sign ssh certificates on demand from ssh itself, warn before setup, say what to do when a host key changes
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1 changed files with 521 additions and 67 deletions
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@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. While you allow it, the agent
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gets a certificate from the swarm's SSH certificate authority (CA) that lasts
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an hour. The machine trusts the CA, so it needs no list of keys.
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> **Warning:** SSH access with no constraints on the machine makes the agent
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> unconstrained there. Whatever the agent's own sandbox stops it doing, it can
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> do on a machine it can log in to. Switch SSH on only for machines you would let
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> the agent control completely. What the agent can do on the machine is up to
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> the account you let it use: give it an account with only the rights you want
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> it to have.
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Two things have to be true before an agent gets in:
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1. **You switch SSH on for that agent**, in the swarm UI.
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@ -16,9 +23,14 @@ certificate unit. The switch alone decides whether the swarm signs.
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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Open the agent's card in the swarm UI and find the **ssh** row. Select it and
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tick **allow the agent to get SSH certificates**. The default is off. The
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agent has a certificate within about 25 minutes of the change. Untick the box
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to stop new certificates. The row also shows the three forms of the target
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tick **allow the agent to get SSH certificates**. The default is off. Untick the
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box to stop new certificates.
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The change takes seconds, not minutes. The swarm updates the agent's login
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within a few seconds. The agent gets its certificate the first time it runs
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`ssh` after that, so there is nothing to wait for on the agent. If it ran `ssh`
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just before you ticked the box, the next run within ten seconds still finds the
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refusal remembered; after that it signs. The row also shows the three forms of the target
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setup below, already filled in with the swarm's CA key and the agent's name.
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The agent then runs `ssh user@host`, with no other setup. It offers its
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@ -29,6 +41,25 @@ shows on the first connection, keeps it in its state directory (so it survives
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restarts), and refuses a changed key afterwards. A swapped machine on the first
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contact would go unnoticed. The row's explainer says so.
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### When a host's key changes
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The agent refuses a machine whose key differs from the one it kept, and `ssh`
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says the host identification changed. A rebuilt or replaced machine does this.
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Verify the new key out of band first: read the machine's host key on the machine
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itself (`ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub`) and compare it with
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the fingerprint the agent reports. If it matches, tell the agent to forget the
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old one. On the hive host, as root:
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```bash
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ssh-keygen -R <host> -f /agents/<agent>/state/ssh_known_hosts
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```
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The next connection records the new key. You can also delete the line, or the
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whole file, at that path. To work inside the agent's container instead, see
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[`hivectl`](../hives/hivectl.md) for the shell it opens as the agent user. If the
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key changed and you didn't change the machine, don't clear it: something else
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answers at that address.
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This doesn't open the network. If you set the hive's `egress.forward` to
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`reject`, the hive refuses the agent's direct connection to the machine's port
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until a separate allowance exists; the default `log` lets it through. See
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@ -77,8 +108,8 @@ bao read -field=public_key ssh-agents/config/ca
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entry, or the `cert-authority` line) and deploy the machine. The next login
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attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** untick the switch. The swarm stops signing
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for it within five minutes; an agent already signed in can still sign
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for up to an hour. Destroying the agent cuts its store identity off within
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for it within seconds; a token the agent got while the switch was on can still
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sign for up to an hour. Destroying the agent cuts its store identity off within
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minutes. Either way a certificate already signed stays valid until it
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expires, at most three hours, so removing the principal on a machine is what
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cuts it off there at once.
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