sign ssh certificates on demand from ssh itself, warn before setup, say what to do when a host key changes
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11 changed files with 521 additions and 67 deletions
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@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ key onto it. The agent holds no standing SSH key. While you allow it, the agent
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gets a certificate from the swarm's SSH certificate authority (CA) that lasts
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an hour. The machine trusts the CA, so it needs no list of keys.
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> **Warning:** SSH access with no constraints on the machine makes the agent
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> unconstrained there. Whatever the agent's own sandbox stops it doing, it can
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> do on a machine it can log in to. Switch SSH on only for machines you would let
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> the agent control completely. What the agent can do on the machine is up to
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> the account you let it use: give it an account with only the rights you want
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> it to have.
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Two things have to be true before an agent gets in:
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1. **You switch SSH on for that agent**, in the swarm UI.
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@ -16,9 +23,14 @@ certificate unit. The switch alone decides whether the swarm signs.
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## 1. Switch it on for an agent
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Open the agent's card in the swarm UI and find the **ssh** row. Select it and
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tick **allow the agent to get SSH certificates**. The default is off. The
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agent has a certificate within about 25 minutes of the change. Untick the box
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to stop new certificates. The row also shows the three forms of the target
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tick **allow the agent to get SSH certificates**. The default is off. Untick the
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box to stop new certificates.
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The change takes seconds, not minutes. The swarm updates the agent's login
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within a few seconds. The agent gets its certificate the first time it runs
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`ssh` after that, so there is nothing to wait for on the agent. If it ran `ssh`
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just before you ticked the box, the next run within ten seconds still finds the
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refusal remembered; after that it signs. The row also shows the three forms of the target
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setup below, already filled in with the swarm's CA key and the agent's name.
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The agent then runs `ssh user@host`, with no other setup. It offers its
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@ -29,6 +41,25 @@ shows on the first connection, keeps it in its state directory (so it survives
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restarts), and refuses a changed key afterwards. A swapped machine on the first
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contact would go unnoticed. The row's explainer says so.
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### When a host's key changes
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The agent refuses a machine whose key differs from the one it kept, and `ssh`
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says the host identification changed. A rebuilt or replaced machine does this.
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Verify the new key out of band first: read the machine's host key on the machine
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itself (`ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub`) and compare it with
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the fingerprint the agent reports. If it matches, tell the agent to forget the
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old one. On the hive host, as root:
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```bash
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ssh-keygen -R <host> -f /agents/<agent>/state/ssh_known_hosts
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```
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The next connection records the new key. You can also delete the line, or the
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whole file, at that path. To work inside the agent's container instead, see
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[`hivectl`](../hives/hivectl.md) for the shell it opens as the agent user. If the
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key changed and you didn't change the machine, don't clear it: something else
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answers at that address.
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This doesn't open the network. If you set the hive's `egress.forward` to
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`reject`, the hive refuses the agent's direct connection to the machine's port
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until a separate allowance exists; the default `log` lets it through. See
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@ -77,8 +108,8 @@ bao read -field=public_key ssh-agents/config/ca
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entry, or the `cert-authority` line) and deploy the machine. The next login
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attempt fails.
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- **One agent from every machine:** untick the switch. The swarm stops signing
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for it within five minutes; an agent already signed in can still sign
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for up to an hour. Destroying the agent cuts its store identity off within
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for it within seconds; a token the agent got while the switch was on can still
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sign for up to an hour. Destroying the agent cuts its store identity off within
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minutes. Either way a certificate already signed stays valid until it
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expires, at most three hours, so removing the principal on a machine is what
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cuts it off there at once.
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@ -81,11 +81,16 @@ and attaches it to the agent's cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` as a second
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- the key is `/run/hive-agent-ssh-cert/key` (directory `0700`, files `0400`,
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`UMask=0377`), generated when absent; the certificate is
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`key-cert.pub` beside it;
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- each run logs in to the store with the cert identity `hive-agent-bao-identity`
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keeps, signs `key.pub` through the role, checks the answer parses as a
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certificate and renames it into place. A `403` from the signing call is the
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switch being off: the unit prints one line and exits 0, and the next tick asks
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again. Any other failure fails the unit, which retries;
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- the unit's script is also the **helper** `ssh` runs: one text, two entries. Each
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run logs in afresh to the store with the cert identity
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`hive-agent-bao-identity` keeps, signs `key.pub` through the role, checks the
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answer parses as a certificate and renames it into place. A `403` from the
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signing call is the switch being off: the unit prints one line and exits 0,
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and the next tick asks again. Any other failure fails the unit, which retries.
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One run at a time (`flock` on the directory), the unit's or an `ssh`'s;
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- the unit copies the store's CA out of its credentials into
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`server-ca.pem` beside the key, so that an `ssh` run, which has no
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credentials directory, can reach the store;
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- the timer fires 20 minutes after each run, a third of the 60-minute lifetime,
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from the same file as the role's TTL;
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- the system `/etc/ssh/ssh_config` has one `Host *` block: `IdentityFile` and
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@ -94,7 +99,16 @@ and attaches it to the agent's cert-auth role `hive-agent-<name>` as a second
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`UserKnownHostsFile /agents/<name>/state/ssh_known_hosts`. The host binds the
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state directory in, so the pins survive a restart; the container root
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doesn't. The agent trusts the first key a host shows and refuses a changed
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one.
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one;
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- the same config starts with `Match exec "HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE=1 <helper> </dev/null"`,
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with no settings of its own. `ssh` runs the command while it reads the config,
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before it loads an identity. With `HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE` the helper is silent and
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its exit status says whether a usable certificate exists: it exits 0 at once
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when the certificate has more than ten minutes left, asks the store nothing
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for ten seconds after a refusal, and otherwise logs in and signs. Nothing in
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the config depends on the answer; the point is the certificate it leaves
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behind. Every `ssh` on the agent runs this, so a loop of them while the switch
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is off costs one login per ten seconds.
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## The target module
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@ -857,10 +857,12 @@ checkbox that does a `PUT` of `ssh` with the stored permissions beside it, and
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a folded **on the target** section. That section reads `GET /api/ssh/ca` and
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shows the swarm's CA key and the agent's name as the lines for a NixOS machine,
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a home-manager user and a plain `authorized_keys` file, with a copy button; the
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card builds the text in `frontend/packages/swarm-ui/src/agent/detail/ssh.ts`. A `PUT`
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card builds the text in `frontend/packages/swarm-ui/src/agent/detail/ssh.ts`. Above the checkbox the card shows a warning (SSH access to an
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unconstrained machine leaves the agent with no limits there), the explainer with the delays,
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and how to forget a host key that changed. The card says the change takes seconds, and why: the controller rewrites the role
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when the field changes and the agent signs on its next `ssh`. A `PUT`
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that leaves `ssh` out, and the `DELETE` of **use the default**, keep it. The
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controller attaches the signing policy to the agent's login role within five
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minutes; see [the SSH CA](../swarm/ssh-ca.md#the-switch-and-the-signing-policy).
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controller attaches the signing policy to the agent's login role at once; see [the SSH CA](../swarm/ssh-ca.md#the-switch-and-the-signing-policy).
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A saved change isn't instant. The hive reads the grant about every 30 seconds
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and the agent takes it at its next turn. A change to `manage_root_agent`
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@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { Hint } from "../../ui/hint/Hint.js";
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import { Preformatted } from "../../ui/preformatted/Preformatted.js";
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import type { GrantState } from "./AgentPermissions.js";
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import {
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forgetHostKeyCommand,
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sshBody,
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sshSummary,
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targetSnippet,
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@ -77,19 +78,27 @@ export function AgentSsh({ agent, g }: { agent: string; g: GrantState }) {
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title={`whether ${agent} may get SSH certificates from the swarm`}
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popoverLabel={`${agent} SSH access`}
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>
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<p class="ui-badge-popover-help" role="note">
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<strong>Warning:</strong> SSH access with no constraints on the
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machine makes {agent} unconstrained there. Whatever {agent}'s own
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sandbox stops it doing, it can do on a machine it can log in to. Only
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allow this for machines you would let {agent} control completely.
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</p>
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<p class="ui-badge-popover-help">
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Lets {agent} log in over SSH to machines that trust the swarm's SSH
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certificate authority. With this on, {agent} gets a certificate that
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names it and lasts one hour, and renews it every 20 minutes; its key
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lives in memory only. The change reaches {agent} within about 25
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minutes. A certificate already signed stays valid until it expires, at
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most three hours. A machine has to trust the authority before anything
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works: see "on the target" below.
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certificate authority. With this on, {agent} signs its own key for a
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certificate that names it, on its first <code>ssh</code> after the
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swarm has updated its login, which takes seconds. The certificate
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lasts one hour, and the key lives in memory only. Switching off stops
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new certificates within seconds; one already signed stays valid until
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it expires, an hour after signing. A machine has to trust the
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authority before anything works: see "on the target" below.
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</p>
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<p class="ui-badge-popover-help" role="note">
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{agent} accepts the key a machine shows on the first connection and
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refuses a changed one afterwards (trust on first use). It does not
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check the key against anything you registered.
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refuses a changed one afterwards (trust on first use). If a host's key
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really changed, check the new key out of band, then forget the old one
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with <code>{forgetHostKeyCommand(agent)}</code> on the hive host.
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</p>
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<CheckboxField
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id={`ssh-${agent}`}
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@ -73,3 +73,12 @@ export function targetSnippet(
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return `# in ~<user>/.ssh/authorized_keys on the target\n${authorizedKeysLine(agent, ca)}`;
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}
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}
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/**
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* The command that makes the agent forget a host's recorded key, run as root on
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* the hive host after the operator has checked the new key out of band. The
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* agent's pins live in its state directory.
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*/
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export function forgetHostKeyCommand(agent: string): string {
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return `ssh-keygen -R <host> -f /agents/${agent}/state/ssh_known_hosts`;
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}
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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import { test } from "node:test";
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import {
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authorizedKeysLine,
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forgetHostKeyCommand,
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sshBody,
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sshSummary,
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targetSnippet,
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@ -37,6 +38,14 @@ test("the authorized_keys line trusts the CA for one principal only", () => {
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);
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});
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test("the forget command names the agent's pin file and leaves the host to the operator", () => {
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assert.equal(
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forgetHostKeyCommand("atlas"),
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"ssh-keygen -R <host> -f /agents/atlas/state/ssh_known_hosts",
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);
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assert.ok(forgetHostKeyCommand("maia").includes("/agents/maia/"));
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});
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test("each target form names the agent and the CA key, and keeps <user> for the operator", () => {
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for (const form of ["nixos", "home-manager", "ssh"]) {
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const text = targetSnippet(form, "atlas", ca);
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@ -3,18 +3,26 @@
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#
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# On every agent that has a store address (the same switch as ./bao.nix: with no
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# store there is nothing to sign with). The agent has no standing SSH credential:
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# `${unitName}.service` generates an ed25519 key in its own `/run` directory
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# (tmpfs, never on disk), logs in to the swarm secret store with the identity
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# ./bao.nix keeps current, and has the public half signed by the store's SSH
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# engine (`swarm_secret_client::policy::SSH_MOUNT`). The role it signs through
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# issues a user certificate with this agent's name as its only principal, valid
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# for an hour; a timer signs again well before that runs out.
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# the helper below generates an ed25519 key in `/run/${unitName}` (tmpfs, never
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# on disk), logs in to the swarm secret store with the identity ./bao.nix keeps
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# current, and has the public half signed by the store's SSH engine
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# (`swarm_secret_client::policy::SSH_MOUNT`). The role it signs through issues a
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# user certificate with this agent's name as its only principal, valid for an
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# hour.
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#
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# Whether the store signs is the operator's per-agent switch in the swarm UI
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# (the `ssh` permission, `swarm-controller`'s `agent_ssh`). With it off the store
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# refuses, the unit logs one line and ends successfully, and the next tick asks
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# again; with it on the agent has a certificate within one tick. The unit
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# needs no change to be switched.
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# (the `ssh` permission, `swarm-controller`'s `agent_ssh`). Every signing makes a
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# fresh login, so a token never outlives the policies the role had when it was
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# issued by more than the helper's own run. Two things run the helper:
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#
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# - `${unitName}.service`, from a timer, renews well before the certificate
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# runs out. With the switch off the store refuses: the unit logs one line, ends
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# successfully and asks again at the next tick.
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# - `ssh` itself, through a `Match exec` line in the system config: when the
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# certificate is missing or close to its end, the helper signs before the
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# connection starts. That is what makes the first `ssh` after the operator
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# switches SSH on work at once. It is silent and its exit status is whether a
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# usable certificate exists; nothing in the config depends on the answer.
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#
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# A target machine trusts the CA, not this key: ../target-modules/agent-ssh.nix.
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{
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@ -38,28 +46,57 @@ let
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unitName = "hive-agent-ssh-cert";
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runtimeDir = unitName;
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keyFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/key";
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dir = "/run/${runtimeDir}";
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keyFile = "${dir}/key";
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pubFile = "${keyFile}.pub";
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# `ssh` reads `<IdentityFile>-cert.pub` by itself, but the config names it so
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# that the file a Host block uses is visible in the config.
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certFile = "${keyFile}-cert.pub";
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stagingFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/cert.new";
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errFile = "/run/${runtimeDir}/bao.err";
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stagingFile = "${dir}/cert.new";
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errFile = "${dir}/bao.err";
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# The store's CA, copied out of the unit's credentials so that the helper can
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# reach the store from an `ssh` run, which has no credentials directory.
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serverCaCopy = "${dir}/server-ca.pem";
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# Written when the store refuses, so that a loop of `ssh` calls does not log in
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# to the store each time the switch is off.
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refusedFile = "${dir}/refused";
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# In the state dir, which is bound from the host, so a pin survives a restart.
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knownHostsFile = "/agents/${agentName}/state/ssh_known_hosts";
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signPath = "${ca.mountPath}/sign/${ca.roleName}";
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# A certificate with less than this left is signed again by `ssh`. The timer
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# fires every `ca.renewEveryMinutes`, so a healthy agent never gets here.
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ensureMarginSec = 600;
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# How long a refusal is remembered. The delay the operator sees after
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# switching on is at most this, then one login and one signing.
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refusedForSec = 10;
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storeRetry = import ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix { };
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binPath = lib.makeBinPath [
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pkgs.openbao
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pkgs.openssh
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pkgs.coreutils
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pkgs.gnused
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pkgs.util-linux
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];
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# The helper, and the unit's script: one text. `HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE=1` is the
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# `ssh` entry; without it this is the timer's. The tools go after the caller's
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# `PATH`, so a caller that has its own wins.
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helper = pkgs.writeShellScript unitName config.systemd.services.${unitName}.script;
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in
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{
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config = lib.mkIf (baoCfg.addr != null) {
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# Every host: the certificate, and the pins in the state dir, which outlives
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# the container root. `accept-new` records a host's key at first contact and
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# refuses a changed one after that.
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# refuses a changed one after that. The `Match` line has no settings: ssh
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# runs its command while it reads the config, before it loads any identity,
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# and the answer is not used.
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programs.ssh.extraConfig = ''
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Match exec "HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE=1 ${helper} </dev/null"
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Host *
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IdentityFile ${keyFile}
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CertificateFile ${certFile}
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@ -77,11 +114,6 @@ in
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"hive-agent-bao-identity.service"
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];
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wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
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path = [
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pkgs.openbao
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pkgs.openssh
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pkgs.coreutils
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];
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# ../host-modules/lib/store-retry.nix.
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inherit (storeRetry) startLimitBurst startLimitIntervalSec;
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serviceConfig = storeRetry.serviceConfig // {
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@ -98,19 +130,77 @@ in
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UMask = "0377";
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LoadCredential = [ serverCaCredential ];
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};
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environment = {
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BAO_ADDR = toString baoCfg.addr;
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BAO_CLIENT_CERT = baoCfg.clientCertFile;
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BAO_CLIENT_KEY = baoCfg.clientKeyFile;
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};
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script = ''
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set -euo pipefail
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# `UMask=0377` in the unit makes every file this script creates `0400`,
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# so each one is removed before the command that creates it. `ssh` runs
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# the same text, which therefore sets it too.
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umask 0377
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export PATH="$PATH:${binPath}"
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export BAO_ADDR=${lib.escapeShellArg (toString baoCfg.addr)}
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export BAO_CLIENT_CERT=${lib.escapeShellArg baoCfg.clientCertFile}
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export BAO_CLIENT_KEY=${lib.escapeShellArg baoCfg.clientKeyFile}
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dir=${lib.escapeShellArg dir}
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key=${lib.escapeShellArg keyFile}
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pub=${lib.escapeShellArg pubFile}
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cert=${lib.escapeShellArg certFile}
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staged=${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile}
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err=${lib.escapeShellArg errFile}
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server_ca=${lib.escapeShellArg serverCaCopy}
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refused=${lib.escapeShellArg refusedFile}
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ensure=
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if [ -n "''${HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE-}" ]; then ensure=1; fi
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# The `ssh` entry is silent and says yes or no by its exit status; the
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# unit's output is its log.
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if [ -n "$ensure" ]; then exec >/dev/null 2>&1; fi
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# `ssh` can run before the unit's first start has made the directory.
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if [ ! -d "$dir" ]; then mkdir -m 0700 "$dir"; fi
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# One run at a time, the unit's or an `ssh`'s: two would race on the key
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# and the staged file.
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exec {lock}<"$dir"
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if ! flock -w 20 "$lock"; then
|
||||
echo "another run holds $dir and did not finish in 20 seconds." >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Epoch second the certificate ends, 0 when there is none.
|
||||
cert_end() {
|
||||
local end
|
||||
end=$(ssh-keygen -L -f "$cert" 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/^ *Valid: from .* to //p') || end=
|
||||
if [ -n "$end" ]; then date -d "$end" +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 0; else echo 0; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$ensure" ]; then
|
||||
now=$(date +%s)
|
||||
# Enough left: nothing to do, and nothing asked of the store.
|
||||
if [ "$(cert_end)" -gt $((now + ${toString ensureMarginSec})) ]; then exit 0; fi
|
||||
# The store refused a moment ago: the switch is off.
|
||||
if [ -e "$refused" ] && [ $((now - $(stat -c %Y "$refused"))) -lt ${toString refusedForSec} ]; then
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# The unit has the credentials directory and keeps the store's CA where
|
||||
# an `ssh` run can find it.
|
||||
if [ -n "''${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY-}" ] && [ -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" ]; then
|
||||
rm -f "$server_ca"
|
||||
cp "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" "$server_ca"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -s "$server_ca" ]; then export BAO_CACERT="$server_ca"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
trap 'rm -f "$err" "$staged"' EXIT
|
||||
|
||||
# No identity delivered: ./bao.nix's check reports that; saying it
|
||||
# twice adds nothing.
|
||||
for f in "$BAO_CLIENT_CERT" "$BAO_CLIENT_KEY"; do
|
||||
if [ ! -s "$f" ]; then
|
||||
echo "this agent has no store identity, so it cannot get an SSH certificate." >&2
|
||||
if [ -n "$ensure" ]; then exit 1; fi
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ ! -r "$f" ]; then
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,19 +209,6 @@ in
|
|||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -s "$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}" ]; then
|
||||
export BAO_CACERT="$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/${serverCaCredential}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# `UMask=0377` makes every file this script creates `0400`, so each one
|
||||
# is removed before the command that creates it.
|
||||
key=${lib.escapeShellArg keyFile}
|
||||
pub=${lib.escapeShellArg pubFile}
|
||||
cert=${lib.escapeShellArg certFile}
|
||||
staged=${lib.escapeShellArg stagingFile}
|
||||
err=${lib.escapeShellArg errFile}
|
||||
trap 'rm -f "$err" "$staged"' EXIT
|
||||
|
||||
# The key lives as long as /run does, which is as long as this
|
||||
# container: a restart is a new key. Only a pair with both halves is
|
||||
# kept.
|
||||
|
|
@ -141,6 +218,8 @@ in
|
|||
chmod 0400 "$key"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# A fresh login every time: a token carries the policies the role had
|
||||
# when it was issued, so only a new one sees the operator's switch.
|
||||
rm -f "$err"
|
||||
if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
|
||||
echo "the swarm secret store at $BAO_ADDR refused or could not answer this agent's certificate login:" >&2
|
||||
|
|
@ -157,7 +236,10 @@ in
|
|||
# so no failed unit. Anything else (a sealed or unreachable store) is
|
||||
# one, and retried.
|
||||
if [[ "$(<"$err")" == *"Code: 403"* ]]; then
|
||||
rm -f "$refused"
|
||||
: >"$refused"
|
||||
echo "SSH certificates are not enabled for this agent (the swarm store refused to sign); asking again next tick."
|
||||
if [ -n "$ensure" ]; then exit 1; fi
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "the swarm secret store would not sign this agent's SSH key at ${signPath}:" >&2
|
||||
|
|
@ -173,6 +255,7 @@ in
|
|||
|
||||
# One rename: ssh never reads a half-written certificate.
|
||||
mv -f "$staged" "$cert"
|
||||
rm -f "$refused"
|
||||
echo "signed this agent's SSH key as ${agentName}, valid for ${toString ca.certTtlMinutes} minutes."
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -236,6 +236,12 @@ in
|
|||
inherit pkgs self nixosSystem;
|
||||
inherit (pkgs) lib;
|
||||
};
|
||||
# Runs ./agent-modules/ssh.nix's helper, the timer's entry and the one `ssh`
|
||||
# runs, against a stub `bao` and a real `ssh-keygen`.
|
||||
script-test-agent-ssh-cert = import ./script-tests/agent-ssh-cert.nix {
|
||||
inherit pkgs self nixosSystem;
|
||||
inherit (pkgs) lib;
|
||||
};
|
||||
# Runs ./agent-modules/backend-env.nix's fetch-and-seed unit against a stub
|
||||
# `bao` that keeps its leaves in files.
|
||||
script-test-agent-backend-env = import ./script-tests/agent-backend-env.nix {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ let
|
|||
&& !(lib.hasInfix "valid_principals" s)
|
||||
&& !(lib.hasInfix ".ssh" s)
|
||||
&& lib.elem "hive-agent-bao-identity.service" u.after
|
||||
&& u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT == agentForgeBao.services.hyperhive.agent.bao.clientCertFile;
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "export BAO_CLIENT_CERT=${agentForgeBao.services.hyperhive.agent.bao.clientCertFile}" s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
# The certificate lives an hour and the timer fires every third of
|
||||
|
|
@ -599,17 +599,35 @@ let
|
|||
&& !(lib.hasInfix "hive-agent-ssh-cert" agentForgeNoBao.environment.etc."ssh/ssh_config".text);
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
# A refused signing is the switch being off, not a fault: one line and a
|
||||
# clean exit. Any other failure still fails the unit so it retries.
|
||||
name = "the ssh certificate unit ends cleanly on a 403 and fails on any other signing error";
|
||||
# `ssh` runs the helper before it loads an identity, so the first `ssh`
|
||||
# after the operator's switch has a certificate. The line comes before the
|
||||
# `Host *` block it serves, runs the `ssh` entry, and is on every agent
|
||||
# with a store and no other.
|
||||
name = "the ssh config signs on demand: a Match exec line runs the helper's ssh entry ahead of the Host block";
|
||||
ok =
|
||||
let
|
||||
conf = agentForgeBao.environment.etc."ssh/ssh_config".text;
|
||||
# What comes before the first `Host *`.
|
||||
before = lib.head (lib.splitString "Host *" conf);
|
||||
in
|
||||
lib.hasInfix "Match exec \"HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE=1 /nix/store/" before
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "</dev/null\"" conf
|
||||
&& !(lib.hasInfix "Match exec" agentForgeNoBao.environment.etc."ssh/ssh_config".text);
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
# The helper is the unit's script and the one `ssh` runs: the ssh entry
|
||||
# is silent, signs from a fresh login, and remembers a refusal.
|
||||
name = "the ssh helper is silent in the ssh entry, logs in afresh to sign, and keeps the store's CA for the ssh run";
|
||||
ok =
|
||||
let
|
||||
s = (sshUnit agentForgeBao).script;
|
||||
at = lib.splitString "Code: 403" s;
|
||||
in
|
||||
lib.length at == 2
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "exit 0" (lib.head (lib.splitString "exit 1" (lib.elemAt at 1)))
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "exit 1" (lib.elemAt at 1);
|
||||
lib.hasInfix "HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE" s
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "exec >/dev/null 2>&1" s
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "bao login -method=cert -token-only" s
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "export BAO_TOKEN" s
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "server-ca.pem" s
|
||||
&& lib.hasInfix "Code: 403" s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
];
|
||||
in
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
92
nix/script-tests/agent-ssh-cert.nix
Normal file
92
nix/script-tests/agent-ssh-cert.nix
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
|
|||
# `checks.script-test-agent-ssh-cert` — runs ../agent-modules/ssh.nix's helper,
|
||||
# the text of the unit `hive-agent-ssh-cert`, against a stub `bao` and a real
|
||||
# `ssh-keygen`, in both entries: the timer's and the `ssh` one. The cases are in
|
||||
# ./agent-ssh-cert.sh.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The one edit to the text is its `/run/` prefix, moved under the build
|
||||
# directory because the sandbox has no writable `/run`. The helper adds its own
|
||||
# tools after the caller's `PATH`, so the stub in front wins.
|
||||
{
|
||||
pkgs,
|
||||
lib,
|
||||
self,
|
||||
nixosSystem,
|
||||
}:
|
||||
let
|
||||
inherit
|
||||
(import ../module-eval/lib.nix {
|
||||
inherit
|
||||
pkgs
|
||||
lib
|
||||
self
|
||||
nixosSystem
|
||||
;
|
||||
})
|
||||
agentWith
|
||||
;
|
||||
|
||||
machine = agentWith { services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr = "https://bao.t.local:8200"; };
|
||||
|
||||
# `login` prints a token; `write` signs `public_key=@<file>` with the test CA
|
||||
# for `FAKE_SIGN_VALID` (an `ssh-keygen -V` interval), or answers 403 when
|
||||
# `FAKE_SIGN_MODE` is `refuse`, or fails otherwise when it is `fail`. A call
|
||||
# without the token the last login printed fails, so a script that signs
|
||||
# without a login of its own cannot pass.
|
||||
fakeBao = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "bao" ''
|
||||
umask 022
|
||||
echo "$1" >> "$FAKE_BAO_LOG"
|
||||
case "$1" in
|
||||
login)
|
||||
printf 'tok-%s' "$(wc -l < "$FAKE_BAO_LOG")"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
write)
|
||||
if [ "''${BAO_TOKEN-}" != "tok-$(( $(wc -l < "$FAKE_BAO_LOG") - 1 ))" ]; then
|
||||
echo "fake bao: write without the token of the login just before it" >&2
|
||||
exit 97
|
||||
fi
|
||||
case "$FAKE_SIGN_MODE" in
|
||||
refuse)
|
||||
printf 'Error writing data: Code: 403. Errors:\n* permission denied\n' >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
fail)
|
||||
printf 'Error writing data: Code: 503. Errors:\n* sealed\n' >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
pub=
|
||||
for a in "$@"; do
|
||||
case "$a" in public_key=@*) pub=''${a#public_key=@} ;; esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
tmp=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
cp "$pub" "$tmp/k.pub"
|
||||
${pkgs.openssh}/bin/ssh-keygen -q -s "$FAKE_CA_KEY" -I fake -n a1 -V "$FAKE_SIGN_VALID" "$tmp/k.pub"
|
||||
cat "$tmp/k-cert.pub"
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "fake bao: unexpected call: $*" >&2
|
||||
exit 98
|
||||
;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
'';
|
||||
|
||||
script = pkgs.writeText "agent-ssh-cert-script" machine.systemd.services.hive-agent-ssh-cert.script;
|
||||
in
|
||||
pkgs.runCommand "hyperhive-script-test-agent-ssh-cert"
|
||||
{
|
||||
nativeBuildInputs = [
|
||||
pkgs.openssh
|
||||
pkgs.coreutils
|
||||
pkgs.util-linux
|
||||
];
|
||||
SSH_CERT_SCRIPT = script;
|
||||
FAKE_BAO_BIN = "${fakeBao}/bin";
|
||||
SSH_CERT_PATH = lib.makeBinPath [
|
||||
pkgs.coreutils
|
||||
pkgs.bash
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
''
|
||||
${pkgs.bash}/bin/bash ${./agent-ssh-cert.sh}
|
||||
touch "$out"
|
||||
''
|
||||
181
nix/script-tests/agent-ssh-cert.sh
Normal file
181
nix/script-tests/agent-ssh-cert.sh
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
|
|||
# Cases for ./agent-ssh-cert.nix. Each case gets a fresh runtime directory and
|
||||
# runs the helper in one entry (the timer's, or `ssh`'s with
|
||||
# HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE=1) with a clean environment, and asserts on the exit
|
||||
# code, the output, the files left behind and the `bao` calls made.
|
||||
set -uo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
failures=0
|
||||
count=0
|
||||
case=
|
||||
|
||||
fail() {
|
||||
echo "FAILED: $case: $*" >&2
|
||||
failures=$((failures + 1))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
top=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N "" -f "$top/ca"
|
||||
|
||||
# setup <description>
|
||||
setup() {
|
||||
case="$1"
|
||||
dir=$(mktemp -d)
|
||||
rt=$dir/run/hive-agent-ssh-cert
|
||||
mkdir -p "$dir/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/current" "$dir/creds"
|
||||
mkdir -m 0700 "$rt"
|
||||
printf cert >"$dir/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/current/cert"
|
||||
printf key >"$dir/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/current/key"
|
||||
printf ca >"$dir/creds/hive-agent-bao-server-ca"
|
||||
log=$dir/bao.log
|
||||
: >"$log"
|
||||
sed -e "s|/run/|$dir/run/|g" "$SSH_CERT_SCRIPT" >"$dir/script"
|
||||
chmod +x "$dir/script"
|
||||
if grep -q ' /run/\|"/run/\|=/run/' "$dir/script"; then fail "the script still names /run after the rewrite"; fi
|
||||
sign_mode=ok
|
||||
valid=+1h
|
||||
creds=$dir/creds
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# go [ensure]
|
||||
go() {
|
||||
count=$((count + 1))
|
||||
local ensure=
|
||||
if [ "${1-}" = ensure ]; then ensure=1; fi
|
||||
(
|
||||
cd "$dir" || exit 99
|
||||
exec env -i \
|
||||
PATH="$FAKE_BAO_BIN:$SSH_CERT_PATH" \
|
||||
HOME="$dir" \
|
||||
CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY="$creds" \
|
||||
HIVE_SSH_CERT_ENSURE="$ensure" \
|
||||
FAKE_BAO_LOG="$log" \
|
||||
FAKE_CA_KEY="$top/ca" \
|
||||
FAKE_SIGN_MODE="$sign_mode" \
|
||||
FAKE_SIGN_VALID="$valid" \
|
||||
"$dir/script"
|
||||
) >"$dir/out" 2>"$dir/err"
|
||||
rc=$?
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect_rc() {
|
||||
if [ "$rc" != "$1" ]; then fail "exit $rc, expected $1; stderr: $(<"$dir/err")"; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect_silent() {
|
||||
if [ -s "$dir/out" ] || [ -s "$dir/err" ]; then fail "output where none was wanted: $(<"$dir/out") $(<"$dir/err")"; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect_calls() {
|
||||
local want
|
||||
want=$(printf '%s\n' "$@")
|
||||
if [ "$(<"$log")" != "${want%$'\n'}" ]; then fail "bao calls were '$(<"$log" tr '\n' ' ')', expected '$*'"; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
expect_cert() {
|
||||
if ! ssh-keygen -L -f "$rt/key-cert.pub" >/dev/null 2>&1; then fail "no readable certificate at $rt/key-cert.pub"; fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# The seconds the certificate at $rt has left; 0 when there is none.
|
||||
left() {
|
||||
local end
|
||||
end=$(ssh-keygen -L -f "$rt/key-cert.pub" 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/^ *Valid: from .* to //p')
|
||||
if [ -z "$end" ]; then echo 0; else echo $(($(date -d "$end" +%s) - $(date +%s))); fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# A certificate for the key the helper will keep, valid for `$1`, put in place
|
||||
# as a first run would have left it.
|
||||
seed_cert() {
|
||||
mkdir -p "$rt"
|
||||
rm -f "$rt/key" "$rt/key.pub" "$rt/key-cert.pub"
|
||||
(umask 0377 && ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N "" -f "$rt/key" && chmod 0400 "$rt/key")
|
||||
ssh-keygen -q -s "$top/ca" -I seed -n a1 -V "$1" "$rt/key.pub"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
setup "ssh finds no certificate: it logs in, signs, and is silent and true"
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_silent
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
expect_cert
|
||||
if [ "$(left)" -lt 3000 ]; then fail "the new certificate has only $(left)s left"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
setup "ssh finds a certificate with time left: it asks the store nothing"
|
||||
seed_cert +1h
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_silent
|
||||
expect_calls
|
||||
|
||||
setup "ssh finds a certificate close to its end: it signs again with a fresh login"
|
||||
seed_cert +5m
|
||||
before=$(left)
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_silent
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
if [ "$(left)" -le "$before" ]; then fail "the certificate was not replaced ($before then $(left))"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
setup "ssh finds an expired certificate: it signs again"
|
||||
seed_cert -2h:-1h
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
if [ "$(left)" -lt 3000 ]; then fail "an expired certificate was kept ($(left)s)"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
setup "the store refuses (switch off): ssh gets false, quietly, and no certificate"
|
||||
sign_mode=refuse
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 1
|
||||
expect_silent
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
if [ -e "$rt/key-cert.pub" ]; then fail "a certificate appeared although the store refused"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
setup "right after a refusal ssh does not ask again, and does once the memory has aged"
|
||||
sign_mode=refuse
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 1
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
touch -d '1 minute ago' "$rt/refused"
|
||||
sign_mode=ok
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_calls login write login write
|
||||
expect_cert
|
||||
|
||||
setup "the timer's entry signs even with time left, and a refusal is one line and a clean exit"
|
||||
seed_cert +1h
|
||||
go
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
expect_calls login write
|
||||
sign_mode=refuse
|
||||
go
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
if ! grep -q 'not enabled for this agent' "$dir/out"; then fail "no line saying signing is off: $(<"$dir/out")"; fi
|
||||
if [ -s "$dir/err" ]; then fail "stderr on a refusal: $(<"$dir/err")"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
setup "any other signing failure fails both entries, and ssh stays quiet"
|
||||
sign_mode=fail
|
||||
go
|
||||
expect_rc 1
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 1
|
||||
expect_silent
|
||||
|
||||
setup "a store identity that is missing is true for the timer and false for ssh"
|
||||
rm "$dir/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/current/cert"
|
||||
go
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
go ensure
|
||||
expect_rc 1
|
||||
expect_calls
|
||||
|
||||
setup "the unit keeps the store's CA where an ssh run finds it, and the key stays unreadable to others"
|
||||
go
|
||||
expect_rc 0
|
||||
if [ "$(<"$rt/server-ca.pem")" != ca ]; then fail "the store's CA was not copied"; fi
|
||||
if [ "$(stat -c %a "$rt/key")" != 400 ]; then fail "the key is mode $(stat -c %a "$rt/key")"; fi
|
||||
if [ "$(stat -c %a "$rt/key-cert.pub")" != 400 ]; then fail "the certificate is mode $(stat -c %a "$rt/key-cert.pub")"; fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "$count runs, $failures failures"
|
||||
if [ "$failures" -ne 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue