gate ssh signing per agent: ssh permission, signing policy on the login role, ca key endpoint
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1 changed files with 805 additions and 57 deletions
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@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ pub fn render_shared_hives(mount_accessor: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
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/// forbids.
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pub const SHARED_AGENT_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent";
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/// The policy that holds the SSH signing grant ([`render_ssh_signer`]). Inside
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/// [`HIVE_PREFIX`] so the controller may write it. It is a policy name; the cert-auth role `hive-agent-ssh` would be an agent
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/// called `ssh`'s, a different namespace.
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pub const SSH_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent-ssh";
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/// The template that stands for the agent's name in [`render_shared_agent`]:
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/// the name of the login's identity entity, which swarm-controller sets to the
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/// agent's name.
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@ -233,11 +238,8 @@ pub const SSH_ROLE: &str = "swarm-agent";
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/// none of [`render_shared_hives`]'s breadth applies. A hive still reads this
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/// agent's secrets, and closing that is its own decision.
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///
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/// The last stanza is `update` on [`SSH_MOUNT`]'s sign endpoint for [`SSH_ROLE`]:
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/// the agent submits a public key it generated and gets a short-lived user
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/// certificate back. It names no agent. What a certificate may say is the
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/// role's: the principal is the identity entity's name, so an agent can be
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/// signed for its own name and no other.
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/// No SSH stanza: signing is [`SSH_POLICY`]'s, which an agent's role attaches
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/// only while the operator has switched SSH on for it.
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#[must_use]
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pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String {
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let kind = <&str>::from(Kind::Agent);
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@ -251,8 +253,21 @@ pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String {
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"{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/{}",
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backend_env::LEAF
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));
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let sign = sign_stanza(&format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"));
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format!("{read}{list}{seed}{sign}")
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format!("{read}{list}{seed}")
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}
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/// The policy that lets an agent have its SSH key signed: `update` on
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/// [`SSH_MOUNT`]'s sign endpoint for [`SSH_ROLE`], and nothing else. The same
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/// text for every agent. The agent submits a public key it generated and gets a
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/// short-lived user certificate back. What the certificate may say is the
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/// role's: the principal is the identity entity's name, so an agent is signed
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/// for its own name and no other.
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///
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/// Attached to an agent's cert-auth role only while its `ssh` permission is on
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/// (`swarm-controller`'s `agent_ssh`).
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#[must_use]
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pub fn render_ssh_signer() -> String {
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sign_stanza(&format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"))
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}
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/// What an agent's token grants under [`SHARED_AGENT_POLICY`]: the document
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@ -284,8 +299,7 @@ mod tests {
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render_shared_agent(),
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"path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
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path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
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path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n\
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path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"
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path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n"
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);
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}
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@ -294,33 +308,30 @@ mod tests {
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let shared = render_shared_agent();
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assert!(!shared.contains("atlas"));
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assert!(!shared.contains("agents/*"), "{shared}");
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assert!(!shared.contains("update"));
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assert!(!shared.contains("delete"));
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// `update` is the signing stanza's and no KV path's: a KV leaf the
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// agent could rewrite would let it replace a credential it only seeds.
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let secret_only = shared
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.split("path \"ssh-agents/")
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.next()
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.unwrap_or_default();
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assert!(!secret_only.contains("update"), "{shared}");
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}
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/// What the SSH policy holds, byte for byte: one update stanza on one role's
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/// sign path, the same text for every agent.
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#[test]
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fn the_agent_may_sign_through_one_role_and_do_nothing_else_on_the_ssh_mount() {
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let shared = render_shared_agent();
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let ssh: Vec<&str> = shared
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.split("path \"")
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.filter(|s| s.starts_with(SSH_MOUNT))
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.collect();
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fn the_ssh_policy_is_update_on_one_sign_path_and_nothing_else() {
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assert_eq!(
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ssh,
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["ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"]
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render_ssh_signer(),
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"path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n"
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);
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// The control: the filter finds a stanza that is there.
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assert!(shared.split("path \"").any(|s| s.starts_with(MOUNT)));
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assert_eq!(
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format!("{SSH_MOUNT}/sign/{SSH_ROLE}"),
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"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent"
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);
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assert!(SSH_POLICY.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
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assert_ne!(SSH_POLICY, SHARED_AGENT_POLICY);
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}
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#[test]
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fn the_shared_agent_policy_names_nothing_on_the_ssh_mount() {
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assert!(!render_shared_agent().contains(SSH_MOUNT));
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assert!(render_ssh_signer().contains(SSH_MOUNT));
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}
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#[test]
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@ -525,8 +536,7 @@ mod tests {
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/// What `effective_agent("atlas")` must be, byte for byte.
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const ATLAS_DOCUMENT: &str = "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
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path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
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path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n\
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path \"ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent\" {\n capabilities = [\"update\"]\n}\n";
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path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/backend-env\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n";
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#[test]
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fn an_agents_document_is_its_stanzas_naming_that_agent() {
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@ -565,8 +575,8 @@ mod tests {
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assert!(!p.contains("argus"), "no other principal is named");
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assert_eq!(
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p.matches("path \"").count(),
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4,
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"four stanzas, or the document grants something unaccounted for: {p}"
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3,
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"three stanzas, or the document grants something unaccounted for: {p}"
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);
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}
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@ -610,12 +620,7 @@ mod tests {
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["secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*", leaf.as_str()]
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);
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assert_eq!(paths_granting(&p, "create"), [leaf.as_str()]);
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// The one `update` is the SSH signing endpoint's: no KV path takes it.
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assert_eq!(
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paths_granting(&p, "update"),
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["ssh-agents/sign/swarm-agent"]
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);
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for capability in ["delete", "sudo", "patch"] {
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for capability in ["update", "delete", "sudo", "patch"] {
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assert!(
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!p.contains(capability),
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"an agent's document must not grant {capability}: {p}"
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@ -636,9 +641,8 @@ mod tests {
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// granted, nor is `list` anywhere but `metadata/`.
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let p = effective_agent("atlas");
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let stanzas: Vec<&str> = p.split_inclusive("}\n").collect();
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assert_eq!(stanzas.len(), 4, "{p}");
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// The third is the create stanza and the fourth the signing stanza,
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// each pinned by a test above.
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assert_eq!(stanzas.len(), 3, "{p}");
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// The third is the create stanza, pinned by the test above.
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for stanza in &stanzas[..2] {
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let on_data = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/data/");
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let on_metadata = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/metadata/");
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