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remove hive and agent apis nothing calls: build-log routes, /api/compact, host.sock list, mcp.sock wake

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atlas 2026-11-13 02:48:37 +01:00
commit 36c7781245
1 changed files with 115 additions and 801 deletions
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21
docs/5-project/process/conventions.md
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@ -66,24 +66,17 @@ No auth tokens exist on the per-agent unix sockets. The socket
bind-mount." A sub-agent only sees its own `/run/hive/mcp.sock`;
hive-c0re owns the host admin socket.
### Wake injection
`hive_core_agent_sock::Request::Wake { from, body }` is the
wake-event-injection surface on the host-served per-agent socket.
Recipient is implicit — the agent the socket belongs to — and `from`
is caller-chosen so the wake prompt can label the source verbatim
(`"matrix: new message in #general"`, `"forge: PR #42 opened"`, etc.). <!-- lint:allow: example strings, not real tags -->
`hive-c0re` handles it; matrix, bash and forge don't call it — their
notifications upsert a todo on the harness's in-agent socket
(`HIVE_AGENT_SOCKET`), which signals the same turn loop without a
Matrix, bash and forge wake the agent by upserting a todo on the harness's
in-agent socket (`HIVE_AGENT_SOCKET`), which signals the turn loop without a
hive-c0re round-trip. See
[`docs/4-implementation/turn-loop/mcp.md` § Waking the agent from inside the
container](../../4-implementation/turn-loop/mcp.md#waking-the-agent-from-inside-the-container).
The host-served `/run/hive/mcp.sock` has no verb that injects a message into
the agent's own inbox.
Identity = socket means anything that can connect to
`/run/hive/mcp.sock` is implicitly trusted to inject wakes. That's
fine: the bind-mount only exposes the socket inside the agent's own
container, so the trust boundary is the container's process
Anything that can connect to `/run/hive/mcp.sock` is implicitly trusted to
call its verbs. That's fine: the bind-mount only exposes the socket inside the
agent's own container, so the trust boundary is the container's process
namespace, not the wire surface.
## Recipient sentinels