agents get a per-agent repo limit in their permissions record, orgs are locked
max_repos (default 0, 0..=100) lives in the agent's agent-permissions record and is edited on its permissions panel. The controller applies each agent's own value as max_repo_creation at CreateForgeUser and to existing accounts on change, restart and every five minutes; agent accounts may not create organizations.
This commit is contained in:
parent
dc0d08b7fb
commit
1edeb5c55d
23 changed files with 763 additions and 58 deletions
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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ checkpoints**, not about sandboxing the agent from its own tools:
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- **Operator merges, not the agent** — an agent may _push_ branches, but a
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**human (the operator) merges the PR**, keeping a person in the loop on the
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highest-value action. On the **internal forge this is technically enforced,
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not just convention**: agents can't create repos (`max_repo_creation = 0`),
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not just convention**: agents can't create repos by default (next bullet),
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and `main` on an `agent-configs/<name>` repo carries swarm-controller's
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branch protection: merge and approval allowlisted to the `operators` team,
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which swarm-controller converges on every config repo. An operator's merge
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@ -129,6 +129,15 @@ checkpoints**, not about sandboxing the agent from its own tools:
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settings nor merge its own PR. It's **not** set up for external VCS (GitHub
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etc.), though — there, operator-merge is process + accepted risk, not a
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technical control.
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- **Repo creation is a per-agent setting, default 0** — the _repositories_ badge
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in an agent's card sets how many repos that agent's forge account may create
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(`max_repos` in its permissions record, Forgejo's `max_repo_creation`, 0 to
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100). The operator must raise it for that agent before it may create any. Agents never create organizations: the
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controller turns that off on every agent account. A repo an agent creates is
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its own, so the operator-merge gate doesn't cover it, and the agent can add a
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CI workflow to it. CI workflows run unsandboxed on the CI runner, which is
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arbitrary code on the runner host. Allow repo creation only for agents you
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would trust with that.
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- **Operator sign-off** — config changes are config PRs an operator merges
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on the forge (see
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[`persistence.md`](persistence.md#config-changes)), and
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ by a test). swarm-controller mints every agent token with it:
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| `write:repository` | Create, clone, push, delete repos; merge PRs. |
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| `write:issue` | Open / comment / review issues **and** pull requests (Forgejo namespaces PR conversation under issues). |
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| `write:user` | Edit own profile, create repos under own user. |
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| `write:organization` | Create + manage orgs (lets agents share a forge namespace). |
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| `write:organization` | Manage orgs the agent belongs to. The forge refuses to create one: agent accounts may not. |
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| `read:user` | Token-owner endpoint used for self-identification at harness startup. |
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| `write:misc` | Hooks, attachments, the rest of the long tail. |
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| `read:notification` | Poll `GET /notifications` for unread events. |
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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Deadline: hive-forge stops after HIVE_FORGE_DEADLINE seconds (default 900), prin
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* `comment-show` — Print the body (or full JSON) of a single comment by id
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* `comment-edit` — Edit an existing comment by id
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* `clone` — Clone a forge repo (default `-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with credentials autoinjected. Pairs with `pr create --agit`
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* `repo-create` — Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0)
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* `repo-create` — Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default)
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* `repo-add-collaborator` — Add a collaborator to the active repo (`-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with a permission level. Companion to `repo-create`
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* `repo-labels` — List every label defined on the repo (name + description), optionally filtered by a name substring
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* `repo-search` — Search the forge for repositories by keyword, topic, or description
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@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ Clone a forge repo (default `-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with credentials autoinjecte
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## `hive-forge repo-create`
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Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0)
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Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default)
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**Usage:** `hive-forge repo-create [OPTIONS] <NAME>`
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@ -224,9 +224,11 @@ plain comment show under `last comment`, not `reviews`.
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### Repo management
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Agent accounts can't create repos: swarm-controller sets their
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repo-creation limit to 0 (see `docs/2-handbook/agents/security.md`), so
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an operator merge stays the only path to main. Ask the operator to
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Agent accounts can't create repos unless the operator allows it for that
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agent: swarm-controller sets the account's repo-creation limit to the
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agent's own `max_repos`, which is 0 until the operator raises it (see
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`docs/2-handbook/agents/security.md`), so an operator merge stays the only
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path to main. Ask the operator to
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create the repo (for example `agents/<name>`) and add you as a
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collaborator. Forgejo also disables push-to-create.
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@ -817,6 +817,21 @@ The agent's **internet** access is its own row beside it: a badge reading
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restricted, log or unrestricted. Selecting it lists the three modes; picking one does a
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`PUT` of the mode with the stored permissions beside it.
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The **repositories** row is how many repositories the agent's forge account may
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create: a badge reading none or `up to N`, in the warning tone above 0. Selecting
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it opens a number box, 0 to 100, and **save** does a `PUT` of `max_repos` with the
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stored permissions beside it. A `PUT` that leaves `max_repos` out, and the `DELETE`
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of **use the default**, keep it. Nothing stored means 0, and the box warns that an
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agent that may create repositories can add a CI workflow to them, CI workflows run
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unsandboxed on the CI runner, and that makes it arbitrary code on the runner host.
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The controller sets the value as Forgejo's `max_repo_creation` on that agent's
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account: on a new one at creation, and on an existing one within seconds of a save
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and again after every restart. It also turns off creating organizations on every
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agent account, whatever the number. Forgejo never reports `max_repo_creation`
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back, so the controller's log (`agent max repos`) is the record of what it applied
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to each agent. The controller tries an agent whose account the forge refuses again
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every five minutes.
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A saved change isn't instant. The hive reads the grant about every 30 seconds
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and the agent takes it at its next turn. A change to `manage_root_agent`
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restarts the agent after its current turn. The card reads
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@ -340,6 +340,15 @@ explicit `unrestricted_internet: false`; read the pair with
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`DELETE` keeps it. A hive that doesn't read the field sees `false` and enforces
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the list. The proxy's handling is under _Log mode_ in [the egress proxy](../../4-implementation/networking/network.md#egress-proxy-squid).
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**Repository limit** — the record also carries `max_repos`, how many repositories
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the agent's forge account may create, 0 to 100. An absent value is 0. Only the
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controller reads it: it sets the account's Forgejo `max_repo_creation` from it at
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`CreateForgeUser`, and again for an existing account within seconds of a change,
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at every start and every five minutes (`forge::agent_max_repos`). It also turns
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off creating organizations on every agent account. A `PUT` that leaves the field
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out, a `DELETE`, and a re-create keep the stored value; the route refuses more
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than 100.
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**How a change applies** —
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- The agent's harness reads its own key every 10 seconds and builds every
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turn's `--tools`, `--allowedTools` and MCP config from the last value, so a
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { AgentLimits } from "./AgentLimits.js";
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import {
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AgentInternet,
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AgentPermissions,
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AgentRepos,
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useGrant,
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} from "./AgentPermissions.js";
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import { AllowedDomains } from "./AllowedDomains.js";
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@ -223,6 +224,10 @@ function GrantRows({ agent }: { agent: string }) {
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<dd>
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<AllowedDomains key={agent} agent={agent} />
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</dd>
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<dt>repositories</dt>
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<dd>
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{g.grant === null ? g.loading : <AgentRepos agent={agent} g={g} />}
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</dd>
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<dt>permissions</dt>
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<dd>
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{g.grant === null ? (
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@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
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// <AgentPermissions> and <AgentInternet> — one agent's grant in an opened agent
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// card: the permissions it holds, and how far its traffic may leave the host.
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// Each is a badge that opens a control under it, which saves as soon as it
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// <AgentPermissions>, <AgentInternet> and <AgentRepos> — one agent's grant in an
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// opened agent card: the permissions it holds, how far its traffic may leave
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// the host, and how many repositories its forge account may create. Each is a badge that opens a control under it, which saves as soon as it
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// changes.
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//
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// Both read `GET /api/agents/{name}/permissions`, which answers the stored
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// grant as `{ permissions?, unrestricted_internet?, internet_log? }` (`{}` when
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// grant as `{ permissions?, unrestricted_internet?, internet_log?, max_repos? }` (`{}` when
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// the swarm sets none, so the agent runs on the default set). The permissions
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// control offers the catalogue from `GET /api/permissions` as checkboxes and
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// PUTs the ticked ones, a PUT replacing the stored value whole. A selection
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// equal to the default set DELETEs instead, as the create form sends nothing
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// for it: the agent then follows the default if that changes. The internet
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// control PUTs the mode with the stored list beside it. The route's refusal
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// control PUTs the mode with the stored list beside it, and the repositories
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// control the limit the same way. The route's refusal
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// shows as it arrives, in the control.
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//
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// Their state belongs to one agent: callers key them by agent name, so
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@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ import { BadgePopover } from "../../ui/badge-popover/BadgePopover.js";
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import { Button } from "../../ui/button/Button.js";
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import { BadgeSkeleton } from "../../ui/skeleton/BadgeSkeleton.js";
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import { Hint } from "../../ui/hint/Hint.js";
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import { TextField } from "../../ui/text-field/TextField.js";
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import { MultiselectFilterOptions } from "../../ui/multiselect-filter/MultiselectFilter.js";
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import {
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requestPermissions,
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@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ import {
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internetBody,
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internetMode,
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internetSummary,
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MAX_REPOS,
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maxReposBody,
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parseMaxRepos,
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reposSummary,
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type InternetMode,
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} from "./permissions.js";
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import "./AgentLimits.css";
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@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ interface Grant {
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permissions?: string[];
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unrestricted_internet?: boolean;
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internet_log?: boolean;
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max_repos?: number;
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}
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// Mirrors swarm-controller's `Catalogue` (`GET /api/permissions`).
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@ -302,3 +309,72 @@ export function AgentInternet({ agent, g }: { agent: string; g: GrantState }) {
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</div>
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);
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}
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export function AgentRepos({ agent, g }: { agent: string; g: GrantState }) {
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const { grant, busy, saveError, loading, send } = g;
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// The box as typed; null shows the stored limit.
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const [typed, setTyped] = useState<string | null>(null);
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if (grant === null) return loading;
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const stored = grant.max_repos ?? 0;
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const text = typed ?? String(stored);
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const parsed = parseMaxRepos(text);
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async function save(e: Event) {
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e.preventDefault();
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if (parsed === null) return;
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const ok = await send({
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method: "PUT",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
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body: JSON.stringify(maxReposBody(grant?.permissions, parsed)),
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});
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// The grant was read again, or the change refused: show what is stored.
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if (ok) setTyped(null);
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}
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return (
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<div class="ui-agent-limits">
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<BadgePopover
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label="repositories"
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value={reposSummary(grant.max_repos)}
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tone={stored === 0 ? "neutral" : "warning"}
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title={`how many repositories ${agent}'s forge account may create`}
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popoverLabel={`${agent} repository limit`}
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>
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<p class="ui-badge-popover-help">
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How many repositories {agent}'s forge account may create, 0 to{" "}
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{MAX_REPOS}. 0 means none. The swarm applies a change to the account
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within seconds.
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</p>
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<p class="ui-badge-popover-help" role="note">
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<strong>Warning:</strong> an agent that may create repositories can
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add a CI workflow to them, and CI workflows run unsandboxed on the CI
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runner. That is arbitrary code on the runner host. Only allow this for
|
||||
agents you would trust with that.
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</p>
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<form onSubmit={(e) => void save(e)}>
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<TextField
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id={`max-repos-${agent}`}
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label="repositories"
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type="number"
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value={text}
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onInput={setTyped}
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||||
/>
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<Button
|
||||
variant="primary"
|
||||
type="submit"
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||||
disabled={busy || parsed === null || parsed === stored}
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||||
>
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||||
{busy ? "saving…" : "save"}
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</Button>
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</form>
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{saveError ? (
|
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<ApiErrorPanel
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context="the repository limit was not saved"
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problem={saveError}
|
||||
/>
|
||||
) : null}
|
||||
</BadgePopover>
|
||||
</div>
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||||
);
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}
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|
|
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|
|
@ -69,3 +69,38 @@ export function internetBody(
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|||
...(mode === "log" ? { internet_log: true as const } : {}),
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||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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/** The most `max_repos` may be set to; the route refuses more. */
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export const MAX_REPOS = 100;
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|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The repository limit a typed value stands for, or null when it is not a
|
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* whole number from 0 to {@link MAX_REPOS}.
|
||||
*/
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export function parseMaxRepos(text: string): number | null {
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const t = text.trim();
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if (!/^\d+$/.test(t)) return null;
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const n = Number(t);
|
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return n <= MAX_REPOS ? n : null;
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||||
}
|
||||
|
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/** What the repositories badge shows: an absent limit is none. */
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export function reposSummary(stored: number | undefined): string {
|
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return stored === undefined || stored === 0 ? "none" : `up to ${stored}`;
|
||||
}
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|
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/**
|
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* The `PUT` body that sets the repository limit. A `PUT` without
|
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* `permissions` resets a stored list to the default, so the stored list goes
|
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* along, as in {@link internetBody}; the internet fields are left out, which
|
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* keeps them.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function maxReposBody(
|
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stored: string[] | undefined,
|
||||
n: number,
|
||||
): { permissions?: string[]; max_repos: number } {
|
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return {
|
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...(stored === undefined ? {} : { permissions: stored }),
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max_repos: n,
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||||
};
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||||
}
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||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ import {
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internetBody,
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internetMode,
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internetSummary,
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MAX_REPOS,
|
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maxReposBody,
|
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parseMaxRepos,
|
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reposSummary,
|
||||
} from "../src/agent/detail/permissions.ts";
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||||
|
||||
const all = ["messaging", "meta", "inbox", "execution", "manage_root_agent"];
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|
|
@ -79,3 +83,29 @@ test("the log mode keeps the old flag false and names internet_log; the others l
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assert.equal("internet_log" in internetBody([], "restricted"), false);
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assert.equal("internet_log" in internetBody([], "unrestricted"), false);
|
||||
});
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||||
|
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test("a whole number from 0 to the most is a repository limit", () => {
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assert.equal(parseMaxRepos("0"), 0);
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assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(" 7 "), 7);
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assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(String(MAX_REPOS)), MAX_REPOS);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
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test("anything else is not: empty, negative, fractional, above the most, text", () => {
|
||||
for (const t of ["", " ", "-1", "1.5", "1e2", String(MAX_REPOS + 1), "x"]) {
|
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assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(t), null, JSON.stringify(t));
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
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||||
|
||||
test("the repositories badge tells none from a limit", () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(reposSummary(undefined), "none");
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assert.equal(reposSummary(0), "none");
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||||
assert.equal(reposSummary(3), "up to 3");
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||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("the limit's body carries the stored list, so the PUT does not reset it", () => {
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(maxReposBody(["meta"], 3), {
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permissions: ["meta"],
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||||
max_repos: 3,
|
||||
});
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||||
assert.deepEqual(maxReposBody(undefined, 0), { max_repos: 0 });
|
||||
});
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||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ enum Verb {
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|||
/// credentials autoinjected. Pairs with `pr create --agit`.
|
||||
Clone(verbs::clone::Args),
|
||||
/// Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints
|
||||
/// the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0).
|
||||
/// the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default).
|
||||
RepoCreate(verbs::repo_create::Args),
|
||||
/// Add a collaborator to the active repo (`-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`)
|
||||
/// with a permission level. Companion to `repo-create`.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
|
|||
//!
|
||||
//! Wraps `POST /api/v1/user/repos` (or `/orgs/{org}/repos`). For accounts
|
||||
//! that may create repos (operators, non-agent users). Agent accounts
|
||||
//! cannot: swarm-controller sets their repo-creation limit to 0, and
|
||||
//! Forgejo reports that as a bare 500 on the user path, which
|
||||
//! cannot unless the operator allows it: swarm-controller sets their
|
||||
//! repo-creation limit to the agent's own `max_repos` (0 by default), and Forgejo
|
||||
//! reports a used-up limit as a bare 500 on the user path, which
|
||||
//! `explain_create_error` turns into a message naming the operator path.
|
||||
//! The instance has push-to-create disabled, so `git push` to a
|
||||
//! non-existent repo 403s. Pairs with `clone` and `repo-add-collaborator`.
|
||||
|
|
@ -57,9 +58,10 @@ fn explain_create_error(org: Option<&str>, err: ForgejoError) -> anyhow::Error {
|
|||
}
|
||||
anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"this account most likely cannot create repositories (the forge answered 500, which is \
|
||||
how Forgejo reports a repo-creation limit of 0). On hyperhive, agent accounts are \
|
||||
locked to 0 by design, so an operator merge stays the only path to main. Ask the \
|
||||
operator to create the repo (for example `agents/<name>`) and add you as a collaborator."
|
||||
how Forgejo reports a used-up repo-creation limit, 0 included). On hyperhive, agent \
|
||||
accounts are locked to 0 unless the operator raises its limit, so an operator merge stays \
|
||||
the only path to main. Ask the operator to create the repo (for example \
|
||||
`agents/<name>`) and add you as a collaborator."
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ pub struct Permissions {
|
|||
/// out keeps the stored value.
|
||||
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
|
||||
pub internet_log: Option<bool>,
|
||||
/// How many repositories the agent's forge account may create, 0 to 100.
|
||||
/// Absent in a `GET` means the swarm never set it, which counts as 0.
|
||||
/// Absent in a `PUT` keeps the stored value. An agent that may create
|
||||
/// repositories can add a CI workflow to them, and CI workflows run
|
||||
/// unsandboxed on the CI runner.
|
||||
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "schema", schema(example = 0, minimum = 0, maximum = 100))]
|
||||
pub max_repos: Option<u32>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,6 +55,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: Some(vec![]),
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: None,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
r#"{"permissions":[]}"#,
|
||||
),
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,6 +64,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: None,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false}"#,
|
||||
),
|
||||
|
|
@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: None,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
|
||||
internet_log: Some(true),
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false,"internet_log":true}"#,
|
||||
),
|
||||
|
|
@ -71,9 +82,17 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: Some(vec![Permission::Messaging, Permission::ManageRootAgent]),
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: None,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
r#"{"permissions":["messaging","manage_root_agent"]}"#,
|
||||
),
|
||||
(
|
||||
Permissions {
|
||||
max_repos: Some(3),
|
||||
..Permissions::default()
|
||||
},
|
||||
r#"{"max_repos":3}"#,
|
||||
),
|
||||
] {
|
||||
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&value).unwrap(), wire);
|
||||
assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Permissions>(wire).unwrap(), value);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ use swarm_controller_api::permissions::Permissions;
|
|||
use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions;
|
||||
use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
|
||||
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{
|
||||
AgentPermissions, Import, ImportReply, hive_from_import_subject, import_subject_wildcard,
|
||||
AgentPermissions, DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS, Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS, hive_from_import_subject,
|
||||
import_subject_wildcard,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use utoipa::ToSchema;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
|
|||
const MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
/// The permissions to store for `req`, whose list is already checked. The list
|
||||
/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` left out keeps the one in
|
||||
/// `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
|
||||
/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` and `max_repos` left out
|
||||
/// keep the ones in `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
|
||||
/// `unrestricted_internet` without it turns it off: an agent that moves to
|
||||
/// unrestricted and back to restricted does not come back logging.
|
||||
fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions {
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions
|
|||
permissions: req.permissions,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: req.unrestricted_internet.or(current.unrestricted_internet),
|
||||
internet_log,
|
||||
max_repos: req.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -78,12 +80,49 @@ pub(crate) fn unique(perms: &[Permission]) -> Result<(), String> {
|
|||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Woken when an agent's `max_repos` changes, so the forge pass applies it at
|
||||
/// once instead of at its next tick. A wake with no pass waiting is kept for
|
||||
/// the next one.
|
||||
pub(crate) static MAX_REPOS_CHANGED: tokio::sync::Notify = tokio::sync::Notify::const_new();
|
||||
|
||||
/// The repository limit `record` sets: its `max_repos`, or
|
||||
/// [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`] when it has none. A value above [`MAX_REPOS`], as a
|
||||
/// hand edit could leave, reads as the default with a warning: the stricter
|
||||
/// reading.
|
||||
fn max_repos_of(agent: &str, record: &AgentPermissions) -> u32 {
|
||||
match record.max_repos {
|
||||
None => DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS,
|
||||
Some(n) if n <= MAX_REPOS => n,
|
||||
Some(n) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
n,
|
||||
"the stored repository limit is out of range; using the default"
|
||||
);
|
||||
DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// `agent`'s repository limit: what its record sets, or [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`]
|
||||
/// when it has no record. A record that does not decode reads as none. Opens
|
||||
/// the bucket, which the controller creates at start anyway.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Errors
|
||||
/// The queue could not be read.
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn max_repos(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<u32> {
|
||||
let store = agent_permissions::open_or_create(client).await?;
|
||||
let (record, _, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, agent).await?;
|
||||
Ok(max_repos_of(agent, &record))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The stored permissions as the API shows them.
|
||||
fn view(v: AgentPermissions) -> Permissions {
|
||||
Permissions {
|
||||
permissions: v.permissions,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: v.unrestricted_internet,
|
||||
internet_log: v.internet_log,
|
||||
max_repos: v.max_repos,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -249,6 +288,12 @@ async fn put_with(
|
|||
if let Some(perms) = &req.permissions {
|
||||
unique(perms).map_err(|why| refuse(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &why)))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(n) = req.max_repos.filter(|n| *n > MAX_REPOS) {
|
||||
return Err(refuse(error_problem(
|
||||
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
&format!("max_repos {n} is more than the {MAX_REPOS} an agent may be given"),
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let client = queue(&state).map_err(|r| refuse(refused(r)))?;
|
||||
if !live(&state).await.map_err(refuse)?.contains(&agent) {
|
||||
return Err(refuse(error_problem(
|
||||
|
|
@ -283,6 +328,9 @@ async fn put_with(
|
|||
.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?
|
||||
{
|
||||
tracing::info!(%agent, ?value, "set agent permissions");
|
||||
if value.max_repos != current.max_repos {
|
||||
MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notify_one();
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !revoking {
|
||||
mirror(leaves, &agent, &before, &after)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
|
|
@ -333,12 +381,15 @@ async fn delete_with(
|
|||
let (current, revision, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, &agent)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?;
|
||||
// Only the flags outlive a clear: dropping `unrestricted_internet`
|
||||
// would turn an agent created with `false` on, and dropping
|
||||
// `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced one.
|
||||
// Only the flags and the repository limit outlive a clear: dropping
|
||||
// `unrestricted_internet` would turn an agent created with `false` on,
|
||||
// dropping `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced
|
||||
// one, and a limit is an operator's decision about repositories, not
|
||||
// part of the permission list.
|
||||
let kept = AgentPermissions {
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: current.unrestricted_internet,
|
||||
internet_log: current.internet_log,
|
||||
max_repos: current.max_repos,
|
||||
..AgentPermissions::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
mirror(leaves, &agent, &held(¤t), &held(&kept))
|
||||
|
|
@ -438,6 +489,7 @@ pub(crate) fn at_create(
|
|||
permissions: perms,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -467,6 +519,7 @@ fn merged_at_create(
|
|||
} else {
|
||||
current.internet_log
|
||||
},
|
||||
max_repos: value.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -810,7 +863,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
use axum::http::StatusCode;
|
||||
use hive_types::Permission;
|
||||
use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
|
||||
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply};
|
||||
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS};
|
||||
|
||||
fn stored(json: &str) -> swarm_wire::agent_permissions::AgentPermissions {
|
||||
serde_json::from_str(json).expect("decodes")
|
||||
|
|
@ -821,6 +874,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: None,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet,
|
||||
internet_log,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -886,6 +940,99 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent's repository limit is its own: a change to one agent's leaves
|
||||
/// every other agent at its limit, a `PUT` that leaves the field out and a
|
||||
/// `DELETE` keep it, and a limit above the range is refused.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn an_agents_repo_limit_is_its_own_and_survives_other_changes() {
|
||||
use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
|
||||
use swarm_wire::wanted::AgentState;
|
||||
|
||||
let nats = TestNats::start();
|
||||
let client = nats.client().await;
|
||||
let state = crate::agent_limits::tests::declared(&client).await;
|
||||
WantedWriter::new(client.clone())
|
||||
.set("pr1ma", "iris", AgentState::Up)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("declare iris");
|
||||
let limit = |n| Permissions {
|
||||
max_repos: Some(n),
|
||||
..Permissions::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 0);
|
||||
// A change wakes the forge pass; drain stale wakes first.
|
||||
while tokio::time::timeout(
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_millis(1),
|
||||
super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.is_ok()
|
||||
{}
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
put(&state, "atlas", limit(3))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("set")
|
||||
.0
|
||||
.max_repos,
|
||||
Some(3)
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
|
||||
tokio::time::timeout(
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
|
||||
super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("the change wakes the forge pass");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
"another agent's limit is not changed"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let _ = put(&state, "iris", limit(7)).await.expect("set");
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(), 7);
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
|
||||
|
||||
// A PUT without the field, and a DELETE, keep the limit.
|
||||
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", granted()).await.expect("set");
|
||||
assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.max_repos, Some(3));
|
||||
delete_agent_permissions(State(state.clone()), Path("atlas".to_owned()))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("cleared");
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
|
||||
|
||||
let problem = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS + 1))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect_err("over the range");
|
||||
assert_eq!(problem.status, Some(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST), "{problem:?}");
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
|
||||
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("control: the top of the range is stored");
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), MAX_REPOS);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A stored limit above the range, as a hand edit could leave it, reads as
|
||||
/// none rather than as that many repositories.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_stored_limit_above_the_range_reads_as_none() {
|
||||
let read = |json: &str| super::max_repos_of("atlas", &stored(json));
|
||||
assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":5000}"#), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(read("{}"), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":7}"#), 7, "control: in range");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A create keeps the stored limit and does not set one.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_create_keeps_the_repo_limit() {
|
||||
let current = stored(r#"{"max_repos":4}"#);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
super::merged_at_create(&stored("{}"), ¤t, true).max_repos,
|
||||
Some(4)
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(super::at_create(None, None).expect("valid").max_repos, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn published(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(client)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
|
|
@ -902,6 +1049,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: Some(vec![Permission::ManageRootAgent]),
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: None,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -947,6 +1095,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: Some(Vec::new()),
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: None,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", none.clone()).await.expect("set");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
|
|
@ -975,6 +1124,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: None,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
|
||||
internet_log: Some(true),
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let stored = put(&state, "atlas", log.clone()).await.expect("set").0;
|
||||
assert_eq!(stored, log);
|
||||
|
|
@ -997,6 +1147,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: None,
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: Some(true),
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", on.clone()).await.expect("set");
|
||||
let off = Permissions {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1144,6 +1295,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
|
|||
permissions: Some(perms.to_vec()),
|
||||
unrestricted_internet: None,
|
||||
internet_log: None,
|
||||
max_repos: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ use crate::webhook::DeliveryKind;
|
|||
use swarm_secret_client::stored_secret::StoredSecret;
|
||||
use swarm_wire::review_classifier::Commit;
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod agent_max_repos;
|
||||
pub mod agent_token;
|
||||
mod api;
|
||||
mod base_pulls;
|
||||
|
|
@ -749,27 +750,29 @@ impl Client {
|
|||
/// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the
|
||||
/// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Then locks the account out of creating repos
|
||||
/// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
|
||||
/// Then limits the account ([`Self::limit_agent_account`]) to `max_repos`
|
||||
/// repositories and no organizations, whether it was just created or
|
||||
/// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
|
||||
/// a failure fails the node. Leaves an existing account's email as it
|
||||
/// finds it.
|
||||
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
|
||||
self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
|
||||
self.limit_agent_account(agent, max_repos).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Set `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`'s account. Agents create repos
|
||||
/// through the hive, never with their own token — a write-scoped token
|
||||
/// can otherwise create and own a repo and self-merge in it, bypassing
|
||||
/// the operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push,
|
||||
/// PRs and clone keep working.
|
||||
/// Set `max_repo_creation = max_repos` and `allow_create_organization =
|
||||
/// false` on `agent`'s account. At 0 an agent creates repos only through
|
||||
/// the hive, never with its own token; above 0 a write-scoped token can
|
||||
/// create and own that many repos and self-merge in them, bypassing the
|
||||
/// operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push, PRs and
|
||||
/// clone keep working. An account that may not create organizations cannot
|
||||
/// get around the limit by making an organization to own repos in.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The PATCH itself is unconditional rather than verify-then-patch:
|
||||
/// Forgejo's API never returns `max_repo_creation` (it is a field of
|
||||
/// `EditUserOption` only, not of `User`), so there is no current value
|
||||
/// to compare against, and setting 0 on an account already at 0 is a
|
||||
/// no-op. But `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
|
||||
/// to compare against, and setting the same value again is a no-op. But
|
||||
/// `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
|
||||
/// account named `agent` exists — a 409 folds with no read at all, and
|
||||
/// a 422's follow-up `user_get` only confirms the username, not that
|
||||
/// swarm-controller created it — so before that PATCH this reads the
|
||||
|
|
@ -781,31 +784,35 @@ impl Client {
|
|||
/// name collided with an account this node didn't create, so it fails
|
||||
/// the node rather than sending the PATCH (or silently skipping) to an
|
||||
/// account nobody verified is agent-controlled.
|
||||
async fn disable_repo_creation(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn limit_agent_account(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let user = self
|
||||
.api
|
||||
.call(|api| api.user_get(agent).into_future())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before locking it down"))?;
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before limiting it"))?;
|
||||
let expected = agent_email(agent);
|
||||
let legacy = legacy_agent_email(agent);
|
||||
if !matches!(user.email.as_deref(), Some(e) if e == expected || e == legacy) {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!(
|
||||
"forge account `{agent}` exists but is not this agent's (email {:?}, expected \
|
||||
`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to lock it down",
|
||||
`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to limit it",
|
||||
user.email
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.api
|
||||
.call(|api| {
|
||||
api.admin_edit_user(agent, repo_creation_lockdown(agent))
|
||||
api.admin_edit_user(agent, agent_account_lockdown(agent, max_repos))
|
||||
.into_future()
|
||||
})
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| {
|
||||
format!("disable repo creation for forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = 0)")
|
||||
format!("limit forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = {max_repos})")
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
tracing::info!(%agent, "swarm forge: disabled repo creation (max_repo_creation = 0)");
|
||||
tracing::info!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
max_repos,
|
||||
"swarm forge: limited the account (max_repo_creation, no organizations)"
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -2167,7 +2174,7 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
|
|||
|
||||
/// Canonical email for an agent's Forgejo account, set by
|
||||
/// [`Client::create_agent_user`] at creation and checked by
|
||||
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
|
||||
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
|
||||
/// format string as `hive-c0re::forge::users::agent_email` — not called
|
||||
/// across the crate boundary (see this module's doc comment), but both
|
||||
/// creators use this exact value, so it doubles as the
|
||||
|
|
@ -2179,7 +2186,7 @@ fn agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
|
|||
|
||||
/// The email older hive-created agent accounts carry, and keep: nothing
|
||||
/// rewrites it to [`agent_email`]. Accepted by
|
||||
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
|
||||
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
|
||||
/// such an account is still recognised as the agent's own.
|
||||
fn legacy_agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
|
||||
format!("{agent}@hive.local")
|
||||
|
|
@ -2215,6 +2222,17 @@ fn repo_creation_lockdown(agent: &str) -> EditUserOption {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// [`repo_creation_lockdown`] for an agent's account: `max_repos` repositories
|
||||
/// instead of none, and no organizations. The service accounts that share the
|
||||
/// lockdown stay at none and are not touched on organizations.
|
||||
fn agent_account_lockdown(agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> EditUserOption {
|
||||
EditUserOption {
|
||||
allow_create_organization: Some(false),
|
||||
max_repo_creation: Some(i64::from(max_repos)),
|
||||
..repo_creation_lockdown(agent)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already
|
||||
/// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422
|
||||
/// (validation) — match both defensively, same as
|
||||
|
|
@ -2842,10 +2860,11 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
async fn a_created_agent_user_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
|
||||
let (client, seen) = stub_forge((201, "{}"), own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false);
|
||||
let set: Vec<&str> = body
|
||||
.as_object()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
|
|
@ -2853,11 +2872,35 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
.filter(|(_, v)| !v.is_null())
|
||||
.map(|(k, _)| k.as_str())
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
assert_eq!(set, ["login_name", "max_repo_creation", "source_id"]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
set,
|
||||
[
|
||||
"allow_create_organization",
|
||||
"login_name",
|
||||
"max_repo_creation",
|
||||
"source_id"
|
||||
]
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["login_name"], "alice");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["source_id"], 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agent's limit is what goes out as `max_repo_creation`, on a created
|
||||
/// account and an existing one alike, and organizations stay refused at any
|
||||
/// limit.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_agents_limit_is_what_the_account_is_set_to() {
|
||||
for create in [(201, "{}"), (409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#)] {
|
||||
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(create, own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 3).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 3, "{create:?}");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false, "{create:?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An account that already existed is locked down too: the node is
|
||||
/// re-run, and an account created before this lockdown existed must
|
||||
/// not keep repo creation just because the create step folded to
|
||||
|
|
@ -2872,7 +2915,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2891,7 +2934,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
|
||||
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
|
||||
assert!(msg.contains("max_repo_creation"), "{msg}");
|
||||
|
|
@ -2915,7 +2958,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
|
||||
|
||||
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
|
||||
assert!(msg.contains("alice"), "{msg}");
|
||||
|
|
@ -2945,7 +2988,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2963,7 +3006,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
|
||||
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
223
swarm-controller/src/forge/agent_max_repos.rs
Normal file
223
swarm-controller/src/forge/agent_max_repos.rs
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
|||
//! Each existing agent's forge account at its own repository limit.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The limit is the `max_repos` of the agent's record in `agent-permissions`
|
||||
//! (`swarm_wire::agent_permissions`). A new account gets it from its
|
||||
//! `CreateForgeUser` node. This pass reaches the others: at start, when a
|
||||
//! change of an agent's `max_repos` wakes it
|
||||
//! ([`crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED`]), and every
|
||||
//! [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`] over every agent that holds a store identity.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Forgejo never returns an account's `max_repo_creation`, so nothing can be
|
||||
//! compared against the forge. The pass remembers what it applied to each agent
|
||||
//! in this process and applies again only what differs, so a restart applies
|
||||
//! every agent's limit once, and an agent whose edit failed is retried at the
|
||||
//! next tick. The decision is pure ([`plan`]), so the tests pin it.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::Client;
|
||||
|
||||
/// How often [`spawn`] re-checks every agent.
|
||||
const RECONCILE_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(5);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The agents of `desired` whose account is not known to be at their limit,
|
||||
/// with that limit.
|
||||
pub fn plan(
|
||||
desired: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
|
||||
applied: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
|
||||
) -> Vec<(String, u32)> {
|
||||
desired
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.filter(|(agent, limit)| applied.get(*agent) != Some(limit))
|
||||
.map(|(agent, limit)| (agent.clone(), *limit))
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One pass: set each limit of `todo` on its agent's account, recording the
|
||||
/// ones the forge took in `applied`. An agent the forge refuses is logged and
|
||||
/// left out, so the next pass plans it again.
|
||||
async fn apply(client: &Client, todo: &[(String, u32)], applied: &mut BTreeMap<String, u32>) {
|
||||
for (agent, limit) in todo {
|
||||
match client.limit_agent_account(agent, *limit).await {
|
||||
Ok(()) => {
|
||||
applied.insert(agent.clone(), *limit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
limit,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"agent max repos: the forge account was not updated; retrying next pass"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every roster agent's limit. An agent whose record can't be read is left
|
||||
/// out, so nothing is applied for it this pass.
|
||||
async fn desired(queue: &async_nats::Client, roster: &[String]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
|
||||
let mut limits = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
for agent in roster {
|
||||
match crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent).await {
|
||||
Ok(limit) => {
|
||||
limits.insert(agent.clone(), limit);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
|
||||
%agent,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"agent max repos: the agent's limit was not read; skipping it this pass"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
limits
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Apply every agent's limit now and again on each wake and tick. A pass that
|
||||
/// fails is logged and retried on the next tick; it never stops the daemon.
|
||||
pub fn spawn(client: Arc<Client>, queue: async_nats::Client) {
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(RECONCILE_INTERVAL);
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
tokio::select! {
|
||||
_ = ticker.tick() => {}
|
||||
() = crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified() => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let roster = match super::docs_grant::read_roster().await {
|
||||
Ok(roster) => roster,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "agent max repos: no roster; retrying next tick");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
applied.retain(|agent, _| roster.contains(agent));
|
||||
let todo = plan(&desired(&queue, &roster).await, &applied);
|
||||
if todo.is_empty() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tracing::info!(agents = todo.len(), "agent max repos: applying the limits");
|
||||
super::within_forge_deadline("agent max repos", apply(&client, &todo, &mut applied))
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
fn limits(of: &[(&str, u32)]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
|
||||
of.iter().map(|(a, n)| ((*a).to_owned(), *n)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent at another value, or not yet applied, is planned with its own
|
||||
/// limit; one already at its limit is not.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn plan_names_the_agents_not_at_their_limit() {
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 5)]);
|
||||
let applied = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 1)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
plan(&desired, &applied),
|
||||
[("iris".to_owned(), 0), ("sock".to_owned(), 5)]
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Control: everything applied at its limit leaves nothing to do.
|
||||
assert!(plan(&desired, &desired).is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A stand-in forge on a loopback port that answers each agent's own
|
||||
/// email and records every admin edit as (login, body).
|
||||
async fn stub_agents() -> (
|
||||
Client,
|
||||
Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode, Uri, header::CONTENT_TYPE};
|
||||
|
||||
let edits: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>> = Arc::default();
|
||||
let recorded = Arc::clone(&edits);
|
||||
let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(
|
||||
move |method: Method, uri: Uri, body: axum::body::Bytes| {
|
||||
let recorded = Arc::clone(&recorded);
|
||||
async move {
|
||||
let login = uri.path().rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or_default().to_owned();
|
||||
let body = match method {
|
||||
Method::GET => format!(r#"{{"email":"{login}@hyperhive.local"}}"#),
|
||||
Method::PATCH => {
|
||||
let json = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
recorded.lock().unwrap().push((login, json));
|
||||
"{}".to_owned()
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => "{}".to_owned(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
(StatusCode::OK, [(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")], body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("http://{}/", listener.local_addr().unwrap())).unwrap();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await });
|
||||
let api = crate::forge::api::tests::fixed(url.clone(), "stub-token");
|
||||
(Client { api, url }, edits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Each agent gets its own limit, none is skipped and none takes another's;
|
||||
/// each is recorded as applied, and a second plan has nothing left.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_pass_sets_each_agent_its_own_limit() {
|
||||
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 9)]);
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
|
||||
apply(&client, &plan(&desired, &applied), &mut applied).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut seen: Vec<(String, i64, bool)> = edits
|
||||
.lock()
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|(login, body)| {
|
||||
(
|
||||
login.clone(),
|
||||
body["max_repo_creation"].as_i64().unwrap(),
|
||||
body["allow_create_organization"] == false,
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
seen.sort();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
seen,
|
||||
[
|
||||
("atlas".to_owned(), 4, true),
|
||||
("iris".to_owned(), 0, true),
|
||||
("sock".to_owned(), 9, true)
|
||||
]
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(applied, desired);
|
||||
assert!(plan(&desired, &applied).is_empty());
|
||||
// One agent's changed limit plans that agent alone.
|
||||
let changed = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 1), ("sock", 9)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(plan(&changed, &applied), [("iris".to_owned(), 1)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An agent whose edit the forge refuses is not recorded, so the next pass
|
||||
/// plans it again.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn a_refused_agent_is_planned_again() {
|
||||
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
apply(&client, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
|
||||
// Control: an account that is the agent's own is recorded.
|
||||
assert_eq!(applied.get("atlas"), Some(&2));
|
||||
assert_eq!(edits.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
let (broken, _seen) = super::super::tests::stub_forge(
|
||||
(200, "{}"),
|
||||
(200, r#"{"email":"someone@example.com"}"#),
|
||||
(200, "{}"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
|
||||
apply(&broken, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
|
||||
assert!(applied.is_empty(), "a refused agent must not be recorded");
|
||||
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2)]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(plan(&desired, &applied), [("atlas".to_owned(), 2)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ impl Client {
|
|||
|
||||
/// The store's `hive-agent-*` cert-auth roles: exactly the agents that hold a
|
||||
/// store identity.
|
||||
async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||
pub(super) async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
|
||||
let store = crate::store::connect()
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
#[test]
|
||||
fn an_agent_called_hive_x_is_not_hive_xs_account() {
|
||||
// Both ways round: the hive job refuses the agent's account, and the
|
||||
// agent's own guard (`disable_repo_creation`) refuses the hive's,
|
||||
// agent's own guard (`limit_agent_account`) refuses the hive's,
|
||||
// because neither accepts the other's email.
|
||||
let login = forge::hive_login("alpha");
|
||||
for agents in [
|
||||
|
|
@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
client
|
||||
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha")
|
||||
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha", 0)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect_err("the hive's account is not the agent's");
|
||||
assert!(lockdown_patch(&seen, "hive-alpha").is_none());
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ use super::{
|
|||
folds_into_success, is_ambiguous_validation_failure, is_confirmed_conflict,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. Agents can't create repos with
|
||||
/// their own token (`max_repo_creation = 0`); a repo an agent asks for is
|
||||
/// created here and the agent added as a **write** member (not owner/admin).
|
||||
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. An agent can create repos with
|
||||
/// its own token only up to its own `max_repos` (default 0, so none); a repo
|
||||
/// an agent asks for is created here and the agent added as a **write**
|
||||
/// member (not owner/admin).
|
||||
/// Because the org, not the agent, owns the repo, perms stay centrally
|
||||
/// managed and branch protection (referencing [`OPERATORS_TEAM`]) can block
|
||||
/// the author from merging their own PR.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -393,7 +393,13 @@ async fn run_node_work(
|
|||
.to_owned(),
|
||||
),
|
||||
Some(client) => {
|
||||
match forge_node("create_forge_user", client.ensure_agent_user(&agent)).await {
|
||||
let max_repos = agent_max_repos_limit(deps.queue.as_ref(), &agent).await;
|
||||
match forge_node(
|
||||
"create_forge_user",
|
||||
client.ensure_agent_user(&agent, max_repos),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(()) => Outcome::Done,
|
||||
Err(e) => Outcome::Failed(format!("{e:#}")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -554,6 +560,26 @@ async fn mint_forge_token(
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The repository limit a new agent account is created at: the `max_repos` of
|
||||
/// the agent's permissions record, or none (0) when there is no queue or it
|
||||
/// cannot be read. The forge pass in `forge::agent_max_repos` raises the
|
||||
/// account to its limit once the queue answers.
|
||||
async fn agent_max_repos_limit(queue: Option<&async_nats::Client>, agent: &str) -> u32 {
|
||||
let Some(queue) = queue else {
|
||||
return swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS;
|
||||
};
|
||||
crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
|
||||
"swarm jobq: the agent's repository limit is unreadable; creating the account at none"
|
||||
);
|
||||
swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The `GrantDocsRead` arm, lifted out for the same reason.
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn grant_docs_read(
|
||||
forge: Option<Arc<forge::Client>>,
|
||||
|
|
@ -2031,6 +2057,29 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A new agent's account is created at the limit of its own record, not
|
||||
/// another agent's, and at none when it has no record or there is no queue.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn a_new_account_is_created_at_its_agents_limit() {
|
||||
let nats = crate::test_nats::TestNats::start();
|
||||
let client = nats.client().await;
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 0);
|
||||
let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(&client)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("bucket");
|
||||
store
|
||||
.put("iris", br#"{"max_repos":4}"#.to_vec().into())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("written");
|
||||
store
|
||||
.put("atlas", br#"{"max_repos":9}"#.to_vec().into())
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("written");
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 4);
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "sock").await, 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(None, "iris").await, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_state(
|
||||
sched: &hive_jobq::scheduler::Scheduler<SwarmNodeKind, super::SwarmResourceKind>,
|
||||
rev: &str,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more
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Reference in a new issue