's CA.
#[derive(Endpoint)]
#[endpoint(path = "{self.mount}/config/ca", method = "GET", response = "SshCa")]
struct ReadSshCa {
#[endpoint(skip)]
mount: String,
}
/// The public half of the CA, the one field read.
#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
struct SshCa {
public_key: String,
}
/// Read the policies of a cert-auth role.
#[derive(Endpoint)]
#[endpoint(
path = "auth/{self.mount}/certs/{self.name}",
method = "GET",
response = "CertRolePolicies"
)]
struct ReadCertRolePolicies {
#[endpoint(skip)]
mount: String,
#[endpoint(skip)]
name: String,
}
/// The one field of a cert-auth role [`SecretStore::cert_role_policies`] reads.
#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
struct CertRolePolicies {
#[serde(default)]
token_policies: Vec<String>,
}
/// Write the policies of a cert-auth role and nothing else, as [`SetCertRoleTtls`]
/// does for the lifetimes.
#[derive(Endpoint)]
#[endpoint(path = "auth/{self.mount}/certs/{self.name}", method = "POST")]
struct SetCertRolePolicies {
#[endpoint(skip)]
mount: String,
#[endpoint(skip)]
name: String,
token_policies: Vec<String>,
}
/// The request [`SecretStore::set_cert_role_token_ttls`] sends. /// The request [`SecretStore::set_cert_role_token_ttls`] sends.
fn set_cert_role_token_ttls_request(mount: &str, name: &str) -> SetCertRoleTtls { fn set_cert_role_token_ttls_request(mount: &str, name: &str) -> SetCertRoleTtls {
SetCertRoleTtls { SetCertRoleTtls {

View file

@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ pub fn render_shared_hives(mount_accessor: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
/// forbids. /// forbids.
pub const SHARED_AGENT_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent"; pub const SHARED_AGENT_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent";
/// The policy that holds the SSH signing grant ([`render_ssh_signer`]). Inside
/// [`HIVE_PREFIX`] so the controller may write it. It is a policy name; the cert-auth role `hive-agent-ssh` would be an agent
/// called `ssh`'s, a different namespace.
pub const SSH_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent-ssh";
/// The template that stands for the agent's name in [`render_shared_agent`]: /// The template that stands for the agent's name in [`render_shared_agent`]:
/// the name of the login's identity entity, which swarm-controller sets to the /// the name of the login's identity entity, which swarm-controller sets to the
/// agent's name. /// agent's name.
@ -233,11 +238,8 @@ pub const SSH_ROLE: &str = "swarm-agent";
/// none of [`render_shared_hives`]'s breadth applies. A hive still reads this /// none of [`render_shared_hives`]'s breadth applies. A hive still reads this
/// agent's secrets, and closing that is its own decision. /// agent's secrets, and closing that is its own decision.
/// ///
/// The last stanza is `update` on [`SSH_MOUNT`]'s sign endpoint for [`SSH_ROLE`]: /// No SSH stanza: signing is [`SSH_POLICY`]'s, which an agent's role attaches
/// the agent submits a public key it generated and gets a short-lived user /// only while the operator has switched SSH on for it.
/// certificate back. It names no agent. What a certificate may say is the
/// role's: the principal is the identity entity's name, so an agent can be
/// signed for its own name and no other.
#[must_use] #[must_use]
pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String { pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String {
let kind = <&str>::from(Kind::Agent); let kind = <&str>::from(Kind::Agent);
@ -251,8 +253,21 @@ pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String {
"{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/{}", "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/{}",
backend_env::LEAF backend_env::LEAF
)); ));
let sign = sign_stanza(&format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}")); format!("{read}{list}{seed}")
format!("{read}{list}{seed}{sign}") }
/// The policy that lets an agent have its SSH key signed: `update` on
/// [`SSH_MOUNT`]'s sign endpoint for [`SSH_ROLE`], and nothing else. The same
/// text for every agent. The agent submits a public key it generated and gets a
/// short-lived user certificate back. What the certificate may say is the
/// role's: the principal is the identity entity's name, so an agent is signed
/// for its own name and no other.
///
/// Attached to an agent's cert-auth role only while its `ssh` permission is on
/// (`swarm-controller`'s `agent_ssh`).
#[must_use]
pub fn render_ssh_signer() -> String {
sign_stanza(&format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"))
} }
/// What an agent's token grants under [`SHARED_AGENT_POLICY`]: the document /// What an agent's token grants under [`SHARED_AGENT_POLICY`]: the document
@ -284,8 +299,7 @@ mod tests {
render_shared_agent(), render_shared_agent(),
"path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\ "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\ path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n\ path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n"
path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"
); );
} }
@ -294,33 +308,30 @@ mod tests {
let shared = render_shared_agent(); let shared = render_shared_agent();
assert!(!shared.contains("atlas")); assert!(!shared.contains("atlas"));
assert!(!shared.contains("agents/*"), "{shared}"); assert!(!shared.contains("agents/*"), "{shared}");
assert!(!shared.contains("update"));
assert!(!shared.contains("delete")); assert!(!shared.contains("delete"));
// `update` is the signing stanza's and no KV path's: a KV leaf the
// agent could rewrite would let it replace a credential it only seeds.
let secret_only = shared
.split("path \"ssh-agents/")
.next()
.unwrap_or_default();
assert!(!secret_only.contains("update"), "{shared}");
} }
/// What the SSH policy holds, byte for byte: one update stanza on one role's
/// sign path, the same text for every agent.
#[test] #[test]
fn the_agent_may_sign_through_one_role_and_do_nothing_else_on_the_ssh_mount() { fn the_ssh_policy_is_update_on_one_sign_path_and_nothing_else() {
let shared = render_shared_agent();
let ssh: Vec<&str> = shared
.split("path \"")
.filter(|s| s.starts_with(SSH_MOUNT))
.collect();
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
ssh, render_ssh_signer(),
["ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"] "path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"
); );
// The control: the filter finds a stanza that is there.
assert!(shared.split("path \"").any(|s| s.starts_with(MOUNT)));
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"), format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"),
"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent" "ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent"
); );
assert!(SSH_POLICY.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
assert_ne!(SSH_POLICY, SHARED_AGENT_POLICY);
}
#[test]
fn the_shared_agent_policy_names_nothing_on_the_ssh_mount() {
assert!(!render_shared_agent().contains(SSH_MOUNT));
assert!(render_ssh_signer().contains(SSH_MOUNT));
} }
#[test] #[test]
@ -525,8 +536,7 @@ mod tests {
/// What `effective_agent("atlas")` must be, byte for byte. /// What `effective_agent("atlas")` must be, byte for byte.
const ATLAS_DOCUMENT: &str = "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\ const ATLAS_DOCUMENT: &str = "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\ path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n\ path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n";
path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n";
#[test] #[test]
fn an_agents_document_is_its_stanzas_naming_that_agent() { fn an_agents_document_is_its_stanzas_naming_that_agent() {
@ -565,8 +575,8 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!p.contains("argus"), "no other principal is named"); assert!(!p.contains("argus"), "no other principal is named");
assert_eq!( assert_eq!(
p.matches("path \"").count(), p.matches("path \"").count(),
4, 3,
"four stanzas, or the document grants something unaccounted for: {p}" "three stanzas, or the document grants something unaccounted for: {p}"
); );
} }
@ -610,12 +620,7 @@ mod tests {
["secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*", leaf.as_str()] ["secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*", leaf.as_str()]
); );
assert_eq!(paths_granting(&p, "create"), [leaf.as_str()]); assert_eq!(paths_granting(&p, "create"), [leaf.as_str()]);
// The one `update` is the SSH signing endpoint's: no KV path takes it. for capability in ["update", "delete", "sudo", "patch"] {
assert_eq!(
paths_granting(&p, "update"),
["ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent"]
);
for capability in ["delete", "sudo", "patch"] {
assert!( assert!(
!p.contains(capability), !p.contains(capability),
"an agent's document must not grant {capability}: {p}" "an agent's document must not grant {capability}: {p}"
@ -636,9 +641,8 @@ mod tests {
// granted, nor is `list` anywhere but `metadata/`. // granted, nor is `list` anywhere but `metadata/`.
let p = effective_agent("atlas"); let p = effective_agent("atlas");
let stanzas: Vec<&str> = p.split_inclusive("}\n").collect(); let stanzas: Vec<&str> = p.split_inclusive("}\n").collect();
assert_eq!(stanzas.len(), 4, "{p}"); assert_eq!(stanzas.len(), 3, "{p}");
// The third is the create stanza and the fourth the signing stanza, // The third is the create stanza, pinned by the test above.
// each pinned by a test above.
for stanza in &stanzas[..2] { for stanza in &stanzas[..2] {
let on_data = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/data/"); let on_data = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/data/");
let on_metadata = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/metadata/"); let on_metadata = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/metadata/");

View file

@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ pub struct AgentPermissions {
/// or agent acts on it. /// or agent acts on it.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub max_repos: Option<u32>, pub max_repos: Option<u32>,
/// Whether the agent may have its SSH key signed by the swarm's SSH CA. Absent
/// is off. Only the controller reads it: it attaches the SSH signing policy
/// to the agent's store login role while this is `true`.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub ssh: Option<bool>,
} }
/// What an agent whose record has no `max_repos` may create: no repositories. /// What an agent whose record has no `max_repos` may create: no repositories.

View file

@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ fn with_permissions(
unrestricted_internet, unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: None, internet_log: None,
max_repos: None, max_repos: None,
ssh: None,
}) })
} }