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agents get a per-agent repo limit in their permissions record, orgs are locked

max_repos (default 0, 0..=100) lives in the agent's agent-permissions record and is edited on its permissions panel. The controller applies each agent's own value as max_repo_creation at CreateForgeUser and to existing accounts on change, restart and every five minutes; agent accounts may not create organizations.
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-11-15 20:47:21 +01:00 • committed by mara
commit 1edeb5c55d
23 changed files with 763 additions and 58 deletions

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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ checkpoints**, not about sandboxing the agent from its own tools:
- **Operator merges, not the agent** — an agent may _push_ branches, but a
**human (the operator) merges the PR**, keeping a person in the loop on the
highest-value action. On the **internal forge this is technically enforced,
not just convention**: agents can't create repos (`max_repo_creation = 0`),
not just convention**: agents can't create repos by default (next bullet),
and `main` on an `agent-configs/<name>` repo carries swarm-controller's
branch protection: merge and approval allowlisted to the `operators` team,
which swarm-controller converges on every config repo. An operator's merge
@ -129,6 +129,15 @@ checkpoints**, not about sandboxing the agent from its own tools:
settings nor merge its own PR. It's **not** set up for external VCS (GitHub
etc.), though — there, operator-merge is process + accepted risk, not a
technical control.
- **Repo creation is a per-agent setting, default 0** — the _repositories_ badge
in an agent's card sets how many repos that agent's forge account may create
(`max_repos` in its permissions record, Forgejo's `max_repo_creation`, 0 to
100). The operator must raise it for that agent before it may create any. Agents never create organizations: the
controller turns that off on every agent account. A repo an agent creates is
its own, so the operator-merge gate doesn't cover it, and the agent can add a
CI workflow to it. CI workflows run unsandboxed on the CI runner, which is
arbitrary code on the runner host. Allow repo creation only for agents you
would trust with that.
- **Operator sign-off** — config changes are config PRs an operator merges
on the forge (see
[`persistence.md`](persistence.md#config-changes)), and

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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ by a test). swarm-controller mints every agent token with it:
| `write:repository` | Create, clone, push, delete repos; merge PRs. |
| `write:issue` | Open / comment / review issues **and** pull requests (Forgejo namespaces PR conversation under issues). |
| `write:user` | Edit own profile, create repos under own user. |
| `write:organization` | Create + manage orgs (lets agents share a forge namespace). |
| `write:organization` | Manage orgs the agent belongs to. The forge refuses to create one: agent accounts may not. |
| `read:user` | Token-owner endpoint used for self-identification at harness startup. |
| `write:misc` | Hooks, attachments, the rest of the long tail. |
| `read:notification` | Poll `GET /notifications` for unread events. |

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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Deadline: hive-forge stops after HIVE_FORGE_DEADLINE seconds (default 900), prin
* `comment-show` — Print the body (or full JSON) of a single comment by id
* `comment-edit` — Edit an existing comment by id
* `clone` — Clone a forge repo (default `-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with credentials autoinjected. Pairs with `pr create --agit`
* `repo-create` — Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0)
* `repo-create` — Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default)
* `repo-add-collaborator` — Add a collaborator to the active repo (`-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with a permission level. Companion to `repo-create`
* `repo-labels` — List every label defined on the repo (name + description), optionally filtered by a name substring
* `repo-search` — Search the forge for repositories by keyword, topic, or description
@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ Clone a forge repo (default `-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with credentials autoinjecte
## `hive-forge repo-create`
Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0)
Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default)
**Usage:** `hive-forge repo-create [OPTIONS] <NAME>`

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@ -224,9 +224,11 @@ plain comment show under `last comment`, not `reviews`.
### Repo management
Agent accounts can't create repos: swarm-controller sets their
repo-creation limit to 0 (see `docs/2-handbook/agents/security.md`), so
an operator merge stays the only path to main. Ask the operator to
Agent accounts can't create repos unless the operator allows it for that
agent: swarm-controller sets the account's repo-creation limit to the
agent's own `max_repos`, which is 0 until the operator raises it (see
`docs/2-handbook/agents/security.md`), so an operator merge stays the only
path to main. Ask the operator to
create the repo (for example `agents/<name>`) and add you as a
collaborator. Forgejo also disables push-to-create.

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@ -817,6 +817,21 @@ The agent's **internet** access is its own row beside it: a badge reading
restricted, log or unrestricted. Selecting it lists the three modes; picking one does a
`PUT` of the mode with the stored permissions beside it.
The **repositories** row is how many repositories the agent's forge account may
create: a badge reading none or `up to N`, in the warning tone above 0. Selecting
it opens a number box, 0 to 100, and **save** does a `PUT` of `max_repos` with the
stored permissions beside it. A `PUT` that leaves `max_repos` out, and the `DELETE`
of **use the default**, keep it. Nothing stored means 0, and the box warns that an
agent that may create repositories can add a CI workflow to them, CI workflows run
unsandboxed on the CI runner, and that makes it arbitrary code on the runner host.
The controller sets the value as Forgejo's `max_repo_creation` on that agent's
account: on a new one at creation, and on an existing one within seconds of a save
and again after every restart. It also turns off creating organizations on every
agent account, whatever the number. Forgejo never reports `max_repo_creation`
back, so the controller's log (`agent max repos`) is the record of what it applied
to each agent. The controller tries an agent whose account the forge refuses again
every five minutes.
A saved change isn't instant. The hive reads the grant about every 30 seconds
and the agent takes it at its next turn. A change to `manage_root_agent`
restarts the agent after its current turn. The card reads

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@ -340,6 +340,15 @@ explicit `unrestricted_internet: false`; read the pair with
`DELETE` keeps it. A hive that doesn't read the field sees `false` and enforces
the list. The proxy's handling is under _Log mode_ in [the egress proxy](../../4-implementation/networking/network.md#egress-proxy-squid).
**Repository limit** — the record also carries `max_repos`, how many repositories
the agent's forge account may create, 0 to 100. An absent value is 0. Only the
controller reads it: it sets the account's Forgejo `max_repo_creation` from it at
`CreateForgeUser`, and again for an existing account within seconds of a change,
at every start and every five minutes (`forge::agent_max_repos`). It also turns
off creating organizations on every agent account. A `PUT` that leaves the field
out, a `DELETE`, and a re-create keep the stored value; the route refuses more
than 100.
**How a change applies** —
- The agent's harness reads its own key every 10 seconds and builds every
turn's `--tools`, `--allowedTools` and MCP config from the last value, so a

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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { AgentLimits } from "./AgentLimits.js";
import {
AgentInternet,
AgentPermissions,
AgentRepos,
useGrant,
} from "./AgentPermissions.js";
import { AllowedDomains } from "./AllowedDomains.js";
@ -223,6 +224,10 @@ function GrantRows({ agent }: { agent: string }) {
<dd>
<AllowedDomains key={agent} agent={agent} />
</dd>
<dt>repositories</dt>
<dd>
{g.grant === null ? g.loading : <AgentRepos agent={agent} g={g} />}
</dd>
<dt>permissions</dt>
<dd>
{g.grant === null ? (

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@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
// <AgentPermissions> and <AgentInternet> — one agent's grant in an opened agent
// card: the permissions it holds, and how far its traffic may leave the host.
// Each is a badge that opens a control under it, which saves as soon as it
// <AgentPermissions>, <AgentInternet> and <AgentRepos> — one agent's grant in an
// opened agent card: the permissions it holds, how far its traffic may leave
// the host, and how many repositories its forge account may create. Each is a badge that opens a control under it, which saves as soon as it
// changes.
//
// Both read `GET /api/agents/{name}/permissions`, which answers the stored
// grant as `{ permissions?, unrestricted_internet?, internet_log? }` (`{}` when
// grant as `{ permissions?, unrestricted_internet?, internet_log?, max_repos? }` (`{}` when
// the swarm sets none, so the agent runs on the default set). The permissions
// control offers the catalogue from `GET /api/permissions` as checkboxes and
// PUTs the ticked ones, a PUT replacing the stored value whole. A selection
// equal to the default set DELETEs instead, as the create form sends nothing
// for it: the agent then follows the default if that changes. The internet
// control PUTs the mode with the stored list beside it. The route's refusal
// control PUTs the mode with the stored list beside it, and the repositories
// control the limit the same way. The route's refusal
// shows as it arrives, in the control.
//
// Their state belongs to one agent: callers key them by agent name, so
@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ import { BadgePopover } from "../../ui/badge-popover/BadgePopover.js";
import { Button } from "../../ui/button/Button.js";
import { BadgeSkeleton } from "../../ui/skeleton/BadgeSkeleton.js";
import { Hint } from "../../ui/hint/Hint.js";
import { TextField } from "../../ui/text-field/TextField.js";
import { MultiselectFilterOptions } from "../../ui/multiselect-filter/MultiselectFilter.js";
import {
requestPermissions,
@ -34,6 +36,10 @@ import {
internetBody,
internetMode,
internetSummary,
MAX_REPOS,
maxReposBody,
parseMaxRepos,
reposSummary,
type InternetMode,
} from "./permissions.js";
import "./AgentLimits.css";
@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ interface Grant {
permissions?: string[];
unrestricted_internet?: boolean;
internet_log?: boolean;
max_repos?: number;
}
// Mirrors swarm-controller's `Catalogue` (`GET /api/permissions`).
@ -302,3 +309,72 @@ export function AgentInternet({ agent, g }: { agent: string; g: GrantState }) {
</div>
);
}
export function AgentRepos({ agent, g }: { agent: string; g: GrantState }) {
const { grant, busy, saveError, loading, send } = g;
// The box as typed; null shows the stored limit.
const [typed, setTyped] = useState<string | null>(null);
if (grant === null) return loading;
const stored = grant.max_repos ?? 0;
const text = typed ?? String(stored);
const parsed = parseMaxRepos(text);
async function save(e: Event) {
e.preventDefault();
if (parsed === null) return;
const ok = await send({
method: "PUT",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(maxReposBody(grant?.permissions, parsed)),
});
// The grant was read again, or the change refused: show what is stored.
if (ok) setTyped(null);
}
return (
<div class="ui-agent-limits">
<BadgePopover
label="repositories"
value={reposSummary(grant.max_repos)}
tone={stored === 0 ? "neutral" : "warning"}
title={`how many repositories ${agent}'s forge account may create`}
popoverLabel={`${agent} repository limit`}
>
<p class="ui-badge-popover-help">
How many repositories {agent}'s forge account may create, 0 to{" "}
{MAX_REPOS}. 0 means none. The swarm applies a change to the account
within seconds.
</p>
<p class="ui-badge-popover-help" role="note">
<strong>Warning:</strong> an agent that may create repositories can
add a CI workflow to them, and CI workflows run unsandboxed on the CI
runner. That is arbitrary code on the runner host. Only allow this for
agents you would trust with that.
</p>
<form onSubmit={(e) => void save(e)}>
<TextField
id={`max-repos-${agent}`}
label="repositories"
type="number"
value={text}
onInput={setTyped}
/>
<Button
variant="primary"
type="submit"
disabled={busy || parsed === null || parsed === stored}
>
{busy ? "saving…" : "save"}
</Button>
</form>
{saveError ? (
<ApiErrorPanel
context="the repository limit was not saved"
problem={saveError}
/>
) : null}
</BadgePopover>
</div>
);
}

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@ -69,3 +69,38 @@ export function internetBody(
...(mode === "log" ? { internet_log: true as const } : {}),
};
}
/** The most `max_repos` may be set to; the route refuses more. */
export const MAX_REPOS = 100;
/**
* The repository limit a typed value stands for, or null when it is not a
* whole number from 0 to {@link MAX_REPOS}.
*/
export function parseMaxRepos(text: string): number | null {
const t = text.trim();
if (!/^\d+$/.test(t)) return null;
const n = Number(t);
return n <= MAX_REPOS ? n : null;
}
/** What the repositories badge shows: an absent limit is none. */
export function reposSummary(stored: number | undefined): string {
return stored === undefined || stored === 0 ? "none" : `up to ${stored}`;
}
/**
* The `PUT` body that sets the repository limit. A `PUT` without
* `permissions` resets a stored list to the default, so the stored list goes
* along, as in {@link internetBody}; the internet fields are left out, which
* keeps them.
*/
export function maxReposBody(
stored: string[] | undefined,
n: number,
): { permissions?: string[]; max_repos: number } {
return {
...(stored === undefined ? {} : { permissions: stored }),
max_repos: n,
};
}

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@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ import {
internetBody,
internetMode,
internetSummary,
MAX_REPOS,
maxReposBody,
parseMaxRepos,
reposSummary,
} from "../src/agent/detail/permissions.ts";
const all = ["messaging", "meta", "inbox", "execution", "manage_root_agent"];
@ -79,3 +83,29 @@ test("the log mode keeps the old flag false and names internet_log; the others l
assert.equal("internet_log" in internetBody([], "restricted"), false);
assert.equal("internet_log" in internetBody([], "unrestricted"), false);
});
test("a whole number from 0 to the most is a repository limit", () => {
assert.equal(parseMaxRepos("0"), 0);
assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(" 7 "), 7);
assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(String(MAX_REPOS)), MAX_REPOS);
});
test("anything else is not: empty, negative, fractional, above the most, text", () => {
for (const t of ["", " ", "-1", "1.5", "1e2", String(MAX_REPOS + 1), "x"]) {
assert.equal(parseMaxRepos(t), null, JSON.stringify(t));
}
});
test("the repositories badge tells none from a limit", () => {
assert.equal(reposSummary(undefined), "none");
assert.equal(reposSummary(0), "none");
assert.equal(reposSummary(3), "up to 3");
});
test("the limit's body carries the stored list, so the PUT does not reset it", () => {
assert.deepEqual(maxReposBody(["meta"], 3), {
permissions: ["meta"],
max_repos: 3,
});
assert.deepEqual(maxReposBody(undefined, 0), { max_repos: 0 });
});

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@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ enum Verb {
/// credentials autoinjected. Pairs with `pr create --agit`.
Clone(verbs::clone::Args),
/// Create a forge repo under the current user (or `--org`). Prints
/// the repo URL. Agent accounts can't create repos (limit 0).
/// the repo URL. Agent accounts create repos only up to their own limit (0 by default).
RepoCreate(verbs::repo_create::Args),
/// Add a collaborator to the active repo (`-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`)
/// with a permission level. Companion to `repo-create`.

View file

@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
//!
//! Wraps `POST /api/v1/user/repos` (or `/orgs/{org}/repos`). For accounts
//! that may create repos (operators, non-agent users). Agent accounts
//! cannot: swarm-controller sets their repo-creation limit to 0, and
//! Forgejo reports that as a bare 500 on the user path, which
//! cannot unless the operator allows it: swarm-controller sets their
//! repo-creation limit to the agent's own `max_repos` (0 by default), and Forgejo
//! reports a used-up limit as a bare 500 on the user path, which
//! `explain_create_error` turns into a message naming the operator path.
//! The instance has push-to-create disabled, so `git push` to a
//! non-existent repo 403s. Pairs with `clone` and `repo-add-collaborator`.
@ -57,9 +58,10 @@ fn explain_create_error(org: Option<&str>, err: ForgejoError) -> anyhow::Error {
}
anyhow::anyhow!(
"this account most likely cannot create repositories (the forge answered 500, which is \
how Forgejo reports a repo-creation limit of 0). On hyperhive, agent accounts are \
locked to 0 by design, so an operator merge stays the only path to main. Ask the \
operator to create the repo (for example `agents/<name>`) and add you as a collaborator."
how Forgejo reports a used-up repo-creation limit, 0 included). On hyperhive, agent \
accounts are locked to 0 unless the operator raises its limit, so an operator merge stays \
the only path to main. Ask the operator to create the repo (for example \
`agents/<name>`) and add you as a collaborator."
)
}

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@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ pub struct Permissions {
/// out keeps the stored value.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub internet_log: Option<bool>,
/// How many repositories the agent's forge account may create, 0 to 100.
/// Absent in a `GET` means the swarm never set it, which counts as 0.
/// Absent in a `PUT` keeps the stored value. An agent that may create
/// repositories can add a CI workflow to them, and CI workflows run
/// unsandboxed on the CI runner.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "schema", schema(example = 0, minimum = 0, maximum = 100))]
pub max_repos: Option<u32>,
}
#[cfg(test)]
@ -47,6 +55,7 @@ mod tests {
permissions: Some(vec![]),
unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
},
r#"{"permissions":[]}"#,
),
@ -55,6 +64,7 @@ mod tests {
permissions: None,
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
},
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false}"#,
),
@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ mod tests {
permissions: None,
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: Some(true),
max_repos: None,
},
r#"{"unrestricted_internet":false,"internet_log":true}"#,
),
@ -71,9 +82,17 @@ mod tests {
permissions: Some(vec![Permission::Messaging, Permission::ManageRootAgent]),
unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
},
r#"{"permissions":["messaging","manage_root_agent"]}"#,
),
(
Permissions {
max_repos: Some(3),
..Permissions::default()
},
r#"{"max_repos":3}"#,
),
] {
assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&value).unwrap(), wire);
assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Permissions>(wire).unwrap(), value);

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@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ use swarm_controller_api::permissions::Permissions;
use swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions;
use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{
AgentPermissions, Import, ImportReply, hive_from_import_subject, import_subject_wildcard,
AgentPermissions, DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS, Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS, hive_from_import_subject,
import_subject_wildcard,
};
use utoipa::ToSchema;
@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
const MAX_ATTEMPTS: usize = 5;
/// The permissions to store for `req`, whose list is already checked. The list
/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` left out keeps the one in
/// `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
/// replaces the stored one; `unrestricted_internet` and `max_repos` left out
/// keep the ones in `current`. `internet_log` is stored only as `true`, and a request that sets
/// `unrestricted_internet` without it turns it off: an agent that moves to
/// unrestricted and back to restricted does not come back logging.
fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions {
@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ fn into_stored(req: Permissions, current: &AgentPermissions) -> AgentPermissions
permissions: req.permissions,
unrestricted_internet: req.unrestricted_internet.or(current.unrestricted_internet),
internet_log,
max_repos: req.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
}
}
@ -78,12 +80,49 @@ pub(crate) fn unique(perms: &[Permission]) -> Result<(), String> {
Ok(())
}
/// Woken when an agent's `max_repos` changes, so the forge pass applies it at
/// once instead of at its next tick. A wake with no pass waiting is kept for
/// the next one.
pub(crate) static MAX_REPOS_CHANGED: tokio::sync::Notify = tokio::sync::Notify::const_new();
/// The repository limit `record` sets: its `max_repos`, or
/// [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`] when it has none. A value above [`MAX_REPOS`], as a
/// hand edit could leave, reads as the default with a warning: the stricter
/// reading.
fn max_repos_of(agent: &str, record: &AgentPermissions) -> u32 {
match record.max_repos {
None => DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS,
Some(n) if n <= MAX_REPOS => n,
Some(n) => {
tracing::warn!(
agent,
n,
"the stored repository limit is out of range; using the default"
);
DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
}
}
}
/// `agent`'s repository limit: what its record sets, or [`DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS`]
/// when it has no record. A record that does not decode reads as none. Opens
/// the bucket, which the controller creates at start anyway.
///
/// # Errors
/// The queue could not be read.
pub(crate) async fn max_repos(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<u32> {
let store = agent_permissions::open_or_create(client).await?;
let (record, _, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, agent).await?;
Ok(max_repos_of(agent, &record))
}
/// The stored permissions as the API shows them.
fn view(v: AgentPermissions) -> Permissions {
Permissions {
permissions: v.permissions,
unrestricted_internet: v.unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: v.internet_log,
max_repos: v.max_repos,
}
}
@ -249,6 +288,12 @@ async fn put_with(
if let Some(perms) = &req.permissions {
unique(perms).map_err(|why| refuse(error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &why)))?;
}
if let Some(n) = req.max_repos.filter(|n| *n > MAX_REPOS) {
return Err(refuse(error_problem(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
&format!("max_repos {n} is more than the {MAX_REPOS} an agent may be given"),
)));
}
let client = queue(&state).map_err(|r| refuse(refused(r)))?;
if !live(&state).await.map_err(refuse)?.contains(&agent) {
return Err(refuse(error_problem(
@ -283,6 +328,9 @@ async fn put_with(
.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?
{
tracing::info!(%agent, ?value, "set agent permissions");
if value.max_repos != current.max_repos {
MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notify_one();
}
if !revoking {
mirror(leaves, &agent, &before, &after)
.await
@ -333,12 +381,15 @@ async fn delete_with(
let (current, revision, _) = read_or_default::<AgentPermissions>(&store, &agent)
.await
.map_err(|e| queue_problem(&e))?;
// Only the flags outlive a clear: dropping `unrestricted_internet`
// would turn an agent created with `false` on, and dropping
// `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced one.
// Only the flags and the repository limit outlive a clear: dropping
// `unrestricted_internet` would turn an agent created with `false` on,
// dropping `internet_log` would turn a logging agent into an enforced
// one, and a limit is an operator's decision about repositories, not
// part of the permission list.
let kept = AgentPermissions {
unrestricted_internet: current.unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: current.internet_log,
max_repos: current.max_repos,
..AgentPermissions::default()
};
mirror(leaves, &agent, &held(&current), &held(&kept))
@ -438,6 +489,7 @@ pub(crate) fn at_create(
permissions: perms,
unrestricted_internet,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
})
}
@ -467,6 +519,7 @@ fn merged_at_create(
} else {
current.internet_log
},
max_repos: value.max_repos.or(current.max_repos),
}
}
@ -810,7 +863,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use hive_types::Permission;
use swarm_secret_client::observability::Grant;
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply};
use swarm_wire::agent_permissions::{Import, ImportReply, MAX_REPOS};
fn stored(json: &str) -> swarm_wire::agent_permissions::AgentPermissions {
serde_json::from_str(json).expect("decodes")
@ -821,6 +874,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: None,
unrestricted_internet,
internet_log,
max_repos: None,
}
}
@ -886,6 +940,99 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
);
}
/// An agent's repository limit is its own: a change to one agent's leaves
/// every other agent at its limit, a `PUT` that leaves the field out and a
/// `DELETE` keep it, and a limit above the range is refused.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_agents_repo_limit_is_its_own_and_survives_other_changes() {
use crate::wanted::WantedWriter;
use swarm_wire::wanted::AgentState;
let nats = TestNats::start();
let client = nats.client().await;
let state = crate::agent_limits::tests::declared(&client).await;
WantedWriter::new(client.clone())
.set("pr1ma", "iris", AgentState::Up)
.await
.expect("declare iris");
let limit = |n| Permissions {
max_repos: Some(n),
..Permissions::default()
};
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 0);
// A change wakes the forge pass; drain stale wakes first.
while tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_millis(1),
super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
)
.await
.is_ok()
{}
assert_eq!(
put(&state, "atlas", limit(3))
.await
.expect("set")
.0
.max_repos,
Some(3)
);
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
super::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified(),
)
.await
.expect("the change wakes the forge pass");
assert_eq!(
super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(),
0,
"another agent's limit is not changed"
);
let _ = put(&state, "iris", limit(7)).await.expect("set");
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "iris").await.unwrap(), 7);
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
// A PUT without the field, and a DELETE, keep the limit.
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", granted()).await.expect("set");
assert_eq!(get(&state, "atlas").await.max_repos, Some(3));
delete_agent_permissions(State(state.clone()), Path("atlas".to_owned()))
.await
.expect("cleared");
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
let problem = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS + 1))
.await
.expect_err("over the range");
assert_eq!(problem.status, Some(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST), "{problem:?}");
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), 3);
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", limit(MAX_REPOS))
.await
.expect("control: the top of the range is stored");
assert_eq!(super::max_repos(&client, "atlas").await.unwrap(), MAX_REPOS);
}
/// A stored limit above the range, as a hand edit could leave it, reads as
/// none rather than as that many repositories.
#[test]
fn a_stored_limit_above_the_range_reads_as_none() {
let read = |json: &str| super::max_repos_of("atlas", &stored(json));
assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":5000}"#), 0);
assert_eq!(read("{}"), 0);
assert_eq!(read(r#"{"max_repos":7}"#), 7, "control: in range");
}
/// A create keeps the stored limit and does not set one.
#[test]
fn a_create_keeps_the_repo_limit() {
let current = stored(r#"{"max_repos":4}"#);
assert_eq!(
super::merged_at_create(&stored("{}"), &current, true).max_repos,
Some(4)
);
assert_eq!(super::at_create(None, None).expect("valid").max_repos, None);
}
pub(crate) async fn published(client: &async_nats::Client, agent: &str) -> Option<String> {
let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(client)
.await
@ -902,6 +1049,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: Some(vec![Permission::ManageRootAgent]),
unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
}
}
@ -947,6 +1095,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: Some(Vec::new()),
unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
};
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", none.clone()).await.expect("set");
assert_eq!(
@ -975,6 +1124,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: None,
unrestricted_internet: Some(false),
internet_log: Some(true),
max_repos: None,
};
let stored = put(&state, "atlas", log.clone()).await.expect("set").0;
assert_eq!(stored, log);
@ -997,6 +1147,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: None,
unrestricted_internet: Some(true),
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
};
let _ = put(&state, "atlas", on.clone()).await.expect("set");
let off = Permissions {
@ -1144,6 +1295,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
permissions: Some(perms.to_vec()),
unrestricted_internet: None,
internet_log: None,
max_repos: None,
}
}

View file

@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ use crate::webhook::DeliveryKind;
use swarm_secret_client::stored_secret::StoredSecret;
use swarm_wire::review_classifier::Commit;
pub mod agent_max_repos;
pub mod agent_token;
mod api;
mod base_pulls;
@ -749,27 +750,29 @@ impl Client {
/// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the
/// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists).
///
/// Then locks the account out of creating repos
/// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
/// Then limits the account ([`Self::limit_agent_account`]) to `max_repos`
/// repositories and no organizations, whether it was just created or
/// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
/// a failure fails the node. Leaves an existing account's email as it
/// finds it.
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
self.limit_agent_account(agent, max_repos).await
}
/// Set `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`'s account. Agents create repos
/// through the hive, never with their own token — a write-scoped token
/// can otherwise create and own a repo and self-merge in it, bypassing
/// the operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push,
/// PRs and clone keep working.
/// Set `max_repo_creation = max_repos` and `allow_create_organization =
/// false` on `agent`'s account. At 0 an agent creates repos only through
/// the hive, never with its own token; above 0 a write-scoped token can
/// create and own that many repos and self-merge in them, bypassing the
/// operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push, PRs and
/// clone keep working. An account that may not create organizations cannot
/// get around the limit by making an organization to own repos in.
///
/// The PATCH itself is unconditional rather than verify-then-patch:
/// Forgejo's API never returns `max_repo_creation` (it is a field of
/// `EditUserOption` only, not of `User`), so there is no current value
/// to compare against, and setting 0 on an account already at 0 is a
/// no-op. But `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
/// to compare against, and setting the same value again is a no-op. But
/// `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
/// account named `agent` exists — a 409 folds with no read at all, and
/// a 422's follow-up `user_get` only confirms the username, not that
/// swarm-controller created it — so before that PATCH this reads the
@ -781,31 +784,35 @@ impl Client {
/// name collided with an account this node didn't create, so it fails
/// the node rather than sending the PATCH (or silently skipping) to an
/// account nobody verified is agent-controlled.
async fn disable_repo_creation(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
pub(crate) async fn limit_agent_account(&self, agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> Result<()> {
let user = self
.api
.call(|api| api.user_get(agent).into_future())
.await
.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before locking it down"))?;
.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before limiting it"))?;
let expected = agent_email(agent);
let legacy = legacy_agent_email(agent);
if !matches!(user.email.as_deref(), Some(e) if e == expected || e == legacy) {
anyhow::bail!(
"forge account `{agent}` exists but is not this agent's (email {:?}, expected \
`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to lock it down",
`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to limit it",
user.email
);
}
self.api
.call(|api| {
api.admin_edit_user(agent, repo_creation_lockdown(agent))
api.admin_edit_user(agent, agent_account_lockdown(agent, max_repos))
.into_future()
})
.await
.with_context(|| {
format!("disable repo creation for forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = 0)")
format!("limit forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = {max_repos})")
})?;
tracing::info!(%agent, "swarm forge: disabled repo creation (max_repo_creation = 0)");
tracing::info!(
%agent,
max_repos,
"swarm forge: limited the account (max_repo_creation, no organizations)"
);
Ok(())
}
@ -2167,7 +2174,7 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
/// Canonical email for an agent's Forgejo account, set by
/// [`Client::create_agent_user`] at creation and checked by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
/// format string as `hive-c0re::forge::users::agent_email` — not called
/// across the crate boundary (see this module's doc comment), but both
/// creators use this exact value, so it doubles as the
@ -2179,7 +2186,7 @@ fn agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
/// The email older hive-created agent accounts carry, and keep: nothing
/// rewrites it to [`agent_email`]. Accepted by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
/// [`Client::limit_agent_account`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`] so
/// such an account is still recognised as the agent's own.
fn legacy_agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
format!("{agent}@hive.local")
@ -2215,6 +2222,17 @@ fn repo_creation_lockdown(agent: &str) -> EditUserOption {
}
}
/// [`repo_creation_lockdown`] for an agent's account: `max_repos` repositories
/// instead of none, and no organizations. The service accounts that share the
/// lockdown stay at none and are not touched on organizations.
fn agent_account_lockdown(agent: &str, max_repos: u32) -> EditUserOption {
EditUserOption {
allow_create_organization: Some(false),
max_repo_creation: Some(i64::from(max_repos)),
..repo_creation_lockdown(agent)
}
}
/// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already
/// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422
/// (validation) — match both defensively, same as
@ -2842,10 +2860,11 @@ mod tests {
async fn a_created_agent_user_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge((201, "{}"), own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false);
let set: Vec<&str> = body
.as_object()
.unwrap()
@ -2853,11 +2872,35 @@ mod tests {
.filter(|(_, v)| !v.is_null())
.map(|(k, _)| k.as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(set, ["login_name", "max_repo_creation", "source_id"]);
assert_eq!(
set,
[
"allow_create_organization",
"login_name",
"max_repo_creation",
"source_id"
]
);
assert_eq!(body["login_name"], "alice");
assert_eq!(body["source_id"], 0);
}
/// The agent's limit is what goes out as `max_repo_creation`, on a created
/// account and an existing one alike, and organizations stay refused at any
/// limit.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_agents_limit_is_what_the_account_is_set_to() {
for create in [(201, "{}"), (409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#)] {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(create, own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 3).await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 3, "{create:?}");
assert_eq!(body["allow_create_organization"], false, "{create:?}");
}
}
/// An account that already existed is locked down too: the node is
/// re-run, and an account created before this lockdown existed must
/// not keep repo creation just because the create step folded to
@ -2872,7 +2915,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
@ -2891,7 +2934,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(msg.contains("max_repo_creation"), "{msg}");
@ -2915,7 +2958,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(msg.contains("alice"), "{msg}");
@ -2945,7 +2988,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
@ -2963,7 +3006,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
client.ensure_agent_user("alice", 0).await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);

View file

@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
//! Each existing agent's forge account at its own repository limit.
//!
//! The limit is the `max_repos` of the agent's record in `agent-permissions`
//! (`swarm_wire::agent_permissions`). A new account gets it from its
//! `CreateForgeUser` node. This pass reaches the others: at start, when a
//! change of an agent's `max_repos` wakes it
//! ([`crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED`]), and every
//! [`RECONCILE_INTERVAL`] over every agent that holds a store identity.
//!
//! Forgejo never returns an account's `max_repo_creation`, so nothing can be
//! compared against the forge. The pass remembers what it applied to each agent
//! in this process and applies again only what differs, so a restart applies
//! every agent's limit once, and an agent whose edit failed is retried at the
//! next tick. The decision is pure ([`plan`]), so the tests pin it.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use super::Client;
/// How often [`spawn`] re-checks every agent.
const RECONCILE_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(5);
/// The agents of `desired` whose account is not known to be at their limit,
/// with that limit.
pub fn plan(
desired: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
applied: &BTreeMap<String, u32>,
) -> Vec<(String, u32)> {
desired
.iter()
.filter(|(agent, limit)| applied.get(*agent) != Some(limit))
.map(|(agent, limit)| (agent.clone(), *limit))
.collect()
}
/// One pass: set each limit of `todo` on its agent's account, recording the
/// ones the forge took in `applied`. An agent the forge refuses is logged and
/// left out, so the next pass plans it again.
async fn apply(client: &Client, todo: &[(String, u32)], applied: &mut BTreeMap<String, u32>) {
for (agent, limit) in todo {
match client.limit_agent_account(agent, *limit).await {
Ok(()) => {
applied.insert(agent.clone(), *limit);
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
%agent,
limit,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"agent max repos: the forge account was not updated; retrying next pass"
),
}
}
}
/// Every roster agent's limit. An agent whose record can't be read is left
/// out, so nothing is applied for it this pass.
async fn desired(queue: &async_nats::Client, roster: &[String]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
let mut limits = BTreeMap::new();
for agent in roster {
match crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent).await {
Ok(limit) => {
limits.insert(agent.clone(), limit);
}
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
%agent,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"agent max repos: the agent's limit was not read; skipping it this pass"
),
}
}
limits
}
/// Apply every agent's limit now and again on each wake and tick. A pass that
/// fails is logged and retried on the next tick; it never stops the daemon.
pub fn spawn(client: Arc<Client>, queue: async_nats::Client) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(RECONCILE_INTERVAL);
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = ticker.tick() => {}
() = crate::agent_permissions::MAX_REPOS_CHANGED.notified() => {}
}
let roster = match super::docs_grant::read_roster().await {
Ok(roster) => roster,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "agent max repos: no roster; retrying next tick");
continue;
}
};
applied.retain(|agent, _| roster.contains(agent));
let todo = plan(&desired(&queue, &roster).await, &applied);
if todo.is_empty() {
continue;
}
tracing::info!(agents = todo.len(), "agent max repos: applying the limits");
super::within_forge_deadline("agent max repos", apply(&client, &todo, &mut applied))
.await;
}
});
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn limits(of: &[(&str, u32)]) -> BTreeMap<String, u32> {
of.iter().map(|(a, n)| ((*a).to_owned(), *n)).collect()
}
/// An agent at another value, or not yet applied, is planned with its own
/// limit; one already at its limit is not.
#[test]
fn plan_names_the_agents_not_at_their_limit() {
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 5)]);
let applied = limits(&[("atlas", 2), ("iris", 1)]);
assert_eq!(
plan(&desired, &applied),
[("iris".to_owned(), 0), ("sock".to_owned(), 5)]
);
// Control: everything applied at its limit leaves nothing to do.
assert!(plan(&desired, &desired).is_empty());
}
/// A stand-in forge on a loopback port that answers each agent's own
/// email and records every admin edit as (login, body).
async fn stub_agents() -> (
Client,
Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>>,
) {
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode, Uri, header::CONTENT_TYPE};
let edits: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>> = Arc::default();
let recorded = Arc::clone(&edits);
let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(
move |method: Method, uri: Uri, body: axum::body::Bytes| {
let recorded = Arc::clone(&recorded);
async move {
let login = uri.path().rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or_default().to_owned();
let body = match method {
Method::GET => format!(r#"{{"email":"{login}@hyperhive.local"}}"#),
Method::PATCH => {
let json = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or_default();
recorded.lock().unwrap().push((login, json));
"{}".to_owned()
}
_ => "{}".to_owned(),
};
(StatusCode::OK, [(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")], body)
}
},
);
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("http://{}/", listener.local_addr().unwrap())).unwrap();
tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await });
let api = crate::forge::api::tests::fixed(url.clone(), "stub-token");
(Client { api, url }, edits)
}
/// Each agent gets its own limit, none is skipped and none takes another's;
/// each is recorded as applied, and a second plan has nothing left.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_pass_sets_each_agent_its_own_limit() {
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 0), ("sock", 9)]);
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
apply(&client, &plan(&desired, &applied), &mut applied).await;
let mut seen: Vec<(String, i64, bool)> = edits
.lock()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.map(|(login, body)| {
(
login.clone(),
body["max_repo_creation"].as_i64().unwrap(),
body["allow_create_organization"] == false,
)
})
.collect();
seen.sort();
assert_eq!(
seen,
[
("atlas".to_owned(), 4, true),
("iris".to_owned(), 0, true),
("sock".to_owned(), 9, true)
]
);
assert_eq!(applied, desired);
assert!(plan(&desired, &applied).is_empty());
// One agent's changed limit plans that agent alone.
let changed = limits(&[("atlas", 4), ("iris", 1), ("sock", 9)]);
assert_eq!(plan(&changed, &applied), [("iris".to_owned(), 1)]);
}
/// An agent whose edit the forge refuses is not recorded, so the next pass
/// plans it again.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_agent_is_planned_again() {
let (client, edits) = stub_agents().await;
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
apply(&client, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
// Control: an account that is the agent's own is recorded.
assert_eq!(applied.get("atlas"), Some(&2));
assert_eq!(edits.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
let (broken, _seen) = super::super::tests::stub_forge(
(200, "{}"),
(200, r#"{"email":"someone@example.com"}"#),
(200, "{}"),
)
.await;
let mut applied = BTreeMap::new();
apply(&broken, &[("atlas".to_owned(), 2)], &mut applied).await;
assert!(applied.is_empty(), "a refused agent must not be recorded");
let desired = limits(&[("atlas", 2)]);
assert_eq!(plan(&desired, &applied), [("atlas".to_owned(), 2)]);
}
}

View file

@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ impl Client {
/// The store's `hive-agent-*` cert-auth roles: exactly the agents that hold a
/// store identity.
async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
pub(super) async fn read_roster() -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let store = crate::store::connect()
.await
.context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?;

View file

@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn an_agent_called_hive_x_is_not_hive_xs_account() {
// Both ways round: the hive job refuses the agent's account, and the
// agent's own guard (`disable_repo_creation`) refuses the hive's,
// agent's own guard (`limit_agent_account`) refuses the hive's,
// because neither accepts the other's email.
let login = forge::hive_login("alpha");
for agents in [
@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.await;
client
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha")
.ensure_agent_user("hive-alpha", 0)
.await
.expect_err("the hive's account is not the agent's");
assert!(lockdown_patch(&seen, "hive-alpha").is_none());

View file

@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ use super::{
folds_into_success, is_ambiguous_validation_failure, is_confirmed_conflict,
};
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. Agents can't create repos with
/// their own token (`max_repo_creation = 0`); a repo an agent asks for is
/// created here and the agent added as a **write** member (not owner/admin).
/// Forgejo org that owns agent-created repos. An agent can create repos with
/// its own token only up to its own `max_repos` (default 0, so none); a repo
/// an agent asks for is created here and the agent added as a **write**
/// member (not owner/admin).
/// Because the org, not the agent, owns the repo, perms stay centrally
/// managed and branch protection (referencing [`OPERATORS_TEAM`]) can block
/// the author from merging their own PR.

View file

@ -393,7 +393,13 @@ async fn run_node_work(
.to_owned(),
),
Some(client) => {
match forge_node("create_forge_user", client.ensure_agent_user(&agent)).await {
let max_repos = agent_max_repos_limit(deps.queue.as_ref(), &agent).await;
match forge_node(
"create_forge_user",
client.ensure_agent_user(&agent, max_repos),
)
.await
{
Ok(()) => Outcome::Done,
Err(e) => Outcome::Failed(format!("{e:#}")),
}
@ -554,6 +560,26 @@ async fn mint_forge_token(
}
}
/// The repository limit a new agent account is created at: the `max_repos` of
/// the agent's permissions record, or none (0) when there is no queue or it
/// cannot be read. The forge pass in `forge::agent_max_repos` raises the
/// account to its limit once the queue answers.
async fn agent_max_repos_limit(queue: Option<&async_nats::Client>, agent: &str) -> u32 {
let Some(queue) = queue else {
return swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS;
};
crate::agent_permissions::max_repos(queue, agent)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!(
agent,
error = %format!("{e:#}"),
"swarm jobq: the agent's repository limit is unreadable; creating the account at none"
);
swarm_wire::agent_permissions::DEFAULT_MAX_REPOS
})
}
/// The `GrantDocsRead` arm, lifted out for the same reason.
pub(crate) async fn grant_docs_read(
forge: Option<Arc<forge::Client>>,
@ -2031,6 +2057,29 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// A new agent's account is created at the limit of its own record, not
/// another agent's, and at none when it has no record or there is no queue.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_new_account_is_created_at_its_agents_limit() {
let nats = crate::test_nats::TestNats::start();
let client = nats.client().await;
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 0);
let store = swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::open_or_create(&client)
.await
.expect("bucket");
store
.put("iris", br#"{"max_repos":4}"#.to_vec().into())
.await
.expect("written");
store
.put("atlas", br#"{"max_repos":9}"#.to_vec().into())
.await
.expect("written");
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "iris").await, 4);
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(Some(&client), "sock").await, 0);
assert_eq!(agent_max_repos_limit(None, "iris").await, 0);
}
fn build_state(
sched: &hive_jobq::scheduler::Scheduler<SwarmNodeKind, super::SwarmResourceKind>,
rev: &str,

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