docs: the handbook follows the three layers: swarm, hives, agents
The handbook's sections were agent-lifecycle, integrations, swarm, tools, trust-boundary and web-ui, which do not follow how the system is built, so a reader could not tell which layer a page is about. Its pages now sit in swarm/, hives/ and agents/, with the accounts an agent can hold outside the system in external-accounts/. - swarm/: forge, matrix and the knowledge repo join the swarm pages, and so does the swarmctl reference. - hives/: the dashboard, hivectl and its reference, and the operator/agent boundary, with a README that takes over the old web-ui and tools pages. - agents/: the roster, persistence, config changes, the agent's own web page (was web-ui/agent) and the security model, with a README. - external-accounts/: GitHub and GitLab. Pages are moved whole; none is split yet. Every reference follows: relative links in the docs, `docs/2-handbook/...` paths in code comments, the nix checks that regenerate the CLI references and the ignore list, and docs/README.md, whose handbook section is now by layer.
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@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ smuggled out in resource attributes on an otherwise-legitimate export.
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That's a **different risk from the one the collector fixes**: an agent that
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held the upstream credential could do everything above _and_ use the token
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anywhere else. The collector removes the token and keeps the pipe. Agents are inside the trust
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boundary (`docs/2-handbook/trust-boundary/security.md`: capability = accepted risk), so an agent being
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boundary (`docs/2-handbook/agents/security.md`: capability = accepted risk), so an agent being
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able to _send_ is an accepted extension of that boundary — but it's not
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closed by this design, and don't read anything here as closing it.
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