docs: the trust-boundary pages keep the operator guidance, the mechanism moves to implementation
boundary.md keeps the model, the design rule, why network isolation matters and host admin socket access; the hive-priv socket activation and the per-agent socket directory move to 4-implementation/trust-boundary. security.md keeps the agent trust model and the path-name rule; the nix builds mode with its threat model, and the hive-c0re privilege separation, move to their own pages there. Headings and text move as they were, with one level shaved off the heading depth. Links, code and nix pointers, and the docs index follow the moves.
This commit is contained in:
iris
mara
parent
5d5df29687
commit
30a8f71bb5
4 changed files with 338 additions and 307 deletions
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@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ Every agent binds its web UI on a unix-domain socket at
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nginx reaches `web.sock` through `o=--x` (traverse) and the socket's
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own `0666`. The gateway is one of three principals sharing that dir
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and doesn't own its ownership rules — see
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[`docs/2-handbook/trust-boundary/boundary.md`](../../2-handbook/trust-boundary/boundary.md#the-per-agent-socket-dir).
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[`docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/boundary-mechanism.md`](../trust-boundary/boundary-mechanism.md#the-per-agent-socket-dir).
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3. **Marker gate**. After a successful `bind_unix`, the harness drops
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`<dir>/hyperhive-socket-bound` next to the socket. c0re's
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`agent_sockets::write` filters its JSON map by marker presence —
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72
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/boundary-mechanism.md
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72
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/boundary-mechanism.md
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
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# Socket mechanics behind the operator/agent boundary
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How systemd activates `hive-priv` and how the per-agent socket directory
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gets its owner and mode, the two pieces of the boundary described in
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[the operator/agent boundary](../../2-handbook/trust-boundary/boundary.md).
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## hive-priv socket activation
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`hive-priv` is **always** socket-activated by the `hive-priv.socket`
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systemd unit. The unit binds `/run/hive/priv.sock` with
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`SocketGroup=hive-core` and mode `0660` and passes the ready listener
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to the helper as fd 3 (`LISTEN_FDS`). The helper requires this and
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bails if it isn't socket-activated.
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⚠️ Intentionally, no self-bind fallback exists: if `hive-priv` bound
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the socket itself, it would create the file owned by root's primary
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group rather than `hive-core`, and a `hive-core` client couldn't
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connect the way the socket unit's `SocketGroup` grant intends.
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Requiring socket activation everywhere keeps dev and prod on the
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exact same path, so the group grant always holds.
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## the per-agent socket dir
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**Three principals that share no group** reach `/run/hive-agent/<name>/`,
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which is why its mode is what it's:
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| principal | reaches | needs |
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| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------ |
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| the agent's harness | binds + unlinks `agent.sock`, `web.sock` | owner, `rwx` |
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| `hive-c0re` | dials `agent.sock` (todo wakes) | traverse |
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| the gateway's nginx | dials `web.sock` | traverse |
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The last two land in "other," so the dir is **`0751`, owned by the
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agent's container uid/gid** — `o=--x` is traverse without listing, and
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both sockets are `0666`, which is all a dialer needs.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
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**One mechanism creates it, one sets its owner.** Before every start,
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hive-priv creates the dir when missing (`EnsureAgentSocketDir`, `0751
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root:root`, no symlink followed) and leaves an existing one alone. The
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container's own activation (`hive-agent-user-migrate`) then chowns it to
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the agent user and sets `0751`. Without a user namespace
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that uid is the host inode's owner. (A namespaced agent, see "User namespace" in
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`docs/2-handbook/agent-lifecycle/persistence.md`, gets the dir from `EnsureAgentSocketDir`
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owned by its data owner instead, because the container can't chown through
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the id map.) Don't add another host-side chown or chmod:
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two owners of one path revert each other. Until the container activates,
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the dir is `0751 root`: nothing but root can plant a socket in it.
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<!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
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The mode is load-bearing, not cosmetic. Write permission on a
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_directory_ is what confers the right to unlink its entries, whoever owns
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them, and the sticky bit is the only thing that would restrain that (it
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isn't set here). A world-writable socket dir therefore lets anything
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able to reach the path delete an agent's socket and bind its own. On the
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host, any non-root process whose `/run` is writable can do that, such as
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a login session or dnsmasq. nginx only dials: `ProtectSystem=strict` makes its view
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of `/run` read-only. Dropping `o=w` removes that permission rather than
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qualifying it.
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⚠️ **The gateway's nginx and dnsmasq are host services, next to
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`hive-c0re`** (see `docs/4-implementation/networking/gateway.md`) — there is no namespace between
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them and the rest of the host. That costs no network isolation: nginx
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binds the host's `:80`/`:443` and reaches `localhost` upstreams, which
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would require opening a netns anyway.
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🔑 It does mean nothing _implicitly_ scopes the privileged reload verb —
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see [`docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md`](hive-c0re-privilege.md) for
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how `PrivRequest::ReloadGatewayNginx`'s containment works.
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⚠️ This dir has exactly one writer, so it needs no world write at all.
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131
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md
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131
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/hive-c0re-privilege.md
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@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
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# hive-c0re privilege separation
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How `hive-c0re` runs unprivileged and delegates its root operations to
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`hive-priv`, from the [security model](../../2-handbook/trust-boundary/security.md).
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## Background
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`hive-c0re` runs as the unprivileged system user `hive-core`
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(`/var/lib/hyperhive` owned by `hive-core:hive-core`). It can't
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directly invoke `nixos-container` or act on a system
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unit (`systemctl reload nginx`) — those require root. `hive-priv` fills
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this gap.
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⚠️ **`ReloadGatewayNginx` acts on a host unit, so nothing implicitly
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scopes it.** Its containment is the unit name hard-coded in `hive-priv`:
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a caller can't name the unit, so it can't steer the verb at another
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service. **A privileged verb needs something bounding what it can act
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on; when that isn't a namespace, it has to be a constant the caller
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can't supply.**
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## hive-priv
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`hive-priv` is a minimal privileged helper that runs as root, socket-activated
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at `/run/hive/priv.sock` (mode `0660`, group `hive-core` — only the
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`hive-core` user can connect). `hive-c0re` calls it via `priv_client`
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for every operation that genuinely requires root.
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**Narrow interface** — `PrivRequest` variants map 1:1 to specific
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known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through:
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| Operation | What it runs |
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| ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `StartContainer` / `StopContainer` | `nixos-container start/stop <name>` |
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| `KillContainer` | `machinectl kill <machine> --signal=SIGKILL` (`nixos-container` has no kill verb) |
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| `StartFailureLog` | `journalctl _SYSTEMD_UNIT=container@h-<name>.service --since @<t> -n 30 -o cat --no-pager`, fixed argv, 5 s timeout, output capped at 8 KiB; hive-priv clamps `<t>` to the last hour. hive-c0re appends the lines to the failed start's build log, which only the dashboard serves. |
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| `CreateContainer` / `UpdateContainer` | `nixos-container create <name> --system-path <toplevel>`; for an update, `nix-env -p <profile> --set <toplevel>` and a reload of the unit. `<toplevel>` must be the store path the last successful `RealiseClosure` returned for that agent (in memory, per agent), so hive-c0re can't name a path never realised for the agent; hive-priv builds nothing. The binding doesn't mean hive-c0re can't choose the closure: it can still ask hive-priv to download any swarm-signed path for any agent and then apply it. The swarm key and the cache bound that to a cross-assignment risk (one agent gets another's closure), not an arbitrary-path one |
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| `RealiseClosure` | `nix-store --realise <store_path> --max-jobs 0` against the swarm cache, with the host's configured cache address, and the public key and netrc from root-owned `/run/hyperhive-priv/attic/`, as per-call settings that replace the host's substituters and trusted keys and require a signature. The path must be `/nix/store/<32 chars>-<name>` and the agent name valid. It downloads and never builds |
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| `DestroyContainer` | `nixos-container destroy <name>` |
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| `ListContainers` | `nixos-container list` |
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| `ReloadGatewayNginx` | `systemctl reload/start/reset-failed nginx` (host unit; the unit name is hard-coded, not a parameter) |
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| `WriteNspawnFlags` | write `/etc/nixos-containers/<container>.conf` (bind-mount list, network isolation vars, and `--ephemeral` after the root's salvage). hive-priv first copies a stopped container's root to the agent's `work/`, then renames it aside (it deletes nothing), following no link the container could have planted; for an agent whose closure record sets `private_users` it also adds `--private-users=pick`, mounts every bind `owneridmap`, and once chowns the agent's `state`, `harness`, `work` and `claude` dirs (never `config`, following no link) to the data owner |
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| `EnsureAgentSocketDir` | `mkdirat` `/run/hive-agent/<name>` `0751 root:root` under an `O_NOFOLLOW` parent fd; leaves an existing directory alone, refuses anything else; for an agent whose closure record sets `private_users` it then chowns the dir to the data owner |
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| `WriteResourceLimits` | write `CPUQuota=`/`MemoryMax=`/`CPUWeight=`/`IOWeight=` systemd drop-in for agent container, with an `ExecStartPre=` that runs `hive-priv check-rootfs <container>` (no-follow check of the root paths the start script touches; see persistence.md), and a GC root on the build it names |
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| `RemoveServiceDropin` | remove `container@<name>.service.d/` drop-in on destroy, and the GC root of the hive-priv build it named |
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| `DaemonReload` | `systemctl daemon-reload` |
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| `ControlInfraContainer` | `systemctl <action> nginx.service` for the gateway — the `InfraContainer` enum is the allowlist, and serde rejects unknown names at the wire boundary (`hive-c0re`, the forge and the matrix have no variant, so no request can name them) |
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| `SyncAgentTmpfiles` | unlink `/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf` and return `Ok` |
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| `SetAgentPaused` | create / remove the `<state>/<name>/harness/paused` marker that parks an agent's turn loop |
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| `EnsureAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume create <state>/<name>` for a new agent — no-op when the path exists or the filesystem isn't btrfs |
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| `UpgradeAgentSubvolume` | migrate an existing plain state dir into a subvolume: create, `cp -a --reflink=auto`, atomic swap. Operator opt-in, and the caller stops the agent first |
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| `DeleteAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume delete <state>/<name>` — purge path only, never a plain destroy |
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| `EnsureBtrfsQuota` | `btrfs quota enable <AGENT_STATE_ROOT>`. Operator opt-in — enabling forces a full rescan |
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| `ReadSubvolumeUsage` | `btrfs qgroup show -f --raw <state>/<name>` |
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| `SetSubvolumeQuota` | `btrfs qgroup limit <bytes\|none> <state>/<name>` |
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| `MeasureAgentDisk` | `du -s -x -b -c -P` over `<state>/<name>/state`, `<state>/<name>/work` and `/var/lib/nixos-containers/h-<name>`, killed after 10 min. hive-priv derives the paths from the name; the request carries none |
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| `SnapshotAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume snapshot -r <agent_root> <snapshot_path>` — the frozen point-in-time copy a migration streams from |
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| `DeleteAgentSnapshot` | `btrfs subvolume delete <snapshot_path>` |
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| `SendAgentSnapshotToFile` | `btrfs send [-p <parent>] <snapshot>` into a bare filename under `MIGRATE_STAGING_ROOT`; refuses to overwrite an existing export |
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| `SendAgentSnapshotToFd` | `btrfs send [-p <parent>] <snapshot>` into a **file descriptor passed with the request** (`SCM_RIGHTS`). hive-c0re connects to the peer and hands over the connected socket, so hive-priv never learns an address or protocol. hive-priv requires exactly one descriptor here, and refuses one that arrives alongside any other operation |
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**Strings that reach root-loaded config** — `WriteResourceLimits` and
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`WriteNspawnFlags` copy request strings into a systemd drop-in and an env
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file that systemd and the nixos-containers start script read, so hive-priv
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refuses, never escapes, any value outside its shape. `memory_max` is
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`infinity`, a decimal percentage or a decimal size with an optional
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`B`/`K`/`M`/`G`/`T`/`P`/`E`; `cpu_quota` is a decimal percentage; `bridge` is
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1-15 ASCII letters, digits, `-`, `_` or `.`; `gateway_ip` is an IPv4 literal. A
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bind or credential path is absolute with no whitespace, control byte, `\`,
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`$`, backtick, `"` or `:`. The size limits of a value stay with systemd.
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**Closures from the swarm cache** — `RealiseClosure` is how a hive's rebuild
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takes the closure the swarm built instead of building it. Root-owned sources
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alone decide what root accepts:
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- The cache signs. The swarm's cache (attic) holds the signing key and signs
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each narinfo it serves; the private key never leaves it. The builder pushes
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with a push token and holds no signing key.
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- The address is the host's configuration:
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`services.hyperhive.swarm.attic.domain` and `cache` become
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`HIVE_PRIV_CACHE_URL` in the `hive-priv` unit. No request and no file chooses
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it, and `hive-priv` refuses an address that isn't `https`.
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- The key and the pull token come from the secret store. The root unit
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`hive-priv-cache-facts` reads the hive's own copies under the hive's own store
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identity and writes them to `/run/hyperhive-priv/attic/` (directory `0700`,
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files `0600`, root). `hive-priv` reads nothing from `/run/hyperhive/attic/`,
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which `hive-c0re` writes for the probe, and it refuses a file in the root
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directory that isn't a plain file owned by root or that others can read, and
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the directory under the same rule.
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- Nix verifies. For that one call `hive-priv` sets `substituters` and
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`trusted-public-keys` to the swarm cache and its key, and `require-sigs true`.
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A path without a signature by that key isn't stored; `hive-priv` answers
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`not available` and logs the refusal at error level. `--max-jobs 0` means no
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answer, whatever the cache sends, starts a build as root.
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- A hive realises only paths whose signature checks. The request carries an
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agent name and a store path, both validated, and no address, key or file; any
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other field never reaches the verb.
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What a compromised `hive-c0re` can do with this verb: ask for any store path
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that has the shape of one and that the swarm cache signed, which fills the
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store with paths the swarm vouches for. It can't make root accept a path from
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a cache or under a key of its choosing, because it writes none of the places
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those come from. The trust anchor is the cache's signing key and the store that
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hands out its public key, as for every other credential.
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**Container allowlist** — `hive-priv` validates every request against
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an allowlist before any operation: the allowlist accepts only names
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matching the agent-name convention (`h-` prefix, char-validated)
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and rejects every other container name, the swarm's `hive-forge` and
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`hive-matrix` included: those belong to the host that runs them, not to
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a hive. `hive-gateway` is a host unit,
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not a container, so it's not in this list — see `ReloadGatewayNginx`
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above for how the hard-coded unit name scopes its access instead.
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**Socket-activated** — systemd starts `hive-priv` on the first
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incoming connection (`LISTEN_FDS=1`); it's not running between calls.
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The `ProtectSystem=strict` + `ReadWritePaths` sandbox limits filesystem
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writes to only the paths `hive-priv` legitimately needs. The unit also sets
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`LockPersonality`, `RestrictRealtime`, `ProtectKernelLogs` and
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`ProtectKernelModules`: it changes no execution domain, schedules nothing in
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real time, reads no kernel log, and loads no module. It sets none of
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`RestrictNamespaces` (`nsenter` into a container needs `setns`),
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`RestrictAddressFamilies`, `PrivateDevices`, `CapabilityBoundingSet` or
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`SystemCallFilter`; those need a watched deploy to judge.
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## Privilege boundary summary
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| Component | Runs as | Privilege needed for |
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| ---------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------------- |
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| `hive-c0re` | `hive-core` | broker, HTTP dashboard |
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| `hive-priv` | `root` | container lifecycle, bind mounts, cred writes |
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| `hive-ag3nt` (per-container) | per-agent user | turn execution, MCP serving |
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104
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/nix-builds.md
Normal file
104
docs/4-implementation/trust-boundary/nix-builds.md
Normal file
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# Nix builds and credential isolation
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The mechanism and threat model for `nix build` inside an agent container, from
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the [security model](../../2-handbook/trust-boundary/security.md).
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## Background
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nixos-containers' start script bind-mounts the host's `nix-daemon` socket
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directory (`/nix/var/nix/daemon-socket`) into every container, hyperhive's
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agents included; hyperhive adds no bind for it. The host daemon may
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have `sandbox-fallback = false` (strict NixOS defaults), which causes `nix build`
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inside nspawn containers to fail — containers lack kernel user namespaces, so nix
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can't set up its build sandbox. the agent modules set `sandbox-fallback = true`
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so that builds fall back to unsandboxed execution rather than failing outright.
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## Per-agent nix builds mode
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`services.hyperhive.agent.nixBuilds` picks where an agent's nix builds run. It
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has two values, and defaults to `host`:
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- **`host`**: builds go to the host daemon through the socket above. The daemon
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forks them in its own cgroup, so they run **outside the agent container's
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CPU and memory caps**, which sit on `container-<name>.service`.
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- **`none`**: the container has no route to the host daemon. hive-priv adds
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`--tmpfs=/nix/var/nix/daemon-socket` to the container's nspawn flags. nspawn
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mounts its custom mounts sorted by destination, then by kind (a bind before
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a tmpfs), so the empty tmpfs lands on top of the start script's bind
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whatever order the flags are in, and the container finds no `socket` in the
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directory. `NIX_REMOTE=daemon` stays, so a build fails with `cannot connect
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to socket at '/nix/var/nix/daemon-socket/socket'`, which names the cause. The
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agent's `/nix/store` and its read-only nix database stay bound, so store
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paths already there stay readable; only a realisation of a new path, or any
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`nix` command that needs the daemon, fails.
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The agent's own NixOS config turns its `nix-daemon` socket and service off in
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this mode: the tmpfs is writable, so the unit would otherwise listen on it.
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Under `host` the directory is the host's read-only bind, which the socket
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unit's `ConditionPathIsReadWrite` rejects, so that unit never starts.
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The mode reaches the container as `privateUsers` does: the swarm builder reads
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the option from the evaluated config into the agent's closure record
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(`nix_builds`), hive-c0re reads the record when it writes the container's
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flags and sends the mode to hive-priv, and the flags apply at the container's
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next start.
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|
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- An agent whose module doesn't declare the option reads `host`. When the builder
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can't read the option (its eval fails or times out), the record carries no
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mode, and so does a record or builder from before the field. hive-c0re then
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sends no mode, and hive-priv keeps what the container's last write chose.
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- A mode this build doesn't know (a record written by a newer swarm) reads as
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`none`, never `host`: an agent that asked for a mode its hive can't give gets
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no builds, not builds outside its limits.
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- A record hive-c0re can't read, or none, sends no mode either, and hive-priv
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keeps what the container's last write chose.
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- A hive-c0re or hive-priv from before the option ignores it, so the agent keeps
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host builds until you upgrade both.
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||||
`none` cuts the daemon only. It leaves the agent's egress alone.
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## Threat model
|
||||
|
||||
Unsandboxed nix builds run as `nixbld` users (non-root; `nrBuildUsers` is at least 32, so UIDs 30001 and up).
|
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Without sandbox isolation, a build derivation's builder script has read access to
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any file in the container that the nixbld user can read.
|
||||
|
||||
The blast radius also has a **network** dimension. `swarm-ci-runner` runs its
|
||||
unsandboxed builds of untrusted PR code in its own private netns behind the
|
||||
bridge: a build reaches the forge by name and can't reach host-loopback
|
||||
services — including the core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`, which
|
||||
has no application-layer auth of its own (see [`docs/4-implementation/scheduler/ci.md`](../../4-implementation/scheduler/ci.md)). The `0600`
|
||||
token policy bounds file reads; network isolation bounds network reach.
|
||||
|
||||
**What's NOT exposed**:
|
||||
|
||||
- `/home/<name>/.claude/` — `.credentials.json`, `history.jsonl` and
|
||||
`settings.json` are `0600`; `projects/` and `sessions/` are `0700`. All owned
|
||||
by the per-agent user `<name>`, so nixbld users can't read any of them.
|
||||
⚠️ The **directory itself is `0755`**, on purpose: `hive-core` is a different
|
||||
user and needs read+execute to list it so `claude_has_session` can detect a
|
||||
valid session (`ensure_claude_dir`, `hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/setup.rs`).
|
||||
The per-file mode is therefore the whole protection here — anything added to
|
||||
this directory at a default mode is world-readable, which isn't
|
||||
hypothetical: `plugins/` and `.last-cleanup` already are.
|
||||
- `$HYPERHIVE_STATE_DIR/forge-token` (= `/agents/<name>/state/forge-token`)
|
||||
— the token hive-c0re wrote at mode `0600`, chowned to the per-agent
|
||||
uid:gid, before swarm-controller took over minting. Nothing writes it any
|
||||
more; it stays as the fallback for an agent without a store identity.
|
||||
nixbld users can't read it. The swarm-minted token lives under
|
||||
`/run/hive-agent-forge-token/` (`0700` directory, `0400` file), outside
|
||||
the state dir.
|
||||
- `/run/hive-agent-proxy-credential/proxy.env` — the agent's egress-proxy
|
||||
credential inside its proxy URL (`0700` directory, `0600` file, tmpfs). Units
|
||||
load it as an environment file, so the credential is also in the environment of
|
||||
every process they start. It authenticates this agent to the hive's squid and
|
||||
nothing else.
|
||||
|
||||
**Policy**: all credential files written to agent state directories MUST be mode
|
||||
`0600` or stricter. Don't create world-readable secret files in agent state dirs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Long-term fix
|
||||
|
||||
The proper fix is to enable user namespaces inside nspawn containers
|
||||
(`--private-users=inherit` in `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS`) so nix can set up its real
|
||||
sandbox and `sandbox-fallback` becomes a true last resort. This requires verifying
|
||||
bind-mount compatibility with user namespace UID mapping first.
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue