agents get a per-agent repo limit in their permissions record, orgs are locked
max_repos (default 0, 0..=100) lives in the agent's agent-permissions record and is edited on its permissions panel. The controller applies each agent's own value as max_repo_creation at CreateForgeUser and to existing accounts on change, restart and every five minutes; agent accounts may not create organizations.
This commit is contained in:
parent
dc0d08b7fb
commit
1edeb5c55d
8 changed files with 763 additions and 58 deletions
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@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ use swarm_controller_api::permissions::Permissions;
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use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions;
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use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
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use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{
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AgentPermissions, Import, ImportReply, hive_from_import_subject, import_subject_wildcard,
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AgentPermissions, DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS, Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS, hive_from_import_subject,
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import_subject_wildcard,
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};
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use utoipa::ToSchema;
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@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
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const MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5;
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/// The permissions to store for `req`, whose list is already checked. The list
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/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` left out keeps the one in
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/// `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
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/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` and `max_repos` left out
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/// keep the ones in `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
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/// `unrestricted_internet` without it turns it off: an agent that moves to
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/// unrestricted and back to restricted does not come back logging.
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fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions {
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@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions
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permissions: req.permissions,
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unrestricted_internet: req.unrestricted_internet.or(current.unrestricted_internet),
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internet_log,
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max_repos: req.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
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}
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}
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@ -78,12 +80,49 @@ pub(crate) fn unique(perms: &[Permission]) -> Result<(), String> {
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Woken when an agent's `max_repos` changes, so the forge pass applies it at
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/// once instead of at its next tick. A wake with no pass waiting is kept for
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/// the next one.
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pub(crate) static MAX_REPOS_CHANGED: tokio::sync::Notify = tokio::sync::Notify::const_new();
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/// The repository limit `record` sets: its `max_repos`, or
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/// [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`] when it has none. A value above [`MAX_REPOS`], as a
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/// hand edit could leave, reads as the default with a warning: the stricter
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/// reading.
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fn max_repos_of(agent: &str, record: &AgentPermissions) -> u32 {
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match record.max_repos {
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None => DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS,
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Some(n) if n <= MAX_REPOS => n,
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Some(n) => {
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tracing::warn!(
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agent,
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n,
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"the stored repository limit is out of range; using the default"
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);
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DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
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}
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}
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}
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/// `agent`'s repository limit: what its record sets, or [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`]
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/// when it has no record. A record that does not decode reads as none. Opens
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/// the bucket, which the controller creates at start anyway.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// The queue could not be read.
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pub(crate) async fn max_repos(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<u32> {
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let store = agent_permissions::open_or_create(client).await?;
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let (record, _, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, agent).await?;
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Ok(max_repos_of(agent, &record))
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}
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/// The stored permissions as the API shows them.
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fn view(v: AgentPermissions) -> Permissions {
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Permissions {
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permissions: v.permissions,
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unrestricted_internet: v.unrestricted_internet,
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internet_log: v.internet_log,
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max_repos: v.max_repos,
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}
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}
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@ -249,6 +288,12 @@ async fn put_with(
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if let Some(perms) = &req.permissions {
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unique(perms).map_err(|why| refuse(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &why)))?;
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}
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if let Some(n) = req.max_repos.filter(|n| *n > MAX_REPOS) {
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return Err(refuse(error_problem(
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StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
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&format!("max_repos {n} is more than the {MAX_REPOS} an agent may be given"),
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)));
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}
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let client = queue(&state).map_err(|r| refuse(refused(r)))?;
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if !live(&state).await.map_err(refuse)?.contains(&agent) {
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return Err(refuse(error_problem(
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@ -283,6 +328,9 @@ async fn put_with(
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.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?
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{
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tracing::info!(%agent, ?value, "set agent permissions");
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if value.max_repos != current.max_repos {
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MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notify_one();
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}
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if !revoking {
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mirror(leaves, &agent, &before, &after)
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.await
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@ -333,12 +381,15 @@ async fn delete_with(
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let (current, revision, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, &agent)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?;
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// Only the flags outlive a clear: dropping `unrestricted_internet`
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// would turn an agent created with `false` on, and dropping
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// `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced one.
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// Only the flags and the repository limit outlive a clear: dropping
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// `unrestricted_internet` would turn an agent created with `false` on,
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// dropping `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced
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// one, and a limit is an operator's decision about repositories, not
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// part of the permission list.
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let kept = AgentPermissions {
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unrestricted_internet: current.unrestricted_internet,
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internet_log: current.internet_log,
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max_repos: current.max_repos,
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..AgentPermissions::default()
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};
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mirror(leaves, &agent, &held(¤t), &held(&kept))
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@ -438,6 +489,7 @@ pub(crate) fn at_create(
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permissions: perms,
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unrestricted_internet,
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internet_log: None,
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max_repos: None,
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})
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}
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@ -467,6 +519,7 @@ fn merged_at_create(
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} else {
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current.internet_log
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},
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max_repos: value.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
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}
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}
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@ -810,7 +863,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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use axum::http::StatusCode;
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use hive_types::Permission;
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use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
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use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply};
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use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS};
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fn stored(json: &str) -> swarm_wire::agent_permissions::AgentPermissions {
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serde_json::from_str(json).expect("decodes")
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@ -821,6 +874,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: None,
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unrestricted_internet,
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internet_log,
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max_repos: None,
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}
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}
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@ -886,6 +940,99 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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);
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}
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/// An agent's repository limit is its own: a change to one agent's leaves
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/// every other agent at its limit, a `PUT` that leaves the field out and a
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/// `DELETE` keep it, and a limit above the range is refused.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn an_agents_repo_limit_is_its_own_and_survives_other_changes() {
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use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
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use swarm_wire::wanted::AgentState;
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let nats = TestNats::start();
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let client = nats.client().await;
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let state = crate::agent_limits::tests::declared(&client).await;
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WantedWriter::new(client.clone())
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.set("pr1ma", "iris", AgentState::Up)
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.await
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.expect("declare iris");
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let limit = |n| Permissions {
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max_repos: Some(n),
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..Permissions::default()
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};
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 0);
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// A change wakes the forge pass; drain stale wakes first.
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while tokio::time::timeout(
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std::time::Duration::from_millis(1),
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super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
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)
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.await
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.is_ok()
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{}
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assert_eq!(
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put(&state, "atlas", limit(3))
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.await
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.expect("set")
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.0
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.max_repos,
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Some(3)
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);
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
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tokio::time::timeout(
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std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
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super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
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)
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.await
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.expect("the change wakes the forge pass");
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assert_eq!(
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super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(),
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0,
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"another agent's limit is not changed"
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);
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let _ = put(&state, "iris", limit(7)).await.expect("set");
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(), 7);
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
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// A PUT without the field, and a DELETE, keep the limit.
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let _ = put(&state, "atlas", granted()).await.expect("set");
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assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.max_repos, Some(3));
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delete_agent_permissions(State(state.clone()), Path("atlas".to_owned()))
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.await
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.expect("cleared");
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
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let problem = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS + 1))
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.await
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.expect_err("over the range");
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assert_eq!(problem.status, Some(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST), "{problem:?}");
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
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let _ = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS))
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.await
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.expect("control: the top of the range is stored");
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assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), MAX_REPOS);
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}
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/// A stored limit above the range, as a hand edit could leave it, reads as
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/// none rather than as that many repositories.
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#[test]
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fn a_stored_limit_above_the_range_reads_as_none() {
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let read = |json: &str| super::max_repos_of("atlas", &stored(json));
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assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":5000}"#), 0);
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assert_eq!(read("{}"), 0);
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assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":7}"#), 7, "control: in range");
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}
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/// A create keeps the stored limit and does not set one.
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#[test]
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fn a_create_keeps_the_repo_limit() {
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let current = stored(r#"{"max_repos":4}"#);
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assert_eq!(
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super::merged_at_create(&stored("{}"), ¤t, true).max_repos,
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Some(4)
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);
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assert_eq!(super::at_create(None, None).expect("valid").max_repos, None);
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}
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pub(crate) async fn published(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> Option<String> {
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let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(client)
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.await
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@ -902,6 +1049,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: Some(vec![Permission::ManageRootAgent]),
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unrestricted_internet: None,
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internet_log: None,
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max_repos: None,
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}
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}
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@ -947,6 +1095,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: Some(Vec::new()),
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unrestricted_internet: None,
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internet_log: None,
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max_repos: None,
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};
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let _ = put(&state, "atlas", none.clone()).await.expect("set");
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assert_eq!(
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@ -975,6 +1124,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: None,
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unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
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internet_log: Some(true),
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max_repos: None,
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};
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let stored = put(&state, "atlas", log.clone()).await.expect("set").0;
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assert_eq!(stored, log);
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@ -997,6 +1147,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: None,
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unrestricted_internet: Some(true),
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internet_log: None,
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max_repos: None,
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};
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let _ = put(&state, "atlas", on.clone()).await.expect("set");
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let off = Permissions {
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@ -1144,6 +1295,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
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permissions: Some(perms.to_vec()),
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unrestricted_internet: None,
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internet_log: None,
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max_repos: None,
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}
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}
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|
|
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@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ use crate::webhook::DeliveryKind;
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use swarm_secret_client::stored_secret::StoredSecret;
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use swarm_wire::review_classifier::Commit;
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pub mod agent_max_repos;
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pub mod agent_token;
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mod api;
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mod base_pulls;
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@ -749,27 +750,29 @@ impl Client {
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/// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the
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/// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists).
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///
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/// Then locks the account out of creating repos
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/// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
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/// Then limits the account ([`Self::limit_agent_account`]) to `max_repos`
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/// repositories and no organizations, whether it was just created or
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/// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
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/// a failure fails the node. Leaves an existing account's email as it
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/// finds it.
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pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
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pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
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self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
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self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
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self.limit_agent_account(agent, max_repos).await
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}
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/// Set `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`'s account. Agents create repos
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/// through the hive, never with their own token — a write-scoped token
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/// can otherwise create and own a repo and self-merge in it, bypassing
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/// the operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push,
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/// PRs and clone keep working.
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/// Set `max_repo_creation = max_repos` and `allow_create_organization =
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/// false` on `agent`'s account. At 0 an agent creates repos only through
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/// the hive, never with its own token; above 0 a write-scoped token can
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/// create and own that many repos and self-merge in them, bypassing the
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/// operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push, PRs and
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/// clone keep working. An account that may not create organizations cannot
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/// get around the limit by making an organization to own repos in.
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///
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/// The PATCH itself is unconditional rather than verify-then-patch:
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/// Forgejo's API never returns `max_repo_creation` (it is a field of
|
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/// `EditUserOption` only, not of `User`), so there is no current value
|
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/// to compare against, and setting 0 on an account already at 0 is a
|
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/// no-op. But `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
|
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/// to compare against, and setting the same value again is a no-op. But
|
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/// `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
|
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/// account named `agent` exists — a 409 folds with no read at all, and
|
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/// a 422's follow-up `user_get` only confirms the username, not that
|
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/// swarm-controller created it — so before that PATCH this reads the
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|
|
@ -781,31 +784,35 @@ impl Client {
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/// name collided with an account this node didn't create, so it fails
|
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/// the node rather than sending the PATCH (or silently skipping) to an
|
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/// account nobody verified is agent-controlled.
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async fn disable_repo_creation(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
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pub(crate) async fn limit_agent_account(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
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let user = self
|
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.api
|
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.call(|api| api.user_get(agent).into_future())
|
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.await
|
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.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before locking it down"))?;
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.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before limiting it"))?;
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let expected = agent_email(agent);
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let legacy = legacy_agent_email(agent);
|
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if !matches!(user.email.as_deref(), Some(e) if e == expected || e == legacy) {
|
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anyhow::bail!(
|
||||
"forge account `{agent}` exists but is not this agent's (email {:?}, expected \
|
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`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to lock it down",
|
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`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to limit it",
|
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user.email
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
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self.api
|
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.call(|api| {
|
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api.admin_edit_user(agent, repo_creation_lockdown(agent))
|
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api.admin_edit_user(agent, agent_account_lockdown(agent, max_repos))
|
||||
.into_future()
|
||||
})
|
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.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| {
|
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format!("disable repo creation for forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = 0)")
|
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format!("limit forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = {max_repos})")
|
||||
})?;
|
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tracing::info!(%agent, "swarm forge: disabled repo creation (max_repo_creation = 0)");
|
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tracing::info!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
max_repos,
|
||||
"swarm forge: limited the account (max_repo_creation, no organizations)"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -2167,7 +2174,7 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
|
|||
|
||||
/// Canonical email for an agent's Forgejo account, set by
|
||||
/// [`Client::create_agent_user`] at creation and checked by
|
||||
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
|
||||
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
|
||||
/// format string as `hive-c0re::forge::users::agent_email` — not called
|
||||
/// across the crate boundary (see this module's doc comment), but both
|
||||
/// creators use this exact value, so it doubles as the
|
||||
|
|
@ -2179,7 +2186,7 @@ fn agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
|
|||
|
||||
/// The email older hive-created agent accounts carry, and keep: nothing
|
||||
/// rewrites it to [`agent_email`]. Accepted by
|
||||
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
|
||||
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
|
||||
/// such an account is still recognised as the agent's own.
|
||||
fn legacy_agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
|
||||
format!("{agent}@hive.local")
|
||||
|
|
@ -2215,6 +2222,17 @@ fn repo_creation_lockdown(agent: &str) -> EditUserOption {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// [`repo_creation_lockdown`] for an agent's account: `max_repos` repositories
|
||||
/// instead of none, and no organizations. The service accounts that share the
|
||||
/// lockdown stay at none and are not touched on organizations.
|
||||
fn agent_account_lockdown(agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> EditUserOption {
|
||||
EditUserOption {
|
||||
allow_create_organization: Some(false),
|
||||
max_repo_creation: Some(i64::from(max_repos)),
|
||||
..repo_creation_lockdown(agent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already
|
||||
/// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422
|
||||
/// (validation) — match both defensively, same as
|
||||
|
|
@ -2842,10 +2860,11 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
async fn a_created_agent_user_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
|
||||
let (client, seen) = stub_forge((201, "{}"), own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false);
|
||||
let set: Vec<&str> = body
|
||||
.as_object()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
|
|
@ -2853,11 +2872,35 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
.filter(|(_, v)| !v.is_null())
|
||||
.map(|(k, _)| k.as_str())
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
assert_eq!(set, ["login_name", "max_repo_creation", "source_id"]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
set,
|
||||
[
|
||||
"allow_create_organization",
|
||||
"login_name",
|
||||
"max_repo_creation",
|
||||
"source_id"
|
||||
]
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["login_name"], "alice");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["source_id"], 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agent's limit is what goes out as `max_repo_creation`, on a created
|
||||
/// account and an existing one alike, and organizations stay refused at any
|
||||
/// limit.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_agents_limit_is_what_the_account_is_set_to() {
|
||||
for create in [(201, "{}"), (409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#)] {
|
||||
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(create, own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 3).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 3, "{create:?}");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false, "{create:?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An account that already existed is locked down too: the node is
|
||||
/// re-run, and an account created before this lockdown existed must
|
||||
/// not keep repo creation just because the create step folded to
|
||||
|
|
@ -2872,7 +2915,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2891,7 +2934,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
|
||||
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
|
||||
assert!(msg.contains("max_repo_creation"), "{msg}");
|
||||
|
|
@ -2915,7 +2958,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
|
||||
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
|
||||
assert!(msg.contains("alice"), "{msg}");
|
||||
|
|
@ -2945,7 +2988,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2963,7 +3006,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
223
swarm-controller/src/forge/agent_max_repos.rs
Normal file
223
swarm-controller/src/forge/agent_max_repos.rs
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
|||
//! Each existing agent's forge account at its own repository limit.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The limit is the `max_repos` of the agent's record in `agent-permissions`
|
||||
//! (`swarm_wire::agent_permissions`). A new account gets it from its
|
||||
//! `CreateForgeUser` node. This pass reaches the others: at start, when a
|
||||
//! change of an agent's `max_repos` wakes it
|
||||
//! ([`crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED`]), and every
|
||||
//! [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`] over every agent that holds a store identity.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Forgejo never returns an account's `max_repo_creation`, so nothing can be
|
||||
//! compared against the forge. The pass remembers what it applied to each agent
|
||||
//! in this process and applies again only what differs, so a restart applies
|
||||
//! every agent's limit once, and an agent whose edit failed is retried at the
|
||||
//! next tick. The decision is pure ([`plan`]), so the tests pin it.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Client;
|
||||
|
||||
/// How often [`spawn`] re-checks every agent.
|
||||
const RECONCILE_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(5);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agents of `desired` whose account is not known to be at their limit,
|
||||
/// with that limit.
|
||||
pub fn plan(
|
||||
desired: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
|
||||
applied: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
|
||||
) -> Vec<(String, u32)> {
|
||||
desired
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|(agent, limit)| applied.get(*agent) != Some(limit))
|
||||
.map(|(agent, limit)| (agent.clone(), *limit))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One pass: set each limit of `todo` on its agent's account, recording the
|
||||
/// ones the forge took in `applied`. An agent the forge refuses is logged and
|
||||
/// left out, so the next pass plans it again.
|
||||
async fn apply(client: &Client, todo: &[(String, u32)], applied: &mut BTreeMap<String, u32>) {
|
||||
for (agent, limit) in todo {
|
||||
match client.limit_agent_account(agent, *limit).await {
|
||||
Ok(()) => {
|
||||
applied.insert(agent.clone(), *limit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
limit,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"agent max repos: the forge account was not updated; retrying next pass"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every roster agent's limit. An agent whose record can't be read is left
|
||||
/// out, so nothing is applied for it this pass.
|
||||
async fn desired(queue: &async_nats::Client, roster: &[String]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
|
||||
let mut limits = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for agent in roster {
|
||||
match crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent).await {
|
||||
Ok(limit) => {
|
||||
limits.insert(agent.clone(), limit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"agent max repos: the agent's limit was not read; skipping it this pass"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
limits
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Apply every agent's limit now and again on each wake and tick. A pass that
|
||||
/// fails is logged and retried on the next tick; it never stops the daemon.
|
||||
pub fn spawn(client: Arc<Client>, queue: async_nats::Client) {
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(RECONCILE_INTERVAL);
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
tokio::select! {
|
||||
_ = ticker.tick() => {}
|
||||
() = crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified() => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let roster = match super::docs_grant::read_roster().await {
|
||||
Ok(roster) => roster,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "agent max repos: no roster; retrying next tick");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
applied.retain(|agent, _| roster.contains(agent));
|
||||
let todo = plan(&desired(&queue, &roster).await, &applied);
|
||||
if todo.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tracing::info!(agents = todo.len(), "agent max repos: applying the limits");
|
||||
super::within_forge_deadline("agent max repos", apply(&client, &todo, &mut applied))
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
fn limits(of: &[(&str, u32)]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
|
||||
of.iter().map(|(a, n)| ((*a).to_owned(), *n)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent at another value, or not yet applied, is planned with its own
|
||||
/// limit; one already at its limit is not.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn plan_names_the_agents_not_at_their_limit() {
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 5)]);
|
||||
let applied = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 1)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
plan(&desired, &applied),
|
||||
[("iris".to_owned(), 0), ("sock".to_owned(), 5)]
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Control: everything applied at its limit leaves nothing to do.
|
||||
assert!(plan(&desired, &desired).is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A stand-in forge on a loopback port that answers each agent's own
|
||||
/// email and records every admin edit as (login, body).
|
||||
async fn stub_agents() -> (
|
||||
Client,
|
||||
Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode, Uri, header::CONTENT_TYPE};
|
||||
|
||||
let edits: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>> = Arc::default();
|
||||
let recorded = Arc::clone(&edits);
|
||||
let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(
|
||||
move |method: Method, uri: Uri, body: axum::body::Bytes| {
|
||||
let recorded = Arc::clone(&recorded);
|
||||
async move {
|
||||
let login = uri.path().rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or_default().to_owned();
|
||||
let body = match method {
|
||||
Method::GET => format!(r#"{{"email":"{login}@hyperhive.local"}}"#),
|
||||
Method::PATCH => {
|
||||
let json = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
recorded.lock().unwrap().push((login, json));
|
||||
"{}".to_owned()
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => "{}".to_owned(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
(StatusCode::OK, [(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")], body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("http://{}/", listener.local_addr().unwrap())).unwrap();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await });
|
||||
let api = crate::forge::api::tests::fixed(url.clone(), "stub-token");
|
||||
(Client { api, url }, edits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Each agent gets its own limit, none is skipped and none takes another's;
|
||||
/// each is recorded as applied, and a second plan has nothing left.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_pass_sets_each_agent_its_own_limit() {
|
||||
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 9)]);
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
|
||||
apply(&client, &plan(&desired, &applied), &mut applied).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut seen: Vec<(String, i64, bool)> = edits
|
||||
.lock()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|(login, body)| {
|
||||
(
|
||||
login.clone(),
|
||||
body["max_repo_creation"].as_i64().unwrap(),
|
||||
body["allow_create_organization"] == false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
seen.sort();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
seen,
|
||||
[
|
||||
("atlas".to_owned(), 4, true),
|
||||
("iris".to_owned(), 0, true),
|
||||
("sock".to_owned(), 9, true)
|
||||
]
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(applied, desired);
|
||||
assert!(plan(&desired, &applied).is_empty());
|
||||
// One agent's changed limit plans that agent alone.
|
||||
let changed = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 1), ("sock", 9)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(plan(&changed, &applied), [("iris".to_owned(), 1)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent whose edit the forge refuses is not recorded, so the next pass
|
||||
/// plans it again.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn a_refused_agent_is_planned_again() {
|
||||
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
apply(&client, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
|
||||
// Control: an account that is the agent's own is recorded.
|
||||
assert_eq!(applied.get("atlas"), Some(&2));
|
||||
assert_eq!(edits.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
let (broken, _seen) = super::super::tests::stub_forge(
|
||||
(200, "{}"),
|
||||
(200, r#"{"email":"someone@example.com"}"#),
|
||||
(200, "{}"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
apply(&broken, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
|
||||
assert!(applied.is_empty(), "a refused agent must not be recorded");
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(plan(&desired, &applied), [("atlas".to_owned(), 2)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ impl Client {
|
|||
|
||||
/// The store's `hive-agent-*` cert-auth roles: exactly the agents that hold a
|
||||
/// store identity.
|
||||
async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||
pub(super) async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||
let store = crate::store::connect()
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
#[test]
|
||||
fn an_agent_called_hive_x_is_not_hive_xs_account() {
|
||||
// Both ways round: the hive job refuses the agent's account, and the
|
||||
// agent's own guard (`disable_repo_creation`) refuses the hive's,
|
||||
// agent's own guard (`limit_agent_account`) refuses the hive's,
|
||||
// because neither accepts the other's email.
|
||||
let login = forge::hive_login("alpha");
|
||||
for agents in [
|
||||
|
|
@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
client
|
||||
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha")
|
||||
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha", 0)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect_err("the hive's account is not the agent's");
|
||||
assert!(lockdown_patch(&seen, "hive-alpha").is_none());
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ use super::{
|
|||
folds_into_success, is_ambiguous_validation_failure, is_confirmed_conflict,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. Agents can't create repos with
|
||||
/// their own token (`max_repo_creation = 0`); a repo an agent asks for is
|
||||
/// created here and the agent added as a **write** member (not owner/admin).
|
||||
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. An agent can create repos with
|
||||
/// its own token only up to its own `max_repos` (default 0, so none); a repo
|
||||
/// an agent asks for is created here and the agent added as a **write**
|
||||
/// member (not owner/admin).
|
||||
/// Because the org, not the agent, owns the repo, perms stay centrally
|
||||
/// managed and branch protection (referencing [`OPERATORS_TEAM`]) can block
|
||||
/// the author from merging their own PR.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -393,7 +393,13 @@ async fn run_node_work(
|
|||
.to_owned(),
|
||||
),
|
||||
Some(client) => {
|
||||
match forge_node("create_forge_user", client.ensure_agent_user(&agent)).await {
|
||||
let max_repos = agent_max_repos_limit(deps.queue.as_ref(), &agent).await;
|
||||
match forge_node(
|
||||
"create_forge_user",
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user(&agent, max_repos),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(()) => Outcome::Done,
|
||||
Err(e) => Outcome::Failed(format!("{e:#}")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -554,6 +560,26 @@ async fn mint_forge_token(
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The repository limit a new agent account is created at: the `max_repos` of
|
||||
/// the agent's permissions record, or none (0) when there is no queue or it
|
||||
/// cannot be read. The forge pass in `forge::agent_max_repos` raises the
|
||||
/// account to its limit once the queue answers.
|
||||
async fn agent_max_repos_limit(queue: Option<&async_nats::Client>, agent: &str) -> u32 {
|
||||
let Some(queue) = queue else {
|
||||
return swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS;
|
||||
};
|
||||
crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"swarm jobq: the agent's repository limit is unreadable; creating the account at none"
|
||||
);
|
||||
swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The `GrantDocsRead` arm, lifted out for the same reason.
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn grant_docs_read(
|
||||
forge: Option<Arc<forge::Client>>,
|
||||
|
|
@ -2031,6 +2057,29 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A new agent's account is created at the limit of its own record, not
|
||||
/// another agent's, and at none when it has no record or there is no queue.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn a_new_account_is_created_at_its_agents_limit() {
|
||||
let nats = crate::test_nats::TestNats::start();
|
||||
let client = nats.client().await;
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 0);
|
||||
let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(&client)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("bucket");
|
||||
store
|
||||
.put("iris", br#"{"max_repos":4}"#.to_vec().into())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("written");
|
||||
store
|
||||
.put("atlas", br#"{"max_repos":9}"#.to_vec().into())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("written");
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 4);
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "sock").await, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(None, "iris").await, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_state(
|
||||
sched: &hive_jobq::scheduler::Scheduler<SwarmNodeKind, super::SwarmResourceKind>,
|
||||
rev: &str,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ fn spawn_forge_workers(
|
|||
}
|
||||
forge::runner_token::spawn(Arc::clone(&client));
|
||||
if let Some(queue) = queue {
|
||||
forge::agent_max_repos::spawn(Arc::clone(&client), queue.clone());
|
||||
crate::cache_miss::spawn(
|
||||
queue.clone(),
|
||||
Arc::new(wanted::WantedWriter::new(queue)),
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue