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docs: the forge has no raw port and is not an infra container on the host netns

ci.md named a raw forge port that no longer exists; network.md's map listed infra containers as sharing the host netns, which the forge no longer does.
This commit is contained in:
maia 2026-11-22 19:50:22 +01:00 • committed by mara
commit 57ca9433a7
2 changed files with 6 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ Agent containers always run in a private netns.
## Network map
One picture of the whole hive — two planes: **infra
containers share the host netns** and bind host ports directly;
**compute containers (agents + CI) each get a private netns** behind
One picture of the whole hive — two planes: **the few infra
containers that bind host ports (the secret store and the queue) share the
host netns**; **every other container (agents, CI, and the service
containers such as the forge and matrix) gets a private netns** behind
the bridge. The unix-socket control plane rides the VFS, and none of
that touches it.

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@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ needs `deploy.forgejo.enable` or a hive on its host.
## Container design
- **Private netns, bridge-attached**: the container runs in its own network namespace (`privateNetwork = true`, `hostBridge`), takes its address from the gateway's DHCP, and resolves through the gateway's dnsmasq on the bridge IP. It can't reach host-loopback services — the core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` and the raw forge port are unreachable from CI.
- **Private netns, bridge-attached**: the container runs in its own network namespace (`privateNetwork = true`, `hostBridge`), takes its address from the gateway's DHCP, and resolves through the gateway's dnsmasq on the bridge IP. It can't reach host-loopback services — the core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` is unreachable from CI, and the forge answers only by name through the gateway.
- **Non-ephemeral**: runner credentials (`.runner`) persist across restarts, written to the container's state dir on registration and reused after.
- **Sandbox fallback**: nspawn containers can't create user-namespaces, so nix's sandboxing would always fail. Module sets `nix.settings.sandbox-fallback = true` in the container — nix builds run unsandboxed (safe because the container is already isolated). See `docs/5-project/process/gotchas.md`.
- **Credential isolation**: no forge admin credential enters the container. swarm-controller holds the forge admin token; the runner holds only the registration token and its own `.runner`, and the host unit that fetches the token holds a store identity that reads that one path. Only `swarm-ci-runner-register.service` loads the registration token; the daemon unit and the jobs it runs have it neither in their environment nor among their credentials.
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ nspawn containers can't create user-namespaces, so the module sets `nix.settings
A malicious `default.nix` or build script in a PR can therefore:
- **Make arbitrary network requests** to any address reachable from the container. The container runs in its own netns behind the hive bridge, so it reaches the forge by name at `https://<forge.domain>` (no admin credentials) and **can't** reach host-loopback services: the unauthenticated core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` and the raw forge port are off-limits (a firewall rule drops bridge→127.0.0.0/8 traffic).
- **Make arbitrary network requests** to any address reachable from the container. The container runs in its own netns behind the hive bridge, so it reaches the forge by name at `https://<forge.domain>` (no admin credentials) and **can't** reach host-loopback services: the unauthenticated core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:7000` is off-limits (a firewall rule drops bridge→127.0.0.0/8 traffic), and the forge has no port to reach at all: it answers only by name through the gateway.
- **Write to the container filesystem**, including corrupting the runner's state dir or `.runner` credentials.
No forge admin token enters the container: swarm-controller holds it and publishes only the registration token, which only `swarm-ci-runner-register.service` loads, so a job step can't read it. A build process can still reach the forge over the network, and it runs as the runner's own user, so it can read `.runner` and act as this runner; it can't issue admin API calls.